Objectivity Sans Intelligibility. Hermann Weyl's Symbolic Constructivism by Toader, Iulian D.
OBJECTIVITY SANS INTELLIGIBILITY:
HERMANN WEYL’S SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTIVISM
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School
of the University of Notre Dame
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

















The general topic of this dissertation is the relation between concept formation
and the demand that scientific theories should provide an objective and intelligi-
ble account of natural phenomena, that is, an account that justifies their mind-
independent reality and, at the same time, renders them understandable. More
particularly, we consider the view of the mathematician and theoretical physicist
Hermann Weyl, that this twofold demand cannot be satisfied, for it pulls science in
opposite methodological directions, one driven by Husserl’s pure phenomenology,
the other by Hilbert’s axiomatic formalism.
According to Weyl, scientific understanding requires wholly contentual reason-
ing and the phenomenological method of concept formation, that is, that concepts
be introduced by abstraction from experience. Scientific objectivity requires partly
non-contentual or purely symbolic reasoning and the method of formal axiomat-
ics, that is, that concepts be freely created or introduced as mere symbols by
stipulating, under certain constraints, fundamental theoretical principles.
This view, which we call Weylean skepticism, is important not only because it
was propagated by one of the most influential scientists of the twentieth century,
but also because it indicates how the tension that Weyl saw between objectivity
and intelligibility can be dissolved.
Iulian D. Toader
We criticize, first, the attempt at dissolving this tension by adopting Husserl’s
pure phenomenological approach to scientific objectivity, which recently re-emerged
in the literature. On this approach, contentual reasoning is indispensable for ob-
jectivity, which entails, as Weyl emphasized, that scientific concepts without con-
tentual significance must be eliminated. We argue that Weyl realized that the
phenomenological approach fails to account for objectivity, since it also entails
the elimination of hypothetical elements, and so collapses into phenomenalism,
which can support only intersubjectivity.
Secondly, we analyze Weyl’s formal axiomatic approach to objectivity, and
examine the requirement of categoricity, i.e., that a scientific theory, as a system
of symbols, may provide objective knowledge only if its contentual interpretation is
univocal up to isomorphism. But we argue, on the one hand, that this requirement
fails to be satisfied in quantum physics, and that recent attempts at addressing
this failure render theories unable to account for natural phenomena that they
were designed to account for. On the other hand, we suggest that objectivity
without categoricity commits one to a modal dappling of the world, that is, to the
view that the structure of the real world spans many physically possible worlds.
Finally, we argue that the alleged tension between objectivity and intelligi-
bility can be dissolved through a formal axiomatic approach to understanding.
Against Weylean skepticism, we submit that the conditions under which purely
symbolic reasoning may render natural phenomena understandable are expressed
by the notions of simplicity and control. While the former can be conceived of
as syntactic elegance, the latter obtains if one shows, by contentual reasoning,
that the deviation from actual observations of results based on purely symbolic
reasoning is smaller than experimental error.
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INTRODUCTION: OBJECTIVITY AND UNDERSTANDING
Time and again the passion for understanding has led to the illusion that
man is able to comprehend the objective world rationally, by pure thought,
without any empirical foundations – in short, by metaphysics. I believe
that every true theorist is a kind of tamed metaphysicist, no matter how
pure a “positivist” he may fancy himself. The metaphysicist believes that
the logically simple is also the real. The tamed metaphysicist believes that
not all that is logically simple is embodied in experienced reality, but that
the totality of all sensory experience can be “comprehended” on the basis
of a conceptual system built on premises of great simplicity. The skeptic
will say that this is a “miracle creed.” Admittedly so, but it is a miracle
creed which has been borne out to an amazing extent by the development
of science.
Einstein1
1.1 The Goal of This Dissertation
It is reasonable to expect that scientific theories aim at providing an objective
and intelligible account of the natural phenomena to which they apply. This ex-
pectation is motivated by a demand of theoretical rationality to render these phe-
nomena understandable and, at the same time, to justify their mind-independent
reality. Nevertheless, the exact conditions required for the satisfaction of this
1Cf. Einstein 1950a, 342 (47).
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twofold demand (and whether they can be met) have been a matter of contro-
versy in the history of philosophy of science.
Berkeley, for example, not only argued that there is no mind-independent re-
ality, but also criticized science for failing to bring about understanding of natural
phenomena. He deplored the scientist’ use of quantities like fluxions and infinites-
imals, of which no clear and distinct ideas can be framed, and claimed that this
renders science unintelligible. Since Kant, however, many philosophers have ar-
gued that, although there is no knowable mind-independent reality, science can
offer an objective and intelligible account of natural phenomena, provided that
one assumes their mind-dependent reality.
No later than the first half of the twentieth century, the German mathemati-
cian and theoretical physicist Hermann Weyl held the view that objectivity and
intelligibility are fundamentally antagonistic epistemic ideals, which pull science
in opposite methodological directions – one driven by Husserl’s pure phenomenol-
ogy, the other by Hilbert’s axiomatic formalism. This view, which we may call
Weylean skepticism, is that modern science, to the extent that it strives to attain
objectivity, i.e., to provide knowledge about the mind-independent reality, may do
so only at the expense of intelligibility; and, vice versa, to the extent that it aims
at intelligibility, may do so only by sacrificing objectivity. To believe otherwise is
to endorse what Einstein called a “miracle creed.”
The goal of this dissertation is to articulate and evaluate the case that might
be made for Weylean skepticism, and the case that Weyl himself made for it.
This is important for at least two reasons. First, although the view underlies, as
will be shown here, the most characteristic aspect of his philosophical thinking,
it seems not to have been recognized by contemporary scholars working on Weyl.
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We want to bring this aspect here under full light. Secondly, and perhaps more
importantly, a careful analysis of his view should help us see what, if anything,
would prove capable of dissolving the tension Weyl saw between objectivity and
intelligibility, thereby giving support to the claim that scientific theories can help
us to understand natural phenomena, as well as to justify their mind-independent
reality.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, we first offer a brief intellectual
biography of Weyl, which is meant to emphasize the development of his philo-
sophical ideas that led to the view just described. Then, we give an outline of
the main argument that we take to support Weylean skepticism, and indicate two
ways of criticizing this argument: one via a pure phenomenological approach to
objectivity – an approach that will be rejected, the other via a formal axiomatic
approach to understanding – an approach that will be advocated.
1.2 Weyl’s Philosophical Portrait
Hermann Weyl (1885-1955) was a German mathematician and physicist, who
took his PhD under David Hilbert in Go¨ttingen in 1908, then pursued his career
as a Professor in Zu¨rich at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (1913-1930),
in Go¨ttingen as Hilbert’s successor (1930-1933), and in Princeton at the Institute
for Advanced Studies (1933-1950). He is now recognized as one of the greatest and
“probably the most influential mathematician of the twentieth century,” with fun-
damental contributions to most branches of mathematics.2 Weyl made important
contributions to theoretical physics as well. He further developed Einstein’s theory
of general relativity and articulated the application of group theory to quantum
2Cf. Borel 1986 (20), Penrose 1986 (144), Atiyah 1978 (2), Atiyah 2003 (3).
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physics.3 His “gauge-invariance” principle, in particular, has had a great impact
on the development of contemporary physics.4
Weyl was also active as a philosopher. Early in his career, he defended pred-
icativism and was attracted to phenomenological ideas. During one phase of his
foundational thinking, he also defended a version of intuitionism, but soon came
to have reservations. He departed from Husserl’s phenomenology, and became an
ally of Hilbert, only to see formalism, too, challenged by Go¨del’s incompleteness
results. Weyl ended up by suggesting a rather unsettled philosophical position
with respect to foundational matters.
This, at any rate, is how his philosophical work is generally portrayed.5 To be
sure, emphasizing certain stages in the evolution of Weyl’s philosophical thinking
has an undeniable expository value. In an autobiographical presentation, he too
noted:
I grew up a stern Cantorian dogmatist. Of Russell I had hardly heard
when I broke away from Cantor’s paradise; trained in a classical gym-
nasium, I could read Greek but not English. During a short vacation
spent together, I fell under the spell of Brouwer’s personality and ideas
and became an apostle of his intuitionism. Then followed Hilbert’s
heroic attempt, through a consistent formalisation ‘die Grundlagen-
fragen einfu¨rallemal aus der Welt zu schaffen,’ and then Go¨del’s great
discoveries. Move and countermove. No final solution is in sight.6
One cannot deny that, in a sense, Weyl was an unsettled philosopher. But it
is perhaps worth emphasizing that one could learn something important about
his philosophical thinking, as well as about the topics that preoccupied him, by
3Cf. Mackie 1988 (125), Speiser 1988 (175).
4Cf. Yang 1986 (224), Mielke and Hehl 1988 (134), Ryckman 2003 (158).
5Cf. Mancosu 1998 (128), Bell 2003 (11). See also Pesic 2009 (146), Wilczek 2009 (221).
6Manuscript Hs91a:17. Draft of a Princeton talk, delivered in December 1946.
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focusing on continuities, rather than on discontinuities, in his work. The analysis
of Weyl’s foundational writings shows that, despite the foundational moves and
countermoves that engaged him, there are philosophical ideas that pervade his
work from the earliest to the latest publications.
One could point out, for instance, that Weyl never actually relinquished his
predicativism, for he seems to have never changed his mind that this is the only
secure reconstruction of real analysis, acceptable in all honesty. Also, he never
really forwent his intuitionist advocacy, for he always maintained that constructive
mathematical proofs ought to be preferred to “transcendental” or “existential”
ones, i.e., to proofs that deploy unbounded existential quantification over infinite
domains. Phenomenology does not seem to have been entirely dismissed, either,
since Weyl always claimed that to properly believe that, and to understand why,
a proposition is true requires evidence, of the sort articulated and defended in
Husserl’s philosophy.
The main challenge for an analysis emphasizing such continuities in Weyl’s
thought is his conversion to Hilbert’s formalism. The conversion to formalism
is suggested by the following argument, presented by Weyl to the mathematical
seminar at the University of Hamburg, in 1927:
If Hilbert’s view prevails over intuitionism, which in all appearance
is the case, then I see in this a decisive defeat of the philosophical
position of pure phenomenology, which thus proves to be insufficient
for the understanding of creative science even in the area of cognition
that is most primal and most readily open to evidence – mathematics.7
7“Setzt sich die HILBERTsche Auffassung, wie das allem Anschein nach der Fall ist,
gegenu¨ber dem Intuitionismus durch, so erblicke ich darin eine entscheidende Niederlage der
philosophischen Einstellung reiner Pha¨nomenologie, die damit schon auf dem primitivsten und
der Evidenz noch am ehesten geo¨ffneten Erkenntnisgebiet, in der Mathematik, sich als unzure-
ichend fu¨r das Versta¨ndnis scho¨pferischer Wissenschaft erweist.” (Weyl 1928a, 149 (200))
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A careful analysis of this argument, an analysis that would help us draw Weyl’s
philosophical portrait more accurately, has to clarify his reasons for thinking that,
in the late 1920s, formalism had prevailed over intuitionism, as well as his reasons
for maintaining that this victory entails a defeat of pure phenomenology. This
clarification requires that the central elements (i.e., the notions of evidence and
scientific creativity) of Weyl’s assessment of these foundational views be carefully
explained. This will allow us to see why he came to the view that objectivity and
intelligibility are opposite epistemic ideals of science.
But one may immediately wonder whether Weyl had any substantial reasons
for thinking that formalism prevailed over intuitionism or whether he expressed,
rather, a mere hypothesis regarding what he thought would become the dominant
view in the foundations of mathematics. If the latter, then clearly Weyl’s argument
would be less than persuasive against a certain dismissive attitude of which Oskar
Becker had made him aware:
It seems to me almost certain that in the public opinion of the mathe-
maticians Hilbert, or presumably a semi-renewal of the old “existential
absolutism,” will prevail. In general, I would not think very much of
this public opinion, which always prefers mediocrity.8
At a first glance, what seems to have provided substantial reasons for Weyl’s
thinking that Hilbert won the dispute with intuitionism is the belief, shared by
many in the late 1920s, that a proof of the consistency of arithmetic was, or could
be, found. In a 1929 paper, Weyl wrote that this is “a concrete mathematical
problem which is not trivial, but at the same time is solvable,” and he added that,
8“Daß in der o¨ffentlichen Meinung der Mathematiker Hilbert, oder vermutlich irgend eine
halbe Erneuerung des alten “Existentialabsolutismus” siegen wird, scheint mir beinahe gewiss.
Ich wu¨rde an sich auf diese o¨ffentliche Meinung nichts geben, die ja immer nur das Mittelma¨ssige
bevorzugt.” Manuscript Hs91:475, published in Mancosu and Ryckman 2002 (130). Eng. tr. in
Mancosu 2002, 141 (129).
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in the case of classical analysis, the situation “remains serious, but not entirely
hopeless.”9 One might, accordingly, criticize Weyl’s argument by pointing out,
with hindsight, that the claim that Hilbert’s formalism prevailed over intuitionism
is simply false, for Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem shows precisely that
even weak fragments of arithmetic cannot prove their own consistency.
Against this criticism stand, of course, the various attempts to show that (at
least a revised form of) Hilbert’s foundational program can overcome Go¨del’s
challenge. As is well known, one such attempt proposed an extension of the type
of reasoning that may be used in a consistency proof, beyond the limits envisaged
by Hilbert.10 Another attempt argues, on the basis of certain epistemic criteria,
for a restriction of the mathematics that needs to be secured via a consistency
proof.11
But Weyl’s reasons for his reconciliation with Hilbert are different than the
ones motivating such attempts. Indeed, as he came to suspect that formalized
mathematics is a mere game with symbols on paper and, thus, incapable of bring-
ing about understanding, Weyl denied that a consistency proof would be enough
to vindicate formalism. Furthermore, in the face of Go¨del’s challenge, he argued
that a consistency proof is not required and that the formalist commitment to
finding one is unjustified. As we will see, his reconciliation with Hilbert can be
explained by paying attention to Weyl’s view about the role of mathematics in
physics. It is this view that led him to believe that objectivity and intelligibility
are fundamentally antagonistic epistemic ideals of science; or so we want to argue
here.
9Cf. Weyl 1929, 170 (202).
10Cf. Gentzen 1936 (73), 1938 (74).
11Cf. Detlefsen 1986 (38). Yet another attempt is represented by the so-called “reverse
mathematics” program. See Simpson 1999 (169).
7
1.3 An Outline of the Main Argument
The argument proceeds as follows. We start, in chapter two, with an analysis
of Weyl’s view about the conditions for belief and understanding in mathemat-
ics. In particular, we are interested in clarifying his criticism of an idea defended
by Dedekind, according to whom, in science, one should not believe a provable
proposition without proof, even if that proposition is intuitively evident. He be-
lieved that although evidence may be the proper basis for believing an unprovable
proposition, it is never the proper basis for believing a provable proposition. Weyl
criticized this view by maintaining that evidence is the most proper basis for be-
lief and by arguing that if a provable proposition is evident, then any attempt to
prove it is useless.
To clarify Weyl’s criticism, we first discuss Bolzano’s view, according to which,
understanding why a theorem is true requires an objective ordering of truths, one
based on proof, rather than on intuitive evidence. This position is then contrasted
with Schopenhauer’s view, according to which, understanding why a theorem is
true requires an ordering of truths based on intuitive evidence, rather than proof.
By criticizing the view defended by Dedekind, Weyl seems to have taken a position
similar to Schopenhauer’s. But to support this position Weyl adopted, as we
will see, Husserl’s conception that evidence is an experience (Erlebnis) of truth.
An experience of truth, unlike a feeling (Gefu¨hl) of inescapable certainty that a
proposition is true, is thought to be an epistemic achievement of the highest type,
characterized by the complete satisfaction of the meaning intentions expressed in
a proposition through the presentation in intuition of the intended objects. We
argue that it is this phenomenological conception of evidence that allowed Weyl
to allege that if a provable proposition is evident, then to properly believe that
8
proposition one is not required to prove it. For, on this conception, if one has an
experience of truth, then one has an unexcelled basis for belief.
But did Weyl believe that an experience of truth is also the proper basis for
understanding why a theorem is true? If so, wherein resides the ability of such
an experience to bring about understanding? This question leads to an analysis
of the relation between evidence and understanding. We will see that, despite
Weyl’s endorsement of the view that mathematical objects are creations of the
mind, he rejected the idea that evidence, conceived of as a feeling caused by one’s
creatorly experiences, is sufficient for understanding why a theorem is true. He
seems to have come to believe, on the one hand, that a feeling of evidence cannot
show why a theorem is true, since, as Husserl pointed out, it cannot even indi-
cate that the theorem is true. On the other hand, Weyl seems to have believed
that an experience of truth is indispensable for understanding, provided that such
an experience is admitted as a form of proof. An experience of truth may, how-
ever, be only admitted as a proof that follows the method of what Weyl called
“immanent” axiomatics (as opposed to what he called “transcendent” axiomat-
ics).12 In immanent axiomatics, as we will see, mathematical reasoning is wholly
contentual and proceeds from axioms formulated in terms of general concepts ob-
tained by abstraction from what is immediately presented in intuition. We argue
that, according to Weyl, understanding requires an immanent axiomatic proof,
i.e., a proof that provides a construction of the objects referred to in a theorem,
and thereby completely satisfies the meaning intentions expressed in the theorem.
Weyl’s view on mathematical understanding raises an important question
12Weyl’s actual term is “transcendental” axiomatics, but in order to better emphasize the
opposition to “immanent” and to avoid confusion with the philosophically established meaning
of “transcendental,” we use “transcendent” axiomatics throughout the dissertation.
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about the scientific relevance of large parts of modern mathematics. He main-
tained, for instance, that proofs that follow the method of transcendent axiomat-
ics – proofs that include transfinite components, such as unbounded existential
quantification over infinite domains – fail to bring about understanding: not only
can they not show why a theorem is true, they cannot even indicate that it is true.
In transcendent axiomatics, concepts are obtained not by abstraction from what
is presented in intuition, but freely created by the mind, and introduced as sym-
bols through the positing of the axioms under certain constraints, like consistency.
The use of such concepts, Weyl contended, entails that a transcendent axiomatic
proof cannot be seen as an experience of truth, since part of its reasoning – the
part involving transfinite components – is non-contentual or purely symbolic.
In chapter three, we reveal the source of Weylean skepticism, i.e., of the ten-
sion that Weyl saw between the conditions required for understanding and the
conditions required for objectivity, by clarifying why he maintained that the lat-
ter cannot be met without purely symbolic reasoning. We focus, first, on Weyl’s
critical reflections on traditional empiricist approaches to modern science, in par-
ticular on Hobbes’ constructivism. Weyl seems to have thought that any such
approach is marred by reliance on empiricist abstraction, for this method does
not allow the introduction of hypothetical elements, i.e., real but in principle un-
observable entities. This is why, on his view, traditional empiricism collapses into
phenomenalism, of the sort defended in Leibniz’ monadology, which, according to
Weyl, may account at most for intersubjectivity.
Afterwards, we discuss Weyl’s reflections on Fichte’s constructivism. Fichte
had rejected abstraction, in a reply to Kant, as a simply non-sensical method of
concept formation, and emphasized the freedom of the mind to create concepts in-
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dependently of perceptual experience. As we will see, this is why Weyl was quite
enthusiastic about Fichte’s view gradually developed in the Wissenschaftslehre.
But this view, as Weyl also pointed out, fails to provide a correct account of the
connection between freely created concepts and our experience, for it claims that
what can be known through perceptual experience coincides with what is freely
created by the mind and, thus, known independently of perceptual experience.
This entails that the Wissenschaftslehre actually embraces monadological phe-
nomenalism and, thus, according to Weyl, may offer only an inadequate account
of objectivity.
Finally, we present Husserl’s criticism of traditional empiricist abstraction, ac-
cording to which this fails to distinguish between an intending act of the mind and
an intended object. He argued that general concepts are introduced by abstrac-
tion from the relations between intending acts, rather than from the properties of
intended objects. This method of concept formation – the so-called “ideational”
abstraction – was used by Weyl, early in his career, for a development of Einstein’s
general relativity via a purely infinitesimal geometry. This development requires,
as we point out, the elimination of concepts abstracted from the relations between
intending acts that cannot be completely satisfied through the intuitive presenta-
tion of the intended objects (e.g., the concept of Riemannian congruence). This
elimination seems to have been justified by the fact that no scientific proposition
formulated in terms of such concepts could allow an experience of truth.
Weyl appears to have remained deeply committed to pure phenomenology, as
he later argued that a proposition is objective only if one knows that it remains
true when relativized to different coordinate systems. For, if one takes a coor-
dinate system as representing the perspective of transcendental subjectivity, as
11
Weyl did, then a proposition is objective only if one knows that it is true for any
transcendental subjectivity. Since, according to Husserl, experiencing the truth of
a proposition is enough for knowing that the proposition is true for any transcen-
dental subjectivity, Weyl’s view seems to have been that a proposition is objective
only if one can experience its truth. However, we argue that he ultimately rejected
this view, for he came to believe that the experience of truth cannot be a nec-
essary condition for objectivity, since it entails the elimination of hypothetical
elements. According to him, as we will see, the assumption of real but in prin-
ciple unobservable entities is indispensable for objectivity, as the only means for
overcoming phenomenalism. Thus, on what we take to be Weyl’s ultimate view,
Husserl’s phenomenology collapses into phenomenalism and may, therefore, just
like Hobbes’ and Fichte’s constructivisms, support at most intersubjectivity.
Objectivity, Weyl came to believe, requires that scientific concepts (like force,
energy, electromagnetic field, etc.) be freely created and introduced as mere sym-
bols through the positing of fundamental theoretical principles. This is, we submit,
the main belief that supports Weyl’s Hamburg argument quoted above. As we
already noted, however, Weyl made a strong claim that purely symbolic reasoning,
as in Hilbert’s transcendent axiomatics, fails to bring about understanding. Never-
theless, as we discuss in chapter four, Weyl also took the view that purely symbolic
reasoning should not, although it might, be considered a mere game with symbols.
For he maintained that mathematical concepts (including transfinite components)
partake in the theoretical construction of the mind-independent world, and they
do so in the same way as the scientific concepts (including hypothetical elements)
do. In other words, Weyl’s view seems to have been that, although it cannot have
any explanatory role, the method of transcendent axiomatics has an objectifying
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role: it is indispensable for scientific objectivity, i.e., for the formation of theories
that may provide knowledge about the mind-independent world.
However, a scientific theory, according to Weyl, may provide objective knowl-
edge only if it is categorical, i.e., only if the connection between a theory and its
domain of application is univocal up to isomorphism, where the criterion for uni-
vocality is expressed by the notion of concordance – the idea that all methods for
determining the value of a physical quantity must lead to the same result (within
the limits of experimental error). This view on objectivity entails a fundamen-
tal limitation of scientific knowledge, in the sense that only the relations between
mind-independent objects, and not these objects themselves, may be epistemically
accessible through natural science. This limitation indicates again the tension that
Weyl saw between scientific objectivity and intelligibility, since he took the latter,
as we emphasized already, to require that objects be immediately presented in in-
tuition. But his view on objectivity seems, all by itself, rather implausible, given
the mathematical-logical context of the 1920s and the 1930s, when, for various
reasons (the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem),
one came to believe that most first-order theories cannot be categorical. In fact,
Weyl himself realized that current scientific theories fail to satisfy the condition of
categoricity, and ultimately adopted a cautious attitude with regard to scientific
objectivity.
A significant challenge that seems to have determined Weyl to adopt this posi-
tion is raised by what can be taken as a failure of categoricity in quantum physics.
This failure is indicated, as we will explain in detail, by the existence of unitar-
ily inequivalent representations in quantum physics (e.g., in quantum mechanical
statistics and quantum field theory). Recently, however, several responses have
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been offered to this challenge. One response advocates the adjustment of these
theories through an elimination of unitarily inequivalent representations, which
is presumed to regain unitary equivalence. But we argue that this adjustment
encounters serious difficulties. In particular, it seems to render theories unable to
account for natural phenomena that they were designed to account for. Another
response proposes that instead of eliminating unitarily inequivalent representa-
tions, one should focus on the structure defined by the relations between the uni-
tarily inequivalent representations that describe physically possible worlds. We
argue that this response can support objectivity only if a criterion is found for
selecting the representations that describe physically possible worlds from those
representations that do not. If such a criterion is given, one is thereby committed
to the idea that the real world is modally dappled, in the sense that its structure
spans a whole range of physically possible worlds.
In the fifth and final chapter, we first summarize the argument supporting
Weylean skepticism, i.e., the view that objectivity and intelligibility are funda-
mentally antagonistic ideals of science. Then we focus on the connection between
free creation of concepts and scientific understanding, a connection that Weyl
seems to have denied. Our aim, admittedly of a rather programmatic character,
is to show that the tension that he saw between objectivity and intelligibility can
be dissolved, by arguing that partly non-contentual or purely symbolic reason-
ing, i.e., reasoning through scientific idealization, can render natural phenomena
understandable.
One condition that we claim is required for understanding is that idealization
be controlled via a proof of concordance, i.e., that one prove by contentual rea-
soning that the outcome of reasoning through idealization does not deviate from
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actual observations more than by what may be due to experimental error. But this
claim faces at least two criticisms. First, one might deny that a concordance proof
has any serious epistemic significance. In the face of the provability limitations
suggested by Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, Weyl actually contended
that the formalist commitment to proving logical consistency is unjustified, and
suggested that the mathematical logician should merely attempt to restore consis-
tency if a contradiction comes up, just like the physicist, who attempts to restore
concordance only when this is found to be lacking. This contention indicates,
however, that Weyl failed to see the epistemic significance of proving consistency
and concordance. Without such proofs, the reliability of purely symbolic reason-
ing, as well as its ability to bring about understanding, would be lost. Secondly,
one might claim that even if a concordance proof could be taken to control ide-
alization, this would be insufficient for understanding. But we point out that a
further requirement for understanding is that reasoning through idealization be
simpler, i.e., more thought-economical, than reasoning without idealization, and
argue that if this further requirement is satisfied, then one is justified to deploy
idealization in bringing about understanding if one can adequately justify as well
the belief that science strives to bring about understanding in the most efficient
way.
Our final conclusion is that Weylean skepticism is untenable, that it is rea-
sonable, rather than just a “miracle creed,” to expect that scientific theories can
provide an objective and intelligible account of natural phenomena, in the sense
indicated at the outset. As far as we are able to see, there is no undissolvable ten-
sion between the conditions required for scientific objectivity and the conditions
required for scientific understanding.
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Before we begin, we should note – and this is something to which many of
Weyl’s readers can no doubt testify – that his writing style does not always serve
the clear presentation of philosophical ideas. Hans Hahn was perhaps the first who
deplored the occasional obscurity of Weyl’s philosophical writing. In his review
of Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science, Hahn noted for instance that
“one certainly feels sometimes, in the middle of these often extremely poetical
expressions, a mild nostalgia for the neat symbols of logical calculus.”13 This
kind of reaction is entirely understandable. For it is far from clear how, e.g.,
turning our attention to the “life of the mind,” as Weyl recommended, would
help clarify anything about twentieth century physics and mathematics.14 Hahn
moved, however, from nostalgia to mistrust: “Most of what is discussed here
belongs to ... what cannot be said in dry formulas, but only in a beautiful style.”15
Indeed, sometimes one cannot but wish that Weyl had traded (at least some) style
for clarity. But we hope that the present dissertation succeeds in illuminating some
of the obscure aspects of his philosophical portrait.
13“Freilich empfindet man vielleicht manchesmal inmitten dieser oft poetisch schwunghaften
Sprache ein leises Heimweh nach der schlichten Symbolik des Logikkalku¨ls.” (Hahn 1928, 54f
(78))
14Part of what leads to obscurity is, perhaps, Weyl’s drawing on philosophical views that
philosophers of science would just too often overlook today. But the English translations of his
works (even where approved by Weyl himself, unfortunately) often enhance the obscurity. This
is the reason we have sometimes chosen to amend the existing translations or to simply offer
new ones.
15“Das meiste, wovon hier die Rede ist, geho¨rt ja zu dem, was ... nur in scho¨nem Stile, aber
nicht in trockenen Formeln sagbar ist.” (Hahn 1928, 55 (78))
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CHAPTER 2
EVIDENCE, BELIEF, AND UNDERSTANDING
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we analyze Weyl’s view on belief and understanding in mathe-
matics. In particular, we are interested in the relation between Weyl’s injunction
against Dedekind’s principle that, in science, one should not believe a provable
proposition without proof, and Weyl’s rejection of the maker’s knowledge view
of mathematical understanding, according to which one understands a theorem
because one has a feeling of evidence caused by one’s having produced the objects
that the theorem refers to. We aim to show that Weyl’s position, on both issues,
is supported by a Husserlian conception of evidence.
Dedekind emphasized, as we will see, that despite the suggestion to the con-
trary often made in mathematical education in the nineteenth century, intuitive
evidence is not a proper basis for believing a provable proposition, and he argued
that proof, and only proof, could be such a basis. Like Dedekind, Bolzano too
argued that evidence is not a proper basis for believing a provable proposition.
According to him, the proper basis for believing a provable proposition is proof,
because this is the only means for revealing the objective ordering of truths. By
revealing the objective ordering of truths, proof brings about at least one definite
epistemic gain: it does not merely indicate that a provable proposition is true, but
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it helps us understand why it is true. In opposition to this view, Schopenhauer
argued that mathematical proof could indeed help one understand why a theorem
is true, rather than merely indicate that it is true, but only if proof reveals an
ordering of truths based on intuitive evidence.
Like Schopenhauer, Weyl seems to have believed that understanding obtains
only if proof reveals an ordering of truths based on intuitive evidence. Unlike
Schopenhauer, however, Weyl endorsed the conception of evidence defended by
Husserl in his Logical Investigations. This suggests that, like Husserl, Weyl too
rejected the view that evidence is a “feeling” (Gefu¨hl), a psychological state of
compulsion to believe that a proposition is true. Husserl argued that evidence
is an epistemic achievement characterized as an “experience” (Erlebnis) of truth.
It is this type of experience, we submit, that Weyl thought was the proper basis
for believing a provable proposition. According to him, then, and against what
Bolzano and Dedekind seem to have maintained, it is useless to prove provable
propositions the truth of which can be experienced, for provability cannot render
an experience of truth an improper basis for belief. But we should note that
Weyl’s view does not entail that it is also useless to prove provable propositions
the truth of which falls short of experience.
This raises a question about the connection between understanding and the
experience of truth. In order to answer this question, we first clarify why Weyl
considered that the notion of understanding developed within the maker’s knowl-
edge tradition, as based on a characteristic feeling of evidence caused by one’s
creatorly experiences, is not sufficient to show why a mathematical theorem is
true. Following Husserl’s criticism of the view of evidence as a feeling, Weyl
seems to have believed that such a feeling is a merely psychological state, one
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that lacks epistemological significance. Afterwards, we argue that, on his view,
evidence, conceived of a` la Husserl as an experience of truth, is the proper basis
for understanding why a theorem is true provided that the experience of truth is
admitted as a form of proof. But an experience of truth can only be admitted as a
proof that follows the method of what Weyl called “immanent” axiomatics, i.e., a
proof in which reasoning is wholly contentual and general concepts are introduced
by abstraction from intuition. This view on understanding raises a question about
the epistemic significance of what Weyl called “transcendent” axiomatics, which
we further discuss in chapter four. It also raises a question about his view on
the nature of abstraction, as a method for introducing general concepts, which we
discuss in chapter three. Finally, as we will explain, it indicates a tension between
what he took to be the conditions required for understanding and the conditions
required for objectivity – a tension that, as we already suggested in chapter one,
is the source of Weylean skepticism.
2.2 Weyl on Dedekind on Believing Provable Propositions
In 1918, in his book on the foundations of real analysis, The Continuum, Weyl
announced a radical project:
It is not the purpose of this work to cover the “firm rock” on which the
house of analysis is founded with a fake wooden structure of formalism
– a structure which can fool the reader and, ultimately, the author into
believing that it is the true foundation. Rather, I shall show that this
house is to a large degree built on sand. I believe that I can replace this
shifting foundation with pillars of enduring strength. They will not,
however, support everything which today is generally considered to be
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securely grounded. I give up the rest, since I see no other possibility.1
Weyl attempted to show that a justification of Dedekind’s definition of the real
numbers as sets of rational numbers is possible only if certain restrictions are
imposed on what one admits as a definition. The version of analysis that emerged
starts from a basic category of mathematical objects – the natural numbers – as
immediately given in intuition, and extends this category by what Weyl called
the “mathematical process.” The fundamental feature of this process is that it
forbids impredicative definitions, i.e., definitions that make reference to sets of
objects in which the defined object is an element. This restriction entails, as Weyl
acknowledged, that some theorems of classical analysis, like the least upper bound
theorem for sets of real numbers, cannot be proved within his system of analysis.2
In a small footnote in the book, Weyl also recorded his disagreement with
Dedekind’s standard for believing what is mathematically provable:
In the Preface to the first edition of Dedekind’s famous Was sind und
was sollen die Zahlen?, we read that “In science, what is provable
ought not to be believed without proof.” This remark is certainly
characteristic of the way most mathematicians think. Nevertheless,
it is a perverse principle. As if such a mediate(d) concatenation of
grounds as what we call a “proof,” can awaken any “belief” without
our assuring ourselves, through immediate insight, of the correctness of
each individual step! This (and not the proof) remains throughout the
ultimate source of knowledge; it is the “experience of truth.” Whoever
1“In dieser Schrift handelt es sich nicht darum, den “sicheren Fels”, auf den das Haus der
Analysis gegru¨ndet ist, im Sinne des Formalismus mit einem ho¨lzernen Schaugeru¨st zu umkleiden
und nun dem Leser und am Ende sich selber weiszumachen: dies sei das eigentliche Fundament.
Hier wird vielmehr die Meinung vertreten, daß jenes Haus zu einem wesentlichen Teil auf Sand
gebaut ist. Ich glaube, diesen schwankenden Grund durch Stu¨tzen von zuverla¨ssiger Festigkeit
ersetzen zu ko¨nnen; doch tragen sie nicht alles, was man heute allgemein fu¨r gesichert ha¨lt; den
Rest gebe ich preis, weil ich keine andere Mo¨glichkeit sehe.” (Weyl 1918a, iii; Eng. tr., 1. (191))
2Cf. Weyl 1918a, 23; Eng. tr., 31f (191). For a detailed presentation and development of
Weyl’s predicativism, see Feferman 1988 (51), Feferman 1997 (52).
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approaches other disciplines, such as philosophy, in the manner of a
mathematician, demanding mathematical definitions and deductions,
proceeds no more sagaciously than a zoologist who rejects numbers on
the ground that they are not living beings.3
Although often quoted in the literature, this remark of Weyl’s has not really been
given the philosophical attention it deserves. Some authors refer to it in order
to emphasize the general importance of immediate insight or intuition in Weyl’s
overall thinking.4 Others think that the footnote reveals, more specifically, his
early adoption of a phenomenological approach to science and his criticism of
formal axiomatic approaches.5 Still others believe that it reveals Weyl’s adoption
of a conception of evidence as a feeling of inescapable certainty, inspired by Fichte.6
Nevertheless, we consider that Weyl’s remark and the reasoning behind it have
yet to be properly clarified.
What we should immediately note about this remark is that it makes two
claims at the same time. First, it criticizes the extension of the mathematical
standard for belief (or at least, the standard endorsed, according to Weyl, by
3““Was beweisbar ist, soll in der Wissenschaft nicht ohne Beweis geglaubt werden”, be-
ginnt die beru¨hmte Dedekindsche Schrift ‘Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?’ (Vorwort
zur 1. Auflage) Diese A¨ußerung ist gewiß charakteristisch fu¨r die Denkweise der meis-
ten Mathematiker, dennoch ist das ein verkehrtes Prinzip. Als ob ein solcher mittelbarer
Begru¨ndungszusammenhang, wie wir ihn als “Beweis” bezeichnen, irgend “Glauben” zu wecken
imstande ist, ohne daß wir uns der Richtigkeit jedes einzelnes Schrittes in unmittelbarer Einsicht
versichern! Diese (und nicht der Beweis) bleibt u¨berall letzte Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis, sie
ist das “Erlebnis der Wahrheit.” Wer als Mathematiker an andere Wissenschaften, etwa an die
Philosophie, mit der Forderung nach Definitionen und Deduktionen mathematischen Stils her-
antritt, handelt nicht klu¨ger, als wenn ein Zoologe die Zahlen ablehnte, weil sie keine lebenden
Wesen sind.” (Weyl 1918a, 11; Eng. tr., 119 (191).)
4Cf., e.g., Bell 2000 (10).
5Cf. Ryckman 1995, 834f (157). See also Ryckman 2005, ch. 5 (159). da Silva 1997 (34),
which is focused on the relationship between Husserl’s phenomenology and Weyl’s predicativism
does not mention the footnote. In Folina 2008, 38 (65), it is stated that Weyl’s remark shows
that his view on proof is “reminiscent of Descartes for whom the reason a proof is justificatory
has to do with the intuitive certainty, or evidence, of each step.” As we will see below, however,
Weyl’s notion of evidence is not Cartesian, but rather Husserlian.
6Cf. Sieroka 2010, 175 (168). As we show below, given Husserl’s criticism of the view of
evidence as a feeling, Weyl seems to have had reasons to reject this view, too.
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“most mathematicians”) to non-scientific disciplines. Secondly, it also criticizes
the application of this standard to scientific disciplines, to mathematics itself.
Weyl’s argument in support of the latter claim, directed against Dedekind, appears
to go as follows: mathematical proof can be a genuine source of knowledge only
if it “awakens” belief in the theorem that it proves. To awaken belief is, as Weyl
quite cryptically put it, to have an “experience” of truth. Thus, proof can be a
genuine source of knowledge only if it provides an experience of truth. This seems
to imply that the epistemic character of an experience of truth is such that, if
one has an experience of the truth of a provable proposition, then one already
has a proper basis for believing that proposition. Therefore, proving a provable
proposition the truth of which can be experienced is useless. Contrary to what
Dedekind seems to have suggested, it is misleading, even perverse, to claim that
one ought not to believe a provable proposition without proof.
What is, or might have been, the support for this argument? In particular,
why did Weyl think that an experience of truth, rather than proof, is the proper
basis for believing a provable proposition? Why did he believe, as against most
mathematicians, that provability could not render this type of experience an im-
proper basis for belief? And did he also think that an experience of truth is also
a proper basis for mathematical understanding? Most basically, perhaps, what is
an experience of truth?
Answering these questions requires an extensive investigation of the various
sources that influenced Weyl’s view on proof, evidence, and mathematical under-
standing. As we will see below, Husserl’s conception of evidence, as presented
in the Logical Investigations, seems to have had a major influence on this view.
Understanding Husserl’s conception helps us indeed to answer some of the ques-
22
tions just raised. In particular, it helps us to clarify Weyl’s argument against
Dedekind’s standard for scientific belief, but also his rejection of a maker’s knowl-
edge approach to mathematical understanding. But before we look more closely
at Husserl’s conception of evidence, however, we want to present in more de-
tail Dedekind’s view, and to also recall a view quite similar to it, defended by
Bolzano, who believed that if the probation of evident propositions is not found
to be impossible, in a certain sense, then it is obligatory.
2.3 Bolzano and Dedekind on Believing Provable Propositions
Dedekind’s principle, that “In science, what is provable ought not to be be-
lieved without proof” was initially intended as a motto to his 1888 book on arith-
metic, Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?.7 At the very least, this suggests
that the principle was thought to have a central significance for his logicist pro-
gram in the foundations of mathematics. According to this principle, the scientific
standard for belief is considered to be different from ordinary standards, in the
following way: one has a proper basis for believing that a provable proposition
is true only after the proposition has been proved. Dedekind did not deny that
one may believe a provable proposition without proof, as one surely does, but
only that believing it without proof may be considered adequate as a scientific
standard for belief.
Dedekind’s principle can be understood as a call to carefully separate what is,
from what is not, provable. For, the application of the proposed standard for belief
requires that one provide an adequate description of the epistemic conditions that
would allow one to realize that a proposition is unprovable, i.e., that it is, as he
7See Dedekind’s letter to H. Weber from November 19, 1878; Dedekind 1932, 486 (37).
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put it, “a pure law of thought.” It is, of course, difficult to give a compelling
delineation of the class of such propositions. As Frege duly noted, Dedekind
himself offered no “inventory of the logical or other laws taken by him as basic.”8
Aristotle, let us also recall, suggested that a certain type of education might
help one overcome this difficulty: “It is impossible for anything at the same time
to be and not to be. ... This is the most indisputable of all principles. Some in-
deed demand that even this shall be demonstrated, but this they do through want
of education, for not to know of what things one should demand demonstration,
and of what one should not, argues want of education.”9 However, whereas Aris-
totle thought that education is needed to guard against those who want to prove
too much, Dedekind considered that the nineteenth century methods of teaching
elementary mathematics encouraged one to leave too much without proof:
So from the time of birth we are continually and in increasing mea-
sure led to relate things to things ... this exercise goes on continually,
though without definite purpose, in our earliest years; the accompany-
ing formation of judgments and chains of reasoning leads us to a store
of real arithmetical truths to which our first teachers later refer as to
something simple, self-evident, and given in inner intuition.10
Dedekind blamed such teaching methods for encouraging one to consider as simple,
self-evident, and immediately presented to the mind, and thus to believe without
proof, that which is only the result of judgment and reasoning. On his view,
8Cf. Frege 1893 (68), viii.
9Cf. Metaphysics, Book IV, ch 4.
10“So sind wir auch schon von unserer Geburt an besta¨ndig und in immer steigendem Maße
veranlaßt, Dinge auf Dinge zu beziehen ... durch diese schon in unsere ersten Lebensjahre fallende
unabla¨ssige, wenn auch absichtslose U¨bung und die damit verbundene Bildung von Urtheilen
und Schlußreihen erwerben wir uns auch einen Schatz von eigentlich arithmetischen Wahrheiten,
auf welche spa¨ter unsere ersten Lehrer sich wie auf etwas Einfaches, Selbstversta¨ndliches, in der
inneren Anschauung Gegebenes berufen.” (Dedekind 1888, (36) Eng. tr. in Ewald 1996, 792
(50))
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considering arithmetical truths in this way conceals the “chains of reasoning”
behind them. Proper belief requires, on the contrary, that these chains be fully
revealed. This was, according to him, the task of mathematical proof.11
Before Dedekind, Bolzano defended similar views. He argued, for instance,
that certainty and conviction are not to be mistaken for the aim of science:
The purpose of a scientific exposition is usually imagined to be the
greatest possible certainty and strength of conviction. It therefore
happens that the obligation to prove propositions which, in themselves,
are already completely certain, is discounted. This is a procedure
which, where we are concerned with the practical purpose of certainty,
is quite correct and praiseworthy; but it cannot possibly be tolerated
in a scientific exposition, because it contradicts its essential aim.12
This passage raises a question about what exactly Bolzano took the purpose of a
scientific exposition to be. But it seems clear that, for him, certainty and strength
of conviction are not the highest epistemic virtues to be pursued in a scientific ex-
position. Rather, as we will presently see, those virtues are only provided by proof.
What proof aims at, according to Bolzano, is to reveal the objective ordering of
truths. This purpose was taken to characterize not only the proper exposition of
science, but its very nature:
The nature of all science lies, in our view, in the presentation of truths
as they are objectively connected, and the fact that their proofs are
designed to indicate the connection of this truth, considered in and for
11Dedekind seems to have further believed that “the ability of the mind to relate things to
things, to let a thing correspond to a thing, or to represent a thing by a thing, an ability
without which no thinking is possible,” i.e., the very ability that, when exercised enough, leads
to arithmetical truths, is something that needs to be given immediately to the mind, in inner
intuition. But he does not seem to have offered, or to have been interested in offering, a more
definite view about the epistemic conditions that characterize this ability. For further discussion
of Dedekind’s view, see Detlefsen 2011 (39).
12Cf. Bolzano 1810a, Eng. tr., 103 (16).
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itself, with other truths, rather than to provide certainty.13
The objective ordering relation among truths was understood as a grounding rela-
tion, and was thus meant to reflect an idea that underlies the classical conception
of scientific knowledge, as presented by Aristotle: “We suppose ourselves to pos-
sess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the
accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause
on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further,
that the fact could not be other than it is.”14 In other words, genuine scientific
knowledge requires that one understand why a fact is what it is, and not only
show that the fact is so. According to Bolzano, understanding why a fact is what
it is requires that one reveal the objective grounding of truths, where the notion
of objective grounding is illustrated by the following example:
The two truths that the three angles of a triangle are always equal to
two right angles, and that every quadrangle can be divided into two
triangles whose combined angles form the angles of the quadrangle,
these two truths form the ground of the truth that the four angles of
every quadrangle are equal to four right angles.15
It is the objective grounding of truths, as here illustrated, that mathematical proof
is designed to reveal. On Bolzano’s view, instrumental for proof’s success in doing
so is the following rule:
13“Da wir das Wesen aller Wissenschaft darin finden, daß sie die Wahrheiten nach ihrem
objektiven Zusammenhange darstellt, daß ihre Beweise – statt des Zwecks Gewißheit zu be-
wirken, nur den haben, den Zusammnehang anzugeben, in welchem diese Wahrheit an u. fu¨r
sich betrachtet mit andern stehet.” (Bolzano 1810b, 16 (17))
14Cf. Posterior Analytics, I, 2.
15Cf. Bolzano 1837, 245 (19). See Tatzel 2002 (177) and Lapointe 2008 (118), for a detailed
analysis of Bolzano’s notion of grounding. We should perhaps note that a distinction between
grounds, causes, and epistemic reasons, similar to Bolzano’s (which is analyzed by Tatzel and
Lapointe), was defended also by Schopenhauer in 1813. More on this below.
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I propose for myself the rule that the evidentness of a proposition does
not free me from the obligation to continue searching for a proof of it,
at least until I clearly realize that absolutely no proof could ever be
required, and why.16
This rule entails that the epistemic conditions that allow one to realize that a
proposition does not require probation are not characterized solely by the posses-
sion of evidence. On the basis of evidence, it is implied, one would be able to
reach merely a subjective ordering of truths. On Bolzano’s view, the epistemic
conditions which would justify one in judging that a proposition does not require
proof are conditions under which it is proper to judge that it cannot require proof.
But under what conditions is it proper to judge that a proposition cannot
require proof? What kind of evidence, if any, is needed to identify those propo-
sitions that cannot require proof? To answer this question, let us note that, on
Bolzano’s view, mathematics is concerned with transcendental truth:
Mathematics could be best defined as a science that deals with the
general laws (forms) to which things must conform in their existence.
... This indicates that our science is concerned not with the proof
of the existence of these things but only with the conditions of their
possibility.17
These general laws, Bolzano added, are “either so general that they are applicable
to all things completely without exception, or not. The former laws, put together
and ordered scientifically, will accordingly constitute the first main part of math-
ematics. It can be called general mathesis ; everything else is then particular
mathesis.”18 Thus, it seems plausible to believe that Bolzano took the epistemic
conditions that would justify one in judging that a mathematical proposition could
16Cf. Bolzano 1804, 31 (15).
17Cf. Bolzano 1810a, Eng. tr., 94 (16).
18Cf. Bolzano 1810a, Eng. tr., 95 (16).
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not require proof to be the conditions determined by a proposition’s transcenden-
tal status as a law of general mathesis. But what are, more specifically, these
latter conditions?
Besides generality, one other requirement for being a law of general mathesis
appears to be simplicity: “the strictly unprovable propositions, or axioms, are
only to be sought in the class of those judgements in which both subject and
predicate are completely simple concepts.”19 But whatever conditions might be
required for determining whether a general concept is simple or not, it is clear
that generality and simplicity are not enough to justify one in judging that one
has successfully identified the laws of general mathesis. For this also requires that
the connection between subject and predicate in the statement of such a putative
law be groundless. If the connection is not groundless, then it requires another,
more basic law to express its ground. But Bolzano rejected the idea that this
ground can reside in the subject itself, or in the predicate, of the statement, or
in their connection. He thought that this was just a roundabout way of saying
that a general law is groundless, and also derided the idea that a thing can be its
own ground as based on sheer ignorance: “if one does not know whether a certain
thing M is a ground or a consequence, one assumes it is a consequence, searches
for its ground, and finds that that is M.”20 Consequently, Bolzano believed that
one should reject the principle of sufficient reason as a law of general mathesis,
since such a principle fails to have general applicability: “I maintain that there is
no principle of sufficient reason, i.e., that it cannot be determined generally (and
a priori) what has, and what does not have, a ground. Rather, whether something
19Cf. Bolzano 1810a, Eng. tr., 205 (16). We come back to the notion of simplicity of axioms,
and its epistemic relevance as a necessary condition for understanding, in section 5.5 below.
20“Wenn man nicht weiß ob eine gewisse Sache M erster Grund oder Folge sei, so nimmt man
an, sie sey Folge, sucht ihren Grund, und findet, daß es M sei.” (Bolzano 1810b, 25 (17))
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has a ground or not is decided only by considering particular cases.”21
Bolzano also rejected the Kantian principles of the understanding as laws of
general mathesis, since their valid application is restricted to objects that can be
given in experience, rather than extended, as the laws of general mathesis should
be, to “everything which can in general be an object of our capacity for representa-
tion,” that is, everything that can be an object of thought, whether individuals or
general concepts.22 These principles, just like the principle of sufficient reason, fail
to meet the generality condition.23 This is important to keep in mind as we turn
below to Schopenhauer’s argument against the need to prove the intuitively evi-
dent. For, as we will see, although he similarly believed that mathematics should
be concerned exclusively with transcendental truths, Schopenhauer’s conception
of transcendentality was more restricted than Bolzano’s.
To sum up, the central claims of the view defended by Bolzano and Dedekind
with regard to believing what is provable are the following. In science, evidence
alone is not a proper basis for believing a provable proposition because it conceals
the reasoning behind that proposition, and so it prevents one from understanding
why the proposition is true. In order to be properly believed, a provable propo-
21“Ich halte dafu¨r, daß es gar kein Princip des Grundes gebe, d.h. daß es sich gar nicht
allgemein (u. a priori) ausmachen lasse, was einen Grund habe, u. was keine habe; sondern es ist
erst aus Betrachtung des besonderen Falles entschieden worden, ob etwas einen Grund hat oder
nicht.” (Bolzano 1810b, 26 (17)) Compare this with Schopenhauer’s view: “Alle Wissenschaften
na¨mlich beruhen auf dem Satze vom Grunde, indem sie durchweg Verknu¨pfungen von Gru¨nden
und Folgen sind.” (Cf. Schopenhauer 1813, 46 (163).) See also section 4.4 below for Helmholtz’
and Weyl’s appreciation of the fundamental role of the principle of sufficient reason in science.
22Cf. Bolzano 1810a, Eng. tr., 94 (16).
23But what are, one might ask, Bolzano’s laws of general mathesis? Unlike Dedekind, he
did provide an inventory (even if only an avowedly incomplete one), as well as a discussion of
these laws. Leaving an analysis of that discussion for another occasion, let us just mention the
fundamental law of Zusammendenkbarkeit, that any thing can be adjoined in thought to another
thing (cf. Bolzano 1810b, 33ff (17)). This law recalls, of course, Dedekind’s talk of a basic ability
of the mind to relate things to things (see footnote 11 on page 25 above). Nevertheless, it would
be mistaken to simply equate these two views.
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sition should not be believed merely on the basis of its evidentness. Rather, it
should be believed on the basis of proof from unprovable propositions, for only
such a proof can reveal the reasoning behind a provable proposition and can help
one understand why that proposition is true. Thus, one lacks a proper basis for
believing a provable proposition if one has not provided a proof of that proposition
based, ultimately, on the pure laws of thought (or, as Bolzano maintained, on the
laws of what he called general mathesis).
Before we discuss Weyl’s argument against this view, we want to turn to
Schopenhauer’s earlier injunction against the need to prove what is intuitively
evident in mathematics. This offers some more historical background that, as we
will see, helps us to better grasp Weyl’s own view.
2.4 Schopenhauer on Proving Evident Propositions
To present Schopenhauer’s rejection of any demand to prove intuitively evi-
dent mathematical propositions, we need to recall Kant’s famous idea that purely
logical reasoning is unable to lead, all by itself, to mathematical knowledge.24
In mathematics, one always needs to make appeal to nonconceptual resources,
like those of pure intuition.25 Schopenhauer embraced this idea and claimed that
24It might be also worth noting that positions similar to Schopenhauer’s had been long before
him defended by Roger Bacon and Locke. For Bacon, see especially part VI of his Opus Majus,
‘De Scientia Experimentali’ (Bacon 1268, vol. II, 167ff; Eng. tr. 288 (5)). Locke writes in the
same vein in part II, 3, and IV, 17, of his Essay (122). In the German tradition, a few years
before Schopenhauer, Jacobi was the philosopher who first rejected, in 1787, the attempt to
prove intuitively evident propositions, on the ground that this leads to nihilism. For discussion,
see Franks 2005, 162ff (66).
25There has been a long-standing problem, of course, regarding Kant’s view on the nature and
locus of such appeal, i.e., whether it is only in the presuppositions from which theorems may be
derived by means of formal logic, or also in the methods of reasoning employed in mathematical
derivations. For a review of the problem, see Shin 1997 (167). As we will show, Schopenhauer’s
view is that intuition has to be the basis for both the axioms and the methods of proof in
mathematics.
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mathematics is never merely a matter of analyzing and judging relationships be-
tween concepts. His criticism of the Euclidean method of proof proceeds in the
following way:
[Mathematics] is ... at great pains deliberately to reject the intuitive
evidence peculiar to it and everywhere at hand in order to substitute
for it a logical one. ... [But] it is only insight into the ground of
being which bestows true satisfaction and thorough knowledge, while
the mere ground of knowledge always remains on the surface, and can
give us cognition that it is so, but not why it is so. Euclid chose
this latter way to the obvious detriment of the science. ... In our
view, this method of Euclid in mathematics can appear only as a very
brilliant piece of perversity. ... Euclid’s logical method for treating
mathematics is a useless precaution, a crutch for sound legs. ... We
need not and should not leave the peculiar province of mathematics
in order to trust merely logical certainty and verify mathematics in a
province entirely foreign to it, namely in the province of concepts.26
According to Schopenhauer, genuine scientific knowledge can be obtained in ge-
ometry by, and only by, explaining why an object has a certain property, rather
than by merely confirming that the object has that property. Thus, geometry can
be a genuine science only if its theorems are rendered intuitively evident, since
only on the basis of intuitive evidence can one actually show why a certain object
has a certain property. Intuitive evidence is believed to possess the greatest ex-
planatory power because, as we will see presently, only pure intuition may reveal
26“[Die Mathematik] ... ist mit grosser Mu¨he bestrebt, die ihr eigenthu¨mliche, u¨berall nahe,
anschauliche Evidenz muthwillig zu verwerfen, um ihr eine logische zu substituiren. ... [Aber] die
Einsicht in den [Grunde des Seyns] allein wahre Befriedigung und gru¨ndliche Kenntnis gewa¨hrt,
wa¨hrend der blosse Erkenntnisgrund stets auf der Oberfla¨che bleibt, und zwar ein Wissen, DASS
es so ist, aber keines, WARUM es so ist, geben kann. Eukleides ging diesen letztern Weg, zum
offenbaren Nachtheil der Wissenschaft. ... In unseren Augen kann jene Methode des Eukleides
in der Mathematik dennoch nur als eine sehr gla¨nzende Verkehrtheit erscheinen. ... Eukleides
logische Behandlungsart der Mathematik eine unnu¨tze Vorsicht, eine Kru¨cke fu¨r gesunde Beine
ist. ... Wir brauchen und du¨rfen also nicht, um bloss [der logischen Gewissheit] zu trauern, das
eigenthmliche Gebiet der Mathematik verlassen, um sie auf einem ihr ganz fremden, dem der
Begriffe, zu beglaubigen.” (Schopenhauer 1819, 15 (164))
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what Schopenhauer called “grounds of being.”
By contrast, Euclidean geometry fails to be genuinely scientific, insofar as it
justifies mathematical theorems on the basis of conceptual evidence, which, on
Schopenhauer’s view, has no explanatory power, since it may reveal only what he
called “grounds of knowledge,” which may only show that an object has a certain
property. This view can be clarified by paying attention to Schopenhauer’s reading
of Aristotle.
As noted above, Aristotle famously maintained that scientific knowledge is
knowledge of causes. He further added that knowledge is given by means of
inferences from given premises, and therefore “the premises must be the causes
of the conclusion.”27 But a common criticism, echoed by Schopenhauer, says
that Aristotle failed to distinguish clearly between causes and epistemic reasons.
By Aristotle’s own standards, Schopenhauer added, an argument from what one
claims are, but which in fact are not, causes, is a mere sophism. He rejected the
Aristotelian view that the definition of a mathematical object, i.e., the description
of the nature or essence of the object, is a type of cause, and proposed a threefold
distinction between causes, “grounds of knowledge,” and “grounds of being.” Here
is an illustration of this distinction:
If I ask: Why are the three sides of this triangle equal? The answer is:
because the three angles are equal. Now, is the equality of the angles
the cause of the equality of the sides? No, for here we are not talking
of any change, of any effect that must have a cause. – Is it merely a
ground of knowledge? No, for the equality of the angles is not merely
a proof of the equality of the sides, it is not merely the ground of a
judgment: from mere conceptions alone one could not see that because
the angles are equal, also the sides must be equal: for the concept of
the equality of the sides is not contained in that of the equality of
27Cf. Posterior Analytics, I, 2.
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the angles. Here, thus, we have no connection between concepts, or
judgments, but between sides and angles.28
Grounds of being are, thus, to be sharply distinguished from causes, but also from
grounds of knowledge. To say that x is a ground of being for y is to say that
y cannot be unless x also is. For example, angle equality in a triangle is the
ground of being for side equality if and only if the sides of the triangle cannot be
equal unless the angles are equal. Clearly, then, grounds of being are distinct from
causes, as side equality is not an effect of angle equality. But grounds of being are,
on Schopenhauer’s view, also distinct from grounds of knowledge. To say that x
is a ground of knowledge for y is to say that the concept of y is contained in the
concept of x (and, consequently, that judgments about y are logically derivable
from judgments about x ). For example, the equality of a triangle’s angles is a
ground of knowledge for the equality of its sides if and only if the concept of side
equality is contained in the concept of angle equality, and thus, our judgment
about side equality is logically derivable from the judgment about angle equality.
Based on this threefold distinction, Schopenhauer argued that geometry can
become a genuine science only if proof is explanatory, i.e., only if it reveals the
grounds of being of a theorem, for only such grounds could justify its acceptance
as a transcendental truth:
In [Euclidean] Geometry, it is only in the axioms that one actually
28“Wenn ich frage: Warum sind in diesem Triangel die drei Seiten gleich? So ist die Antwort:
weil die drei Winkel gleich sind. Ist nun die Gleichheit der Winkel URSACH der Gleichheit der
Seiten? Nein, denn hier ist von keiner Vera¨nderung, also von keiner Wirkung die eine Ursach
haben mu¨ßte, die Rede. – Ist sie bloß Erkenntnißgrund? Nein, denn die Gleichheit der Winkel
ist nicht bloß Beweis der Gleichheit der Seiten, nicht bloß Grund eines Urtheils: aus bloßen
Begriffen ist ja nimmermehr einzusehn, daß, weil die Winkel gleich sind, auch die Seiten gleich
seyn mu¨ssen: denn im Begriff von Gleichheit der Winkel liegt nicht der von Gleichheit der Seiten.
Es ist hier also keine Verbindung zwischen Begriffen, oder Urtheilen, sondern zwischen Seiten
und Winkeln.” (Schopenhauer 1813, 15 (163))
33
appeals to intuition. All the other theorems are demonstrated, that is
to say, a ground of knowledge is indicated, the truth of which everyone
is bound to acknowledge: the logical truth of the theorem is thus
shown, but not its transcendental truth. The latter lies in the ground
of being and not in the ground of knowledge, and never can become
evident except by means of intuition.29
Hence, geometry can become a genuine science only if appeal to intuition is made
not only in the axioms, but also in mathematical reasoning. For otherwise the
axioms cannot be revealed as the grounds of being of a theorem, and so this
cannot be justifiably accepted as a transcendental truth. Schopenhauer took a
mathematical proposition to be justifiably accepted as a transcendental truth only
if it is based on Kantian pure intuitions of space and time as necessary conditions
for the possibility of all objects of knowledge.30 Geometry can, thus, become
a genuine science only if proof is constructive, i.e., if it provides the intuitive
construction of an object that possesses the properties attributed to it in the
theorem, from the objects referred to, and the properties attributed to them, in
the axioms.
If this is the right way to look at Schopenhauer’s view, then his criticism that
Euclidean geometry substitutes a ground of knowledge to a ground of being points
out that Euclidean proof is not sufficiently constructive:
After such a geometrical demonstration [i.e., one that follows Euclid’s
method], one has the conviction that the theorem which has been
demonstrated is true, but has no insight into why that which it asserts
29“Auf die Anschauung beruft man also in der Geometrie sich eigentlich nur bei den Ax-
iomen. Alle u¨brigen Lehrsa¨tze werden demonstrirt, d.h. man giebt einen Erkenntnißgrund des
Lehrsatzes an, welcher Jeden zwingt denselben als wahr anzunehmen: also man weist die logis-
che, nicht die transzendentale Wahrheit des Lehrsatzes nach. Dieser aber, welche im Grund des
Seyns und nicht in dem des Erkennens liegt, leuchtet nie ein, als nur mittelst der Anschauung.”
(Schopenhauer 1813, 39 (163))
30Cf. Schopenhauer 1813, 32 (163).
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is as it is. . . . A proof by indicating the ground of knowledge effects
mere conviction (convictio), not insight (cognition): therefore it might
perhaps be more correctly called elenchus than demonstratio.”31
Schopenhauer believed that geometry was in need of radical reform, one motivated
by the need to show that all theorems are intuitively evident. Hence, the reform
would require an elimination of Euclidean proof:
The stilted logical proof, which is always foreign to the matter, is gen-
erally soon forgotten without detriment to conviction, and could be
dispensed with entirely, without diminishing the evidence of geome-
try, which is entirely independent of proof, which always proves only
what we are already through another kind of knowledge fully con-
vinced of. To this extent it is like a cowardly soldier who gives another
wound to an enemy killed by someone else, and then boasts that he
himself killed him. ... One hopes that there will be no doubt that the
evidence of mathematics, which has become the pattern and symbol
of all evidence, rests essentially not on proofs, but on immediate intu-
ition. Here, as everywhere, that is the ultimate ground and source of
all truth.32
One immediate problem with this view regards, of course, the extension of its va-
lidity. For one can hardly see how one may seriously believe that Schopenhauer’s
view holds beyond the simple theorems of elementary plane geometry. But he
31“Man [hat] nach so einer geometrischen Demonstration zwar die U¨berzeugung, daß der
demonstrirte Satz wahr sei, aber keineswegs einsieht, warum was er behauptet so ist, wie es ist.
. . . Der Beweis durch Aufweisung des Erkenntnißgrundes wirkt bloß U¨berfu¨hrung (convictio),
nicht Einsicht (cognitio): es wa¨re deswegen vielleicht richtiger elenchus, als demonstratio zu
nennen.” (Schopenhauer 1813, 39 (163))
32“Keineswegs ist es der auf Stelzen einherschreitende logische Beweis, welcher, der Sache im-
mer fremd, meistens bald vergessen wird, ohne Nachtheil der U¨berzeugung, und ganz wegfallen
ko¨nnte, ohne daß die Evidenz der Geometrie dadurch vermindert wu¨rde, da sie ganz unabha¨ngig
vom ihm ist und er immer nur das beweist, wovon man schon vorher, durch eine andere Erkennt-
nissart, vo¨llige U¨berzeugung hat: insofern gleicht er einem feigen Soldaten, der dem von andern
erschlagenen Feinde noch eine Wunde versetzt, und sich dann ru¨hmt, ihn erlegt zu haben. ...
Diesem allen zufolge wird es hoffentlich keinem Zweifel weiter unterliegen, dass die Evidenz der
Mathematik, welche zum Musterbild und Symbol aller Evidenz geworden ist, ihrem Wesen nach
nicht auf Beweisen, sondern auf unmittelbarer Anschauung beruht, welche also hier, wie u¨berall,
der letzte Grund und die Quelle aller Wahrheit ist.” (Schopenhauer 1819, 15 (164))
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maintained, though without further argument, that the whole extent of Euclidean
geometry can be thus reformed: “The ground of being is certainly not as evident
in all cases as it is in simple theorems . . . Still I am persuaded that it might
be brought to evidence in every theorem, however complicated.”33 Furthermore,
Schopenhauer also seems to have believed that this is the right view about arith-
metical knowledge. Although he did not say much about arithmetic, his view on
arithmetical proof did not differ essentially from his view on geometrical proof.
Thus, for example, he maintained that the successor relation must be regarded as
a ground of being relation, and that only this may form the basis of genuine arith-
metical knowledge.34 In any case, it is hard to see how, on Schopenhauer’s view,
one can avoid the conclusion that most of modern mathematics is unscientific.
And still, as we will see below, Weyl – one of the most influential mathematicians
of the twentieth century, may be seen to have held a similar view.
To conclude our discussion up to this point, we should say that, both Schopen-
hauer and Bolzano seem to have endorsed the idea that, in science, mathematical
proof needs to explain why a theorem is true, rather than to merely confirm that
this is so. Thus, both Schopenhauer and Bolzano agreed that mathematical proof
must, in some sense(s), be explanatory. But they seem to have disagreed about
the conditions under which explanation can be achieved. Schopenhauer thought
that explanation required elimination of conceptual proof and maximization of
intuitive evidence. Bolzano believed that explanation requires, on the contrary,
minimization (rather than elimination) of intuitive evidence, and maximization of
conceptual proof.
33Cf. Schopenhauer 1813, 39 (163).
34“Jede Zahl setzt die vorhergehenden als Gru¨nde ihre Seyns voraus: zur Zehn kann ich nur
gelangen durch alle vorhergehenden, und bloß vermo¨ge dieser Einsicht in den Seynsgrund weiß
ich, daß wo Zehn sind, auch Acht, Sechs, Vier sind.” (Schopenhauer 1813, 38 (163))
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The difference between these two views appears to be ultimately due to dis-
tinct conceptions of the notion of transcendentality. Like Kant, Schopenhauer
regarded as transcendental any proposition that expresses necessary conditions
for the possibility of all objects of knowledge. A mathematical proof is, on his
view, explanatory only if it justifies the acceptance of a theorem as a transcen-
dental truth, in this sense. Unlike Kant, Bolzano regarded as transcendental any
proposition that expresses necessary conditions for the possibility of all things
whatsoever. A mathematical proof is, on his view, explanatory only if it justifies
the acceptance of a theorem as a transcendental truth, in this other sense.
The question that we must address now is why did a mathematician like Weyl
think that it is useless, even perverse, to prove provable propositions that are
intuitively evident. One could argue that he justified this claim in a way that
is reminiscent of Schopenhauer. Indeed, there can be no doubt that a culti-
vated mathematician like Weyl read Schopenhauer, especially as the latter be-
came widely read in the second part of the nineteenth century, and his work still
exerted influence at the beginning of the twentieth century.35 As an indication
that Weyl took Schopenhauer’s view of mathematics seriously, one may point to
his endorsement of Schopenhauer’s claim that every number, as an individual, is
the ground of being for its immediate successor.36 Furthermore, Weyl could not
have been ignorant of Schopenhauer’s resounding attack on the Euclidean method
of proof, which was often recalled even after the turn of the century.37
35Cf., e.g., Howard 1997 (97) for Schopenhauer’s influence on Einstein.
36Cf. Weyl 1927a, 28 (198); Eng. tr., 34 (211).
37For instance, in 1902, Meinong wrote the following: “The older epistemology placed ‘in-
tuitive’ knowledge ahead of the ‘demonstrative.’ ... One remembers the complaint, so often
repeated since Schopenhauer, concerning how Euclidean geometry just forces its propositions
upon our conviction, as it were, without leading one to a proper insight into the demonstrated
state of affairs.” (cf. Meinong 1902, 173; Eng. tr. 127 (133)) Such complaints about Euclidean
geometry had been voiced, of course, before Schopenhauer, by Hobbes, Bolzano, and others.
37
However, even if Schopenhauer’s views did have a deep echo in his mind, Weyl
could not have overlooked the nineteenth century developments in mathematics
(such as non-Euclidean geometries and the arithmetization of analysis), which
showed that the Kantian intuitions of space and time are an improper basis for
scientific belief. Indeed, rather than embracing the Kantian notion of intuition,
Weyl endorsed, as we will see below, the view defended by Husserl in his Logical
Investigations.
2.5 Husserl on Truth and Evidence as an Experience of Truth
It would not be possible, of course, to present here an exhaustive account of
Husserl’s conception of evidence. For one thing, his view was in constant develop-
ment throughout his career, and it is extremely difficult to trace all its changes and
apparently endless variations.38 Nevertheless, insofar as this conception had any
influence on Weyl, it is its elaboration in the 1900 Logical Investigations – where
Husserl argued that evidence (Evidenz ) is an experience (Erlebnis) of truth, rather
than a feeling (Gefu¨hl) – that we should focus on. For it is precisely this concep-
tion of evidence that Weyl was deeply impressed with, as his correspondence with
Husserl indicates:
Despite all the faults you attribute to the Logical Investigations from
your present standpoint, I find the conclusive results of this work,
which has rendered such an enormous service to the spirit of pure
objectivity in epistemology – the decisive insights about evidence and
truth, the recognition that “intuition” extends far beyond sensuous
38For a succinct account of this development, see Rosen 1977 (154).
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intuition – established with great clarity and concision.39
In this section, we want to present what Weyl took to be Husserl’s “decisive
insights about evidence and truth” developed in the Logical Investigations, and
clarify their role in Weyl’s argument against Dedekind’s standard for scientific
belief. To begin with, let us note that, in the work just mentioned, Husserl
emphatically maintained that evidence is fundamental for scientific knowledge:
The most perfect mark of correctness is evidence; it counts as an imme-
diate inner development of truth itself. ... Ultimately, all genuine, all
scientific, knowledge rests on evidence, and as far as evidence extends,
the concept of knowledge extends also.40
Questions about the nature of evidence as an “inner development” of truth arise
here naturally. For Husserl also suggested, as we shall see below, that truth is
adequatio intellectus et rei : a proposition is true if and only if there is a cor-
respondence or agreement between its meaning and the state of affairs that the
proposition refers to. Before we discuss in more detail Husserl’s view on truth, and
its relation to evidence, we should like to note that it seems natural to read the
quotation above as a reiteration of Schopenhauer’s exaltation of the crucial role
played by intuitive evidence in science. Unlike Schopenhauer, however, Husserl
does not argue against those who, like Bolzano, believed that certainty and convic-
tion based on evidence are not the proper aim of science. Rather, Husserl argued
39“Trotz allem, was Sie etwa von Ihrem heutigen Standpunkt an den Logischen Untersuchun-
gen auszusetzen haben, finde ich darin die Schlussresultate dieses Werk, das dem Geist reiner
Sachlichkeit in der Erkenntnistheorie so ungeheure Dienste geleistet hat, die entscheidenden Ein-
sichten u¨ber Evidenz und Wahrheit, die Erkenntnis, daß ‘Anschauung’ weit u¨ber das Sinnliche
hinausreicht, mit gro¨ßer Klarheit und Pra¨gnanz aufgestellt.” (Letter to Husserl, from 26 March
1921. Husserl 1994, 290 (108). Eng. tr. in Ryckman 2005, 113 (159), my emphasis.)
40“Das vollkommenste Kennzeichen der Richtigkeit ist die Evidenz, es gilt uns als unmittel-
bares Innewerden der Wahrheit selbst. ... Im letzten Grunde beruht also jede echte und speziell
jede wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis auf Evidenz, und so weit die Evidenz reicht, so weit reicht
auch der Begriff des Wissens.” (Husserl 1900, 6 (102))
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against those who, on the contrary, did believe that certainty and conviction based
on evidence are the very aim of science, but nevertheless misunderstood the na-
ture of evidence. His target, thus, is what he called empiricism, and its associated
psychologistic account of evidence:
Empiricism altogether misunderstands the relation between the ideal
and the real: it likewise misunderstands the relation between truth and
evidence. Evidence is no accessory feeling, either arbitrarily attached,
or attached by natural necessity, to certain judgments.41
To understand the criticism that Husserl raised here against empiricism, that is,
the view defended, according to him, by philosophers like Mill, Meinong, and
Alois Ho¨fler, we need to see how these philosophers, themselves, conceived of the
relation between truth and evidence. We also need to examine how they defined
the notion of feeling (Gefu¨hl).
As one would expect, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning
of the twentieth century, no universally accepted definition of feeling was available
in the philosophical or psychological literature. However, a definition of feeling,
which did perhaps pass muster on all accounts, was given by Rudolf Eisler in his
famous Dictionary of Philosophical Concepts : “Feeling is a subjective state in
which the ego takes position with regard to the modifications that he experiences,
with regard to his experiences.”42 Thus, a feeling seems to have been understood
as the result of one’s psychological reaction to one’s own experiences.
41“Wie der Empirismus u¨berhaupt das Verha¨ltnis zwischen Idealem und Realem im Denken
verkennt, so auch das Verha¨ltnis zwischen Wahrheit und Evidenz. Evidenz ist kein akzesorisches
Gefu¨hl, das sich zufa¨llig oder naturgesetzlich an gewisse Urteile anschließt.” (Husserl 1900,
Prolegomena 51 (102))
42“Gefu¨hl ist der subjektive Zustand, in welchem das Ich Stellung nimmt zu den Modifikatio-
nen, die es erfa¨hrt, zu seinen Erlebnissen.” (Eisler 1904 (49))
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The nature of the relation between an experience and the result of one’s re-
action to it was more carefully described by Ho¨fler, in his 1903 Introduction to
Logic and Psychology. He formulated a psychological law, according to which, ev-
ery feeling has a psychological presupposition.43 A psychological presupposition
is a representation (in perception, memory, or imagination) or an act of judging,
which appears to causally determine a certain feeling. According to Ho¨fler’s ac-
count of mental causation, the feelings caused by our acts of judging (Akte des
Urteilens) may be called “feelings of knowledge” (Wissensgefu¨hle). Among these,
one can distinguish “logical feelings” (logische Gefu¨hle) as those feelings that are
caused by acts of judging like 2+1=1+2 or that a2 + b2 = c2, where c represents
the length of the hypotenuse, a and b the lengths of the other sides of a right
triangle.44 Just like one’s subjective reaction to hearing a beautiful song is a sen-
sible feeling of pleasure, and one’s subjective reaction to burning one’s hand is
a sensible feeling of pain, one’s subjective reaction to judging that 2+1=1+2 or
that a2 + b2 = c2 is a logical feeling of knowledge. Evidence, on Ho¨fler’s view, is
a psychological state (einen psychischen Zustand) that can be experienced as a
characteristic (Merkmal) of such acts of judging.
Now, what is the basis of the criticism that Husserl raised against a view like
Ho¨fler’s? It is fair to say that, to a certain extent, Husserl misdescribed this
view, when he said that, for the empiricist, evidence is a feeling. For, as we have
just seen, although evidence is considered to be a psychological state, Ho¨fler did
not define it as a feeling, i.e., as a subjective reaction to one’s experiences, but
rather as a particular characteristic of certain acts of judging. But of course, one
could insist that any psychological state is, in a certain sense, a feeling. Mill,
43“Jedes Gefu¨hl hat eine psychologische Voraussetzung.” (Ho¨fler 1903, 291 (93))
44Cf. Ho¨fler 1903, 313 (93). See also Ho¨fler and Meinong 1890, 122 (94).
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for instance, considered that “a feeling and a state of consciousness are, in the
language of philosophy, equivalent expressions: everything is a feeling of which
the mind is conscious. ... Feeling, in the proper sense of the term, is a genus,
of which sensation, emotion, and thought, are subordinate species.”45 Evidence,
too, would then have to be considered as a feeling.
At any rate, Husserl argued that, if one takes evidence to be a feeling, then one
turns logic into a science concerned with the description of merely psychological
phenomena. One does so because one fails to distinguish between the real and
the ideal, that is, between the real acts of judging, which are dependent on the
psychological profile of epistemic subjects, and the ideal content or meaning of
judgments, which is independent of such subjects. The former are, indeed, the
object of descriptive psychology, but only the latter should be the object of logic
correctly conceived of as a normative science. On the empiricist view, however,
the investigation of logical laws becomes an investigation of the psychological laws
according to which acts of judging with evidence can lead to other acts of judging
with evidence.
Furthermore, the failure to distinguish between real acts of judging and ideal
meaning of judgments shows, according to Husserl, that the empiricist conception
of the relation between evidence and truth is mistaken. More specifically, Husserl
argued that empiricism cannot establish evidence as a criterion for truth: “How
can we know that this feeling [of evidence] indicates the truth?”46 The causal
relation between an act of judging with evidence and the feeling that what is
judged is true does not guarantee that what is judged is true. For, Husserl seems to
have thought, this causal relation remains within the real domain of psychological
45Cf Mill 1843, 35f (135).
46“Woher wissen wir, dass dieses Gefu¨hl die Wahrheit anzeigt?” (Husserl 1984, 154f (107))
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states, whereas the proper conditions for truth do not belong to this domain.
In order to present Husserl’s own account of evidence and of its relation to
truth, and to understand why he believed that his account should be preferred to
the empiricist view, let us briefly note that, before him, Brentano similarly argued
against Sigwart, who had maintained that an evident judgment involves a feeling
pertaining to the ideas judged upon:
The peculiar nature of insight – the clarity and evidence of certain
judgements which is inseparable from their truth – has little or nothing
to do with a feeling of compulsion. ... no awareness of a compulsion
to judge in a certain way could, as such, guarantee the truth of the
judgement.47
Hence, Brentano seems to have believed that evidence can justify belief only if it
is inseparable from truth. However, if evidence is understood as a feeling, as a
psychological state, then it is, presumably, separable from truth and, therefore,
cannot justify belief. But what does it mean to say that evidence, properly un-
derstood, is inseparable from truth? In a letter to Husserl, Brentano, himself,
attempted to spell out the sense of this inseparability:
Whoever really makes an evident judgement really knows and is certain
of the truth; whoever really knows something with immediate evidence
is immediately certain of the truth. This is unaffected by the fact that
the one who judges came into being, is subject to causation, and is
dependent upon the particular cerebral organization which we have.
To the one who judges with evidence, the truth is secured in itself,
and not by reflection on such preconditions. ... Having the insight is
sufficient to assure one that no one else can have a contrary insight.
Not even God Almighty could provide one; for this very assumption
47“Die Eigentu¨mlichkeit der Einsicht, die Klarheit, Evidenz gewisser Urteile, von der ihre
Wahrheit untrennbar ist, hat wenig oder nichts mit einem Gefu¨hle der No¨tigung zu tun. ... kein
Bewußtsein einer Notwendigkeit, so zu urteilen, ko¨nnte als solches die Wahrheit sichern.” (Cf.
Brentano 1930, 63; Eng. tr., 54 (22))
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would be absurd and inconsistent with the concept of evidence.48
Thus, Brentano seems to have believed that inseparability from truth is built
into the very definition of the concept of evidence. In other words, he seems to
have thought that evidence was logically sufficient for truth, that it is logically
impossible to have evidence for a false proposition. By contrast, Husserl’s account
of the relation between truth and evidence should be seen as an attempt to show
that this relation is neither a matter of psychology (as it was for Ho¨fler) nor a
matter of mere definition (as it was for Brentano). On Husserl’s view, as we
explain below, evidence is an instantiation of the universal idea of truth.
In the introduction to his Logical Investigations, the relationship between truth
and evidence is articulated in the following way:
Evidence is rather nothing but the “experience” of truth. Truth is
of course only experienced in the sense in which an ideal can be an
experience in a real act. In other words: Truth is an idea, whose
particular case is an actual experience in the evident judgment. ...
The experience of the agreement between meaning and what is meant
and is itself present, between the actual sense of an assertion and the
given state of affairs, is evidence, and the idea of this agreement is
truth.49
48“Wer wahrhaft evident urteilt, wahrhaft erkennt, der ist der Wahrheit sicher; wer wahrhaft
unmittelbar evident erkennt, unmittelbar der Wahrheit sicher. Und dies wird nicht dadurch
beeintra¨chtigt, daß er als Urteilender angefangen hat, verursacht worden ist und im Besondern
von unserer Gehirnorganization abha¨ngig ist. Dem evident Urteilenden ist die Wahrheit nicht
in Reflexion auf solche Vorbedingungen, sondern in sich selbst gesichert. ... Genug, er hat
die Einsicht, um auch zu wissen, daß kein anderer die entgegengesetzte haben kann. Selbst
Gottes Allmacht ko¨nnte sie keinem geben; denn die Annahme wa¨re dem Begriff der Evidenz
widerstreitend und absurd.” (Cf. Brentano 1930, 156f; Eng. tr. 136f (22))
49“Evidenz ist vielmehr nichts anderes als das “Erlebnis” der Wahrheit. Erlebt ist die Wahrheit
natu¨rlich in keinem andern Sinne, als in welchem u¨berhaupt ein Ideales im realen Akt Erlebnis
sein kann. Mit anderen Worten: Wahrheit ist eine Idee, deren Einzelfall im evidenten Urteil
aktuelles Erlebnis ist. ... Das Erlebnis der Zusammenstimmung zwischen der Meinung und dem
selbst Gegenwa¨rtigen, das sie meint, zwischen dem aktuellen Sinn der Aussage und dem selbst
gegebenen Sachverhalt ist die Evidenz, und die Idee dieser Zusammenstimmung die Wahrheit.”
(Husserl 1900, Prolegomena 51 (102))
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Why might Husserl have thought that the conception of evidence presented in
this passage could show that the relation between truth and evidence was neither
a matter of psychology, nor a matter of mere definition? This is what we need
to clarify. More specifically, we need to explain why evidence, understood as an
experience of truth, could serve as a criterion of truth.
One plausible suggestion is to take Husserl’s idea of truth as a universal, more
specifically, as a Platonic idea.50 Hence, the idea of truth is related to a true
proposition in the same way in which the idea of equality is related to two equal
sticks. In other words, the agreement between the meaning of a proposition and
the state of affairs meant by that proposition is an instantiation of the idea of
truth, just like the agreement in length between the two sticks is an instantiation
of the idea of equality. One might say, thus, that one has an “experience” of truth
in the same way in which one has an “experience” of equality.
However, although truth represents the agreement between meaning and what
is meant, adequatio intellectus et rei, on Husserl’s view, it is not this agreement
that is an instantiation of the idea of truth. Rather, he claimed that it is the
experience of this agreement, rather than the agreement itself, that is an instanti-
ation of the idea of truth. Analogously, although equality is a length agreement,
it is not the agreement in length between two sticks, but the visual perception of
this agreement, that would be an instantiation of the idea of equality. If this is
the right way to understand Husserl’s view, then, by contrast with both Brentano
and Ho¨fler, the relation between evidence and truth is one of instantiation.
It might seem obvious that, on Husserl’s view, evidence can serve as a criterion
of truth. That is, an experience of an agreement between the meaning of a propo-
50This suggestion was made by Gu¨nther Patzig: “One is speaking here of an idea in Plato’s
rather than Kant’s sense, and so also of its particular cases.” (Patzig 1973, 184 (143))
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sition and what the proposition means seems to guarantee that the proposition
is true. But we should ask what exactly is the relation between evidence and an
evident proposition. From the fact that evidence is an instantiation of the idea
of truth, it does not immediately follow that an evident proposition is true. For
this to obtain, evidence, i.e., the experience of agreement, has to be a constitu-
tive part of that proposition. It is not clear, however, how the experience of an
agreement between meaning and object, can be a constitutive part of a proposi-
tion. One might say that such an experience is a sort of phenomenal quality of
a proposition. But when may a proposition be said to possess this phenomenal
quality?
One can find an answer to this question in Husserl’s sixth Logical Investigation,
where he developed the view according to which an experience of truth is to be
understood as a complete satisfaction of a meaning intention, that is, as we explain
below, as a certain type of epistemic achievement. Briefly put, what Husserl seems
to have maintained is that a proposition may be said to possess evidence when
the meaning intention expressed by that proposition is completely satisfied, i.e.,
when we have “set directly before us” the intended objects and states of affairs.
The first thing to note is that Husserl spoke of evidence in different senses,
corresponding to different possible levels of satisfaction of a meaning intention.51
Thus, evidence may be anything from an experience of partial agreement to an
experience of complete agreement between the meaning of a proposition and the
state of affairs that is meant by that proposition. Full agreement obtains when
the intention expressed by a proposition is completely satisfied, i.e., when the in-
tended state of affairs is entirely presented to the mind in intuition or perception.
51Cf. Husserl 1900, VI, 37 (102).
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In this case, the notion of evidence is understood in a strict sense, as an experience
of the identity between the object meant and the object presented in intuition.
Partial agreement obtains when the intention expressed by a proposition is par-
tially unsatisfied, i.e., when only part of the object or state of affairs meant is
presented in intuition. When the intention expressed by a proposition remains
entirely unsatisfied, i.e., when the intention is empty, that is, when the object
meant is not given in intuition, then one says that a proposition lacks evidence.
One should further observe that this view implies that evidence, in the strict
sense, may be achieved in stages, and presupposes a gradual ascent from empty
to completely satisfied meaning intentions:
The discussion of possible relationships of satisfaction points to a goal
in which increase of satisfaction terminates, in which the complete and
entire intention has reached its satisfaction, and not an intermediate
and partial, but an final and ultimate satisfaction. ... Where a pre-
sentative intention has achieved its ultimate satisfaction, the genuine
adaequatio rei et intellectus has been brought about.52
Hence, the difference between propositions that express merely empty or partially
satisfied intentions and propositions that express completely satisfied intentions is
epistemically significant. For, as this passage seems to suggest, only the latter may
be said to be true. Thus, evidence as an experience of truth is, on Husserl’s view, a
criterion for truth, but only if understood in a strict sense, i.e., as the achievement
of complete satisfaction of meaning intentions. If a proposition is evident in the
sense that the intended objects and states of affairs are given in intuition exactly
52“So weist die Erwa¨gung der mo¨glichen Erfu¨llungsverha¨ltnisse auf ein abschließendes Ziel der
Erfu¨llungssteigerung hin, in dem die volle und gesamte Intention ihre Erfu¨llung und zwar nicht
eine intermedia¨re und partielle, sondern eine endgu¨ltige und letzte Erfu¨llung erreicht hat. ...
Und wo sich eine Vorstellungsintention ... letzte Erfu¨llung verschafft hat, da hat sich die echte
adaequatio rei et intellectus hergestellt.” (Cf. Husserl 1900, VI, 37 (102))
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as they are meant, then one is justified to believe that the proposition is true.
Unlike Brentano, Husserl reasonably allowed for the possibility of error, that
is, for judgments that are taken to be evident, but are in fact false. This may be
explained by the failure, on the part of the epistemic subject, to realize that the
goal of complete satisfaction of her meaning intentions has not been attained and,
consequently, that the evidence for a certain proposition does not instantiate the
idea of truth. Husserl’s view also seems to allow for uninstantiated truths, that is,
truths that we do not have an experience of. These are propositions that express
empty or at least partially unsatisfied intentions.
How did Weyl apply this phenomenological conception of evidence, which he
was avowedly much impressed with, to mathematics? Why might he have thought
that this could refute Dedekind’s view about what constitutes, in science, the
proper basis for believing provable propositions?
2.6 The Experience of Truth and the Question about Understanding
According to Dedekind’s principle, as we have seen above in section 2.3, in
science, one ought not to believe a provable proposition without proof. For, as
Bolzano had emphasized, proof and only proof can reveal the objective ordering of
truths. To be believed in a proper way, a provable proposition must be ultimately
derived from unprovable propositions in a way that reflects this objective ordering.
By contrast, as we have seen in section 2.4, Schopenhauer argued that genuine
scientific knowledge requires that the ordering revealed by proof be based on
intuitive evidence. More exactly, it requires the construction in intuition of the
objects referred to in a theorem from the objects referred to in the axioms.
Weyl’s claim, presented in section 2.2, that if a provable proposition is evident,
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then proving it is entirely useless, suggests that he adopted a largely Schopenhaue-
rian position. For Weyl, too, believed that a proof could provide genuine scientific
knowledge only if the ordering of truths revealed by that proof is based on in-
tuitive evidence. But his notion of evidence could not have been framed by the
Kantian intuitions of space and time. Given the historical development of mod-
ern mathematics, especially through the nineteenth century, he was aware that
intuitive evidence, of the Kantian sort defended by Schopenhauer, is insufficient
to justify mathematical belief. In 1913, in the preface to the first edition of his
first book, The Idea of Riemann Surfaces, Weyl explained why proof should be
valued in mathematics:
It used to be common and, as far as I can tell, it remained common
until today in all presentations of the theory of Riemann surfaces, to
accept the representation of a curve as it appears to be given in our
sensorial intuition, without conceptual fixation, and to make a naive
use of those properties which impose themselves on us by this rep-
resentation with a sort of intuitive evidence (e.g., of the proposition
that a curve has two sides). But, there can be no doubt about this
today, the “intuitive evidence” does not absolve us from the necessity
to provide even for these truths proofs, which rest in the end on the ax-
ioms of arithmetic. Such proofs become necessary at least when those
flowing intuitions extend (as it happens in the practice of mathematics
as an exact science) to general abstract concepts and get, as it were,
paralysed.53
53“Es war fru¨her u¨blich und ist, soviel ich sehe, bis jetzt in allen Darstellungen der Theorie der
Riemannschen Fla¨chen u¨blich geblieben, die Vorstellung der Kurve, wie sie in unserer sinnlichen
Anschauung gegeben vorzuliegen scheint, ohne begriffliche Fixierung heru¨berzunehmen und von
denjenigen Eigenschaften, welche sich uns an dieser Vorstellung mit einer Art anschaulicher
Evidenz aufdra¨ngen (z.B. von dem Satz, dass eine Kurve zwei Ufer hat) einen naiven Gebrauch
zu machen. Die “anschauliche Evidenz” enthebt uns aber, daran kann heute kein Zweifel mehr
sein, keineswegs der Notwendigkeit, fu¨r eben diese Wahrheiten Beweise zu erbringen, die letzten
Endes auf die Axiome der Arithmetik gestu¨tzt sind; zum mindesten werden solche Beweise no¨tig,
sobald jene fließenden Anschauungen sich (wie es das Verfahren der Mathematik als exakter
Wissenschaft mit sich bringt) zu allgemeinen abstrakten Begriffen ausgeweitet haben und in
ihnen gleichsam erstarrt sind.” (Weyl 1913, III (190))
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The “paralysis” of geometrical intuition was induced, of course, by the intro-
duction in analysis of mathematical concepts like, e.g., continuous but nowhere
differentiable functions. The young Weyl realized that the introduction of such
concepts indicates that intuitive evidence does not absolve the mathematician
of the responsibility of trying to prove evident propositions. His own project in
the book mentioned was to attempt an arithmetization of the theory of Riemann
surfaces, in the spirit of the earlier arithmetization of analysis. Undoubtedly, he
believed that such attempts are extremely valuable, in that they help to properly
justify propositions that are believed on the basis of intuitive evidence, like the
intermediate value theorem or the Jordan curve theorem, thus contributing to the
development of mathematical knowledge.54
Soon thereafter, however, Weyl came to understand the notion of evidence
in a phenomenological sense, as an experience of truth. This is indicated, as
we emphasized above, in his correspondence with Husserl, as well as by the phe-
nomenological idiom used in his own publications. Thus, Weyl seems to have come
to believe that mathematical proof can be a genuine source of knowledge only if
it allows an experience of truth, which seems to imply that if one already has an
experience of the truth of a provable proposition, then believing that proposition
does not require proof. This led him to make the remark that Dedekind’s principle
that, in science, one ought not to believe a provable proposition without proof, is
a mere epistemological perversity.
We are now in a position to explain, more exactly than before, what Weyl
believed could justify this remark. The adoption of a Husserlian conception of
evidence as an experience of truth suggests that Weyl’s rejection of Dedekind’s
54For a recent discussion of rigorous proofs of the Jordan curve theorem, see Hales 2007 (79).
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principle was supported in the following way: if one experiences the truth of a
provable proposition, then this completely satisfies the meaning intentions ex-
pressed by that proposition, by setting directly before one’s eyes the objects and
states of affairs that the proposition refers to. This epistemic achievement was
taken by Weyl to be one of the highest sort, one that provides the most proper
basis for believing a provable proposition, or at least a basis as proper as the
typical basis for believing unprovable propositions. Therefore, on Weyl’s view,
proving a provable proposition that is evident, in Husserl’s sense, is useless, since
no mathematical proof can evidentially surpass an experience of truth, as a ba-
sis for belief. Quite the contrary, Weyl appears to have believed that a proof is
of the highest epistemic quality only when it reaches the epistemic achievement
characteristic of an experience of truth.
Furthermore, in The Continuum, Weyl noted that mathematical proof, as
usually understood, employs propositions that lack evidence, and takes inferential
steps that are not supported by evidence:
The presentation of the fact that a judgment U is a consequence of the
axioms can and must be done ... through a generally ramified organism
of ‘elementary’ inferences, which in order to be communicated must
be artificially transformed in a chain of interlocking links. It is in this
way that mathematical proof comes about; in it, all insight that is to
be satisfied is concentrated on the logical inferences and is no longer
directed at the objects and states of affairs judged upon.55
Given Weyl’s advocacy of the phenomenological conception of evidence, this obser-
55“Die Aufzeigung der Tatsache, daß ein Urteil U Folge der Axiome ist, kann und muß ...
durch einen im allgemeinen vielverzweigten Organismus “elementarer” Schlu¨ße geschehen, der
dann noch zum Zwecke der Mitteilung ku¨nstlicherweise in eine Glied an Glied schließende Kette
umgewandelt werden muß. So kommt der mathematische Beweis zustande; alle zu vollziehende
Einsicht konzentriert sich in ihm auf die logischen Schlu¨ße und ist nicht mehr auf die beurteilten
Sachen und Sachverhalte gerichtet.” (Weyl 1918a, 11; Eng. tr., 17f (191))
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vation should be taken to say that in a mathematical proof, as usually understood,
one’s meaning intentions remain empty or unsatisfied. This is due to one’s failure
to set directly before oneself the objects and states of affairs the proof refers to.
But, according to Weyl, this entails that mathematical proof, as usually under-
stood, cannot be a genuine source of knowledge. This is why Weyl recommended
that mathematicians should search for mathematical “organisms,” i.e., for proofs
that do not obscure, but reveal, intuitive evidence. Again, given his advocacy
of the phenomenological conception of evidence, this recommendation should be
taken to say that mathematicians should search for proofs that are capable of
providing an experience of truth by completely satisfying the prover’s meaning
intentions. To completely satisfy the prover’s meaning intentions, Weyl seems to
have believed that mathematicians should provide constructive proofs, i.e., proofs
that set directly before us the objects and states of affairs referred to by the ax-
ioms and construct, on this basis, the objects and states of affairs referred to by
a theorem.56
Husserl was, unsurprisingly, extremely satisfied with Weyl’s phenomenological
standpoint.57 But many others considered the phenomenological conception of
evidence as untenable. Schlick, for example, criticized quite harshly this concep-
tion and rejected the claim that an experience of evidence (Evidenzerlebnis) can
be “the sufficient criterion and unmistakable indicator of truth”:58
56As an aside, it may be interesting to note that Weyl’s view was shared by physicist Erwin
Schro¨dinger, his colleague at the ETH in Zu¨rich, who wrote: “Man muss die Physiologie und
Biologie und womo¨glich die Phylogenie eines mathematischen Apparates verstehen, dann hat
man etwas davon.” (Letter to Weyl, Nov 6, 1929) This remark is important in the context of
Schro¨dinger’s development of his wave version of quantum mechanics, and his charge against
the unintelligibility of Heisenberg’s matrix version.
57See Husserl’s letter to Weyl from April 10, 1918 (van Dalen 1984, 3 (183)).
58“das ausreichende Kriterium und untru¨gliche Kennzeichen der Wahrheit” (cf. Schlick 1918,
129 (161))
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[Evidence] represents nothing more than a word for the requirement
to stop doubting at this point. By means of this word, misgivings are
defeated, not reconciled. ... We have repeatedly rejected the invoca-
tion of evidence as the highest authority and last resort as perverse
and inappropriate.59
More pointedly, perhaps, Schlick maintained that even if one conceived of evidence
as an experience of truth, rather than as a feeling, one would still make the funda-
mental mistake of considering “truth and the mark of truth ... as something that
pertains to the individual judgment itself, without considering other judgments
and the real states of affairs.”60
In the remainder of this chapter, we want to bring under attention an episte-
mological question that Weyl’s phenomenological conception of evidence appears
to have left unanswered. The question is motivated by the fact that Weyl appears
to have believed that an experience of truth is not only an unexcelled basis for
believing that a theorem is true, but should also be taken as the proper basis
for explaining why a theorem is true. So the question is what characteristic(s)
of the experience of truth might have led him to believe this? More generally, in
what sense could an experience of truth render a mathematical proof explanatorily
deeper than a proof which does not seem to permit such an experience?
Weyl was definitely aware of the importance of providing explanatory proofs,
i.e., proofs that help one understand why a theorem is true. This is shown, for
example, in a 1932 paper:
59“[Evidenz] stellt ... nichts dar als ein Wort fu¨r die Forderung, an diesem Punkte mit dem
Zweifel Halt zu machen. Durch dies Wort werden Bedenken niedergeschlagen, nicht verso¨hnt.
... Wir haben die Anrufung der Evidenz als ho¨chste Instanz und letzte Zuflucht wiederholt als
verkehrt und untunlich abgelehnt.” (cf. Schlick 1918, 129 (161))
60“die Wahrheit und das Kennzeichen der Wahrheit gedacht werden als etwas am einzelnen
Urteil selber Haftendes, ohne Ru¨cksicht auf andere Urteile und auf Wirklichkeiten.” (Cf. Schlick
1918, 129 (161)). For a detailed analysis of Schlick’s theory of truth, see Howard 1992, 200-205
(96). For Weyl’s reaction to Schlick’s theory, see Weyl 1918b, 59f (192).
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We are not content to get convicted, as it were, rather than convinced
of a mathematical theorem by a long chain of formal inferences and
calculations leading us as blindfolded from link to link. We would like
to be shown besides the goal also the way we are to follow in general
outline, to understand the underlying ideas of the proof and their con-
nections. Instead, a modern mathematical proof just as any modern
machine or experimental arrangement smothers, by the complexity of
technical details, the simple principles on which it is based.61
Hence, Weyl acknowledged that mathematical proof may produce conviction, i.e.,
show that a theorem is true. However, understanding why a theorem is true
requires stronger epistemic conditions than mere conviction, it requires that one
reveal the “inner ground” of the theorem. According to him, the most important
reason for which a modern mathematical proof fails to bring about understanding
is its opacity. This implies that, on Weyl’s view, understanding requires that proof
be transparent. But what makes proof transparent?
Proof, one might argue, is transparent just in case the mathematical objects
that the proof refers to are, themselves, transparent. This claim is typically en-
dorsed by those who believe, like Weyl did, that mathematical objects, numbers
in particular, are creations of the mind. However, as we will see presently, he be-
61Manuscript Hs91a:72. In another manuscript, Hs91a:27, published as ‘Axiomatic versus
Constructive Procedures in Mathematics’ in 1985 by T. Tonietti, the same passage underwent
some minor modifications: “We are not content to get convicted, as it were, rather than con-
vinced of a mathematical truth by a long chain of formal inferences and calculations leading
us as blindfolded from link to link. We would like to be shown not only the goal but also the
way and general outline we are to travel to that goal, to understand the underlying ideas of the
proof and their connections. Indeed a modern mathematical proof just as any modern machine
or experimental arrangement effaces, so to speak, by the complexity of technical details the
simple principles on which it is based.” (Weyl 1985, 14 (218)) The published version missed
Weyl’s original emphasis of the word “understand.” The German version is: “Wir geben uns
nicht gerne damit zufrieden, einer mathematischen Wahrheit u¨berfu¨hrt zu werden durch eine
komplizierte Verkettung formeller Schlu¨ße und Rechnungen, an der wir uns sozusagen blind von
Glied zu Glied entlang tasten mu¨ssen. Wir mo¨chten vorher Ziel und Weg u¨berblicken ko¨nnen, wir
mo¨chten den inneren Grund der Gedankenfu¨hrung, die Idee des Beweises, den tieferen Zusam-
menhang verstehen. Es ist ja mit einem modernen mathematischen Beweis kaum anders als
mit einer modernen Maschine oder einer modernen physikalischen Versuchsanordnung: die ein-
fachen Grundprinzipien sind eingebettet und dem Blicke fast entzog durch eine Fu¨lle technischer
Details.” (Weyl 1932a, 348 (205))
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lieved that the transparency of mathematical objects, which is due to one’s having
created them, is insufficient for understanding if it is conceived of as a feeling of
evidence, i.e., as a subjective reaction to one’s creatorly experiences. We suggest
that Weyl was led to this view by Husserl’s criticism of empiricism. We further
submit that, on Weyl’s view, the experience of truth is not only a proper basis
for believing a provable proposition, but also one that is indispensable for under-
standing why the proposition is true, for only an experience of truth can make its
proof transparent.
2.7 Weyl on the “Understanding from Within”
In this section, we argue that Weyl’s commitment to a maker’s knowledge
view about the nature of mathematical objects, according to which these objects
are created by the mind and thus fully transparent to the mind, does not entail
commitment to the view that this transparency of objects is enough to explain
why a mathematical theorem is true.
Let us start by noting that, in the German cultural space, the maker’s knowl-
edge tradition received its earliest expression in the works of Nicholas of Cusa.
He argued, against Plato and his followers, that mathematics is based on acts of
creation, rather than acts of contemplation:
Man is a second god. For just as God is the Creator of real beings
and of natural forms, so man is the creator of conceptual beings and
of artificial forms that are only likenesses of his intellect, just as God’s
creatures are likenesses of the Divine Intellect. And so, man has an
intellect that is a likeness of the Divine Intellect, with respect to cre-
ating. [...] Plato said ... that the circle’s quiddity (which is simple and
incorruptible and free of all contraries) is seen by the intellect alone. ...
[But] if Plato had considered [that man’s intellect is like God’s intel-
lect with respect to creating], assuredly he would have found that our
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mind, which constructs mathematical entities, has these mathematical
entities, which are in its power, more truly present within itself than
as they exist outside the mind.62
What Cusa seems to have meant here is that the fact that mathematical objects
are produced by the mind guarantees their being “more truly present” within the
mind than the objects that are not produced by the mind. The true presence
within the mind of the mathematical objects makes us able allegedly to obtain
precise, or divine-like, knowledge of mathematical objects: “mathematical entities
are notional entities, we know them precisely, by our reason’s precision, since they
proceed from our reason.”63
Before we analyze this view, let us further note that, like Cusa, Weyl also
believed that as far as the certainty (Gewißheit) of mathematical insight is con-
cerned, “the human intellect does not fall short of the divine intellect.”64 This
claim seems to be supported by his endorsement of the maker’s knowledge view of
the nature of mathematical objects: “The numbers are to a far greater measure
than the objects and relations of space a free product of the mind and therefore
62Cf. Cusa 1458, 7ff (31).
63Cf. Cusa 1460, 43 (32) (see Breidert 1977 (21) and Ho¨sle 1990 (95), for a discussion of Cusa’s
anti-Platonism). Similar epistemological views were, before Cusa, advanced by Maimonides, and
after him, by Hobbes (see section 3.2 below) and Vico (cf. Vico 1725 (185)). Kant expressed
himself along similar lines, most clearly perhaps in the third Critique: “One sees completely only
into what one can make oneself and bring about in accordance with concepts.” (“Denn nur soviel
sieht man vollsta¨ndig ein, als man nach Begriffen selbst machen und zustande bringen kann.”)
Schopenhauer, as we have seen in section 2.4 above, defended similar views. Salomon Maimon
also noted: “All concepts of mathematics are thought by us, and at the same time presented
as real objects through construction a priori. Thus we are in this respect similar to God. ...
God thinks all real objects, not merely according to the principle of contradiction so highly
prized in philosophy, but rather as we (albeit in a more complete manner) think the objects of
mathematics, i.e., He produces them immediately through thought.” (quoted in Franks 2005,
141. For discussion, see Lachterman 1992 (116), Buzaglo 2002 (23).) For two valuable book-
length discussions of the maker’s knowledge tradition, see Pe`rez-Ramos 1988 (145) and Miner
2004 (136).
64“der ... Gewißheit nach, aber stehe in jeder gewonnenen mathematischen Einsicht der men-
schliche Intellekt dem go¨ttlichen nicht nach.” (Weyl 1927a, 15 (198); Eng. tr., 16 (211))
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transparent to the mind.”65 Hence, in Weyl’s opinion, arithmetic is characterized
by its objects’ being transparent to the mind, where this transparency appears to
be due to their being presented to the mind from within, rather than from without.
This characteristic seems to entail a special kind of knowledge of mathematical
objects, more certain than whatever knowledge we might have of objects that
are not produced by the mind. But in spite of his commitment to this maker’s
knowledge view of the nature of mathematical objects, Weyl came to doubt that
the view offers an adequate epistemology of mathematics. Evidence for this claim
appears in the following passage, where he dismissed the notion of “understanding
from within” as inadequate for mathematics:
Ideas and intuitive understanding versus calculation and strict logical
deductions: what is the real point in these contrasts, what is the se-
cret of understanding a mathematical fact? Certain epistemological
schools, I mention the name of Wilhelm Dilthey, have claimed under-
standing from within, hermeneutics, as the proper basis for historical
research and the humanities, whereas the natural sciences seek to ex-
plain rather than to understand [from within] the phenomena. The
words “intuition, understanding” appear here with a certain [mystical]
nimbus indicating a depth and immediacy of their own. In mathemat-
ics we prefer to look at things more soberly.66
Why did Weyl believe that the depth and immediacy of the “understanding from
within” or “intuitive understanding,” as the notion was conceived of in Dilthey’s
65“Die Zahlen in ganz anderem Maße freies Erzeugnis des Geistes und darum auch fu¨r den
Geist durchsichtig sind als die Objekte und Beziehungen des Raumes.” (Weyl 1927a, 19 (198);
Eng. tr., 22 (211))
66“Was aber ist das Geheimnis eines solchen Verstehens mathematischer Sachverhalte, worin
besteht es? In der Philosophie der Wissenschaften hat man neuerdings versucht, das Verste-
hen, die Hermeneutik als die Grundlage der Geisteswissenschaften dem naturwissenschaftlichen
Erkla¨ren gegenu¨berzustellen, und die Worte Intuition, Verstehen erscheinen da mit einem gewis-
sen mystischen Nimbus, eine eigene Tiefe und Unmittelbarkeit anzeigend. In der Mathematik
werden wir vorziehen, die Dinge etwas nu¨chterner anzusehen.” (Weyl 1932a, 348 (205)) The
English translation is Weyl’s own (Weyl 1985, 15 (218)).
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hermeneutics, while presumably appropriate for the human sciences, is inadequate
for mathematics? To answer this question, let us observe that Dilthey’s doctrine
of Verstehen has been usually interpreted as having developed along the lines
of the maker’s knowledge view.67 Indeed, according to him, the essential feature
that distinguishes the methodology of the human sciences from that of the natural
sciences is that the object of the former, but not that of the latter, is a product
of the mind of the scientist:
These sciences [i.e., the human sciences] have an entirely different foun-
dation and structure than the sciences of nature. Their object is com-
posed of given, elementary units, which we understand from within.
... There is a specific type of experience that takes place here [in the
human sciences]: the object builds up itself only gradually before the
eyes of the progressing science. Individuals and actions are the ele-
ments of this experience, whose nature is the absorption in the object
of all the powers of the mind.68
Dilthey seems to have believed that in the human sciences objects are products of
the mind, and that we experience these objects in a particular way, different than
that in which we may experience the objects of the natural sciences. For example,
he added, we reach intuitive understanding in the theory of the states because
states are created by us; and we understand history because we make the objects
that history is concerned with. The rejection of this view, by Weyl, suggests that
67Isaiah Berlin, for instance, wrote that the maker’s knowledge view, as formulated by Vico,
“uncovered a species of knowing not previously clearly discriminated, the embryo that later grew
into the ambitious and luxuriant plant of German historicist Verstehen – empathetic insight,
intuitive sympathy, historical Einfu¨hlung, and the like.” (Berlin 1969, 375 (13)) See also Tuttle
1976 (181).
68“Diese Wissenchaften haben eine ganz andere Grundlage und Struktur als die der Natur. Ihr
Objekt setzt sich aus gegebenen, nicht erschloßenen Einheiten, welche uns von ihnen versta¨ndlich
sind, zusammen. ... Und es ist eine eigene Art von Erfahrung, die hier stattfindet: das Objekt
baut sich selber erst vor den Augen der fortschreitenden Wissenschaft nach und nach auf; In-
dividuen und Taten sind die Elemente dieser Erfahrung, Versenkung aller Gemu¨tskra¨fte in den
Gegenstand ist ihre Natur.” (Dilthey 1883, 109 (41))
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the type of experience that one has of one’s own creations is, according to him,
not sufficient for understanding a mathematical theorem. As we have seen in
the previous section, understanding a mathematical theorem requires, on Weyl’s
view, that one give a transparent proof for the theorem, i.e., a proof that helps
one understand why the theorem is true. Thus, his point seems to have been that,
in mathematics, creatorly experience is not sufficient to make a proof transparent.
But what could justify this point?
Let us look more carefully at the maker’s knowledge view. According to this
view, as we have seen already, our creation of mathematical objects entails that
our knowledge in mathematics is deeper and more certain than in other sciences,
the objects of which are not made by us. For creation offers a special kind of
experience, one that a maker is thought to have of her own creations just in virtue
of being their maker. But one should ask what renders this type of experience
capable of furnishing any knowledge at all?
One might argue that the making itself provides a privileged observation point,
from where the object made – the artefact – can be most properly observed. This
means that the artefact is transparent to the mind in virtue of an experience
associated with observation from a vantage point. But why would the ability to
observe an object from that vantage point entail that the maker’s knowledge of it
is deeper or more secure than the knowledge other observers, located at different
observation points, might have of that same object? Indeed, why would that
ability entail that the maker has any knowledge at all of that object? As has been
noted, “simple balances were constructed in antiquity hundreds of years before
Archimedes discovered the principle upon which they operate, and for us post-
Archimedeans a simple glance at such artefacts tells us much more than their
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makers could have known.”69 The special character of the maker’s knowledge
might also be said to be based on the maker’s privileged access to her own creative
intentions. Then, those who constructed simple balances before Archimedes could
really be said to have possessed a special kind of knowledge. But if what is
needed for the maker’s knowledge of an artefact is only knowledge of her creative
intentions, then this type of knowledge is not obtained in virtue of being a maker,
but rather in virtue of being an intender. Thus, one could have had maker’s
knowledge of simple balances, before Archimedes, even if nobody had actually
produced any such thing!70
Yet, one may think that the special epistemic character of the maker’s knowl-
edge derives from a certain feeling of evidence that the creator has with respect
to her own creations. A mathematician, thus, obtains a deeper and more certain
knowledge of mathematical objects because her creatorly experiences in making
these objects give rise to such a feeling of evidence. But if this is so, and if it is
indeed correct to see Dilthey’s notion of understanding from within as developed
along the lines of the maker’s knowledge view, then Weyl’s justification for re-
jecting the understanding from within as inadequate for mathematics is that the
feeling of evidence caused by one’s having created the mathematical objects a the-
orem refers to is insufficient for rendering its proof transparent, i.e., is incapable of
revealing the axioms from which the theorem is derived. In other words, the feel-
ing of evidence caused by a mathematician’s creatorly experiences cannot explain
why the theorem is true. This claim, we suggest, was taken by Weyl to be based
69Cf. Gaukroger 1986, 40 (72).
70One might want to point out, nevertheless, that the maker’s knowledge is not only knowledge
of intentions, but also knowledge that the artefact has been actually produced. But this seems
to be based on mere observation and, thus, not of a special epistemic character (cf. Mackie 1974,
104f (126)).
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on Husserl’s criticism of the empiricist view of evidence as a feeling, discussed
above in section 2.5. As we have seen there, Husserl argued that philosophers like
Mill, Ho¨fler, and Meinong misconceived the nature of evidence and, thus, failed to
establish it as a criterion of truth. Weyl appears to have taken this to imply that
the understanding from within, as supported by a feeling of evidence, cannot ex-
plain why a proposition is true, since it cannot even indicate that the proposition
is true. Hence, he concluded, one should be looking at mathematical things more
soberly, that is, one should investigate more carefully the conditions required for
understanding in mathematics.
What did Weyl take these conditions to be? In particular, what did he think
about the relation between understanding and Husserl’s own notion of evidence
as an experience of truth? Does the experience of truth fare any better than the
understanding from within with respect to explaining why a mathematical theo-
rem is true? What might be the conditions under which a Husserlian experience
of truth can be considered explanatory? We want to suggest, in the following sec-
tion, that Weyl took an experience of truth to be indispensable for mathematical
understanding, but only if admitted as a form of proof.
2.8 Weyl on Immanent Axiomatics and Understanding
According to Weyl, by contrast to what he called transcendent axiomatics,
illustrated by Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry and real analysis, immanent
axiomatics is a method of proof aimed at bringing about understanding: “The pur-
pose of this sort of axiomatics [i.e., of immanent axiomatics] is to understand.”71
As we have seen above, understanding a mathematical theorem amounts, on his
71Cf. Weyl 1985, 14 (218).
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view, to determining the inner ground of that theorem, i.e., to explaining why
the theorem is true. This suggests that Weyl believed that immanent axiomatics
should be thought of as a means for explaining why a theorem is true. But what
are the features of immanent axiomatics that confer explanatory power to imma-
nent axiomatic proofs? There are two main features that need to be emphasized
in this respect. First, on Weyl’s view, immanent axiomatic proofs are always new
proofs, which attempt to supersede, in an epistemic sense, proofs already avail-
able. Secondly, as we will presently see, the immanent axioms are not considered
unprovable propositions. Rather, they need to be, in a certain sense, proved.
Let us start with Weyl’s remark that the mathematician’s attempts to solve
problems and prove theorems are indispensable for the formation of general mathe-
matical concepts. In his Fields Committee President speech, speaking of Kodaira’s
work in algebraic geometry, Weyl noted: “Only if someone has the courage of
attacking the primary concrete problems in all their complexity, will the gen-
eral concepts gradually emerge which resolve the difficulties and ease the further
progress.”72 What does it mean to say that general concepts emerge by attacking
and eventually solving concrete mathematical problems?
The case is this: all these nice general notions do not fall into our laps
by themselves. But definite concrete problems were first conquered in
their undivided complexity, single-handed by brute force, so to speak.
Only afterwards the axiomaticians came along and stated: Instead of
breaking in the door with all your might and bruising your hands, you
should have constructed such and such a key of skill, and by it you
would have been able to open the door quite smoothly. But they can
72Cf. Weyl 1954a, 619 (215). The concept that Weyl referred to is that of a Kodaira dimension,
a numerical invariant on the basis of which Kodaira attempted to classify the algebraic varieties,
such that each family of algebraic varieties has a given Kodaira dimension (although more than
one family can have the same Kodaira dimension). The emergence of this concept allowed, as
Weyl remarked, a “profound generalization of the well-known fact that every compact Riemann
surface belongs to an algebraic function field.”
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construct the key only because they are able, after the breaking in was
successful, to study the lock from within and without. Before you can
generalize, formalize and axiomatize, there must be a mathematical
substance.73
Weyl seems to have denied that the axiomatist could actually solve problems
and prove theorems that have not already been given a solution or proof. He
suggested that non-axiomatic proofs and solutions – what he metaphorically called
the “mathematical substance” – must be already available for the axiomatist to
be able to form general concepts and formulate her axioms. Weyl thought that
the goal of axiomatics was not to prove theorems, but to find new proofs for those
already proved. He also suggested that there are particular epistemic gains that
are brought about by axiomatic proofs. But it is not clear why he believed that
mathematical understanding might be an epistemic gain of immanent axiomatics,
in particular. That is, it is not clear why he believed that an immanent axiomatic
proof would be needed for understanding why a theorem is true. To clarify this
point, let us look at Weyl’s general characterization of immanent axiomatics:
Immanent axiomatics as applied in algebra or topology or some other
concrete branch of mathematics is neither based on external evidence
nor on hypotheses, but the axioms are proved to hold for the math-
ematical objects in the individual situations to which the axioms are
applied. ... Axiomatics as used in concrete mathematical research is au
fond a much simpler affair [than transcendent axiomatics]. One just
73“Es ist na¨hmlich so, daß alle die scho¨nen allgemeinen Begriffe nicht von selber den Menschen
in die Ha¨nde fallen. Sondern zuerst sind bestimmte konkrete Probleme, in ihrer unzerlegten
Komplexita¨t, sozusagen durch brutale Gewalt von Einzelnen bezwungen worden. Erst nach-
her kommen die Axiomatiker und stellen fest: Statt die Tu¨r mit aller Anspannung der Kra¨fte
einzudru¨cken und sich die Ha¨nde blutig zu reißen, ha¨tte man sich einen so und so beschaffenen
kunstvollen Schlu¨ssel konstruieren sollen, und mit ihm wa¨re die Tu¨r ganz leise wie von selber zu
o¨ffnen gewesen. Aber den Schlu¨ssel ko¨nnen sie doch erst konstruieren, weil sie nach gelungenem
Durchbruch das Schloss von hinten und vorn, von aussen und innen studieren ko¨nnen. Bevor
man generalisieren, formalisieren und axiomatisieren kann, muss eine mathematische Substanz
da sein.” (Weyl 1932a, 357 (205); Weyl 1935, 438 (207))
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formulates some of the fundamental facts which, as one can prove,
hold for the object of investigation, which is usually a set of freely
constructed elements. The questions of consistency, independence and
completeness are here [i.e., in immanent axiomatics] but of minor im-
portance.74
Hence, on Weyl’s view, immanent axioms should not be regarded as hypotheses
or postulates, nor are they empirical propositions. In a certain sense, such axioms
are to be proved. This claim is, of course, quite strange, since axioms are typically
considered to be unprovable propositions, i.e., propositions that are in no need of
proof or may not even allow of proof. It goes against the old Aristotelian view,
recalled in section 2.3 above, that only the uneducated man seeks to prove things
that one should not require proofs for. But it also seems to go against Weyl’s own
idea that, if one has an experience of their truth, mathematical propositions –
even those that are provable – are in no need of proof to provide a proper basis for
believing them. As we have seen already, he defended this idea against Dedekind,
and claimed that it is not proof, but rather the experience of truth, that offers
the most proper basis for believing a provable proposition.
However, these tensions disappear if one assumes the experience of truth as a
type of proof. On this assumption, to prove a proposition one needs to experience
its truth, that is, as we have seen in section 2.5 above, one must present before
one’s eyes, as Husserl put it, the objects that completely satisfy the meaning
intentions expressed in that proposition. If this is what Weyl had in mind, as it
seems plausible to think, then immanent axioms may be said to be provable in
the sense that their truth is experienceable.
This clarifies, to a certain extent, his view on the relation between the expe-
rience of truth and mathematical understanding: one cannot understand why a
74Cf. Weyl 1985, 14 (218).
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mathematical theorem is true without an experience of the truth of immanent
axioms. But it seems clear that Weyl could not have taken the experience of
the truth of immanent axioms to be sufficient for mathematical understanding.
The reason for this is that, as he suggested, though it may start from evident ax-
ioms, mathematical proof often proceeds in ways less than transparent. For proof
transparency to obtain, one must experience not only the truth of the axioms but
also the truth of the theorem derived from them. As emphasized in section 2.6
above, Weyl believed that this requires that one construct in intuition the objects
referred to in the theorem from those referred to in the axioms. For only the con-
struction of these objects can completely satisfy the prover’s meaning intentions
expressed in the theorem. Briefly stated, then, Weyl’s view seems to have been
that mathematical proof can bring about understanding only if it is constructive,
which entails that he regarded immanent axiomatic proof as constructive, i.e., as
proceeding through wholly contentual reasoning.
This view on understanding raises several questions. First, it is not clear what
Weyl thought about how mathematical concepts emerge in immanent axiomatics
and how they acquire contentual significance. Quite generally, the emergence of
concepts might be understood as a process of creation that is either free or con-
strained by intuition. As we will see in section 4.2 below, free creation character-
izes, according to Weyl, Hilbert’s transcendent axiomatics: transcendent axioms
are postulates formulated in terms of concepts that are radically separated from
intuition (although they may be suggested by intuition), rather than propositions
whose truth can be experienced. By contrast, the method of concept formation
that appears to characterize immanent axiomatics may be conceived of as a pro-
cess of creation by abstraction from what is intuitively presented in experience.
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This seems to be suggested by Weyl’s opinion that the concepts of group, field,
or Kodaira dimension are obtained from the “mathematical substance,” i.e., from
the properties and relations of the mathematical objects considered intuitively in
non-axiomatic proofs and solutions. We defer a closer discussion of Weyl’s view on
concept formation to the next chapter, where we analyze his critical engagement
with Fichte’s and Husserl’s philosophical doctrines.
Secondly, in the passage quoted above, Weyl claimed that the consistency,
independence and completeness of immanent axiomatic systems are of “minor im-
portance.” Since, according to him, this type of axiomatics aims at understanding,
to say that that consistency, independence, and completeness are of minor impor-
tance is to say that they are of minor importance with respect to understanding.
This claim might be taken to mean that consistency, independence, and complete-
ness are unnecessary for understanding, which entails that one may understand
why a theorem is true despite the inconsistency, non-independence, and/or incom-
pleteness of the system in which the theorem is proved. However, it is hard to
see how a proof can bring about understanding, if it is based on an inconsistent
and/or non-independent system of axioms.75
But Weyl’s claim that the consistency, independence, and completeness of
immanent axiomatic systems are of minor importance might also be taken to
mean that their proof is unnecessary. This entails that one may understand
why a theorem is true despite having no proof of consistency, independence, and
completeness. In fact, Weyl seems to have believed that proving completeness, in
the sense of syntactic completeness, would be adverse to understanding:
Completeness in this sense would be ensured only by the specification
75Weyl’s view on the relation between understanding and completeness, in the sense of cate-
goricity, is discussed in section 4.3 below.
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of a method to strictly regulate proof procedures, one that provably
leads to a decision for every relevant problem. Mathematics would
thereby be trivialized. But such a “philosopher’s stone” has not been
found and never will be found. Mathematics does not consist in omni-
laterally developing logical consequences from given assumptions; but
intuition, the life of the scientific mind, poses the problems, and these
cannot be solved like calculations, by applying a strict scheme.76
Weyl’s argument seems to be that syntactic completeness, if proved, would entail
a trivialization or mechanicization of mathematical activity. But trivialization
is adverse to understanding because it transforms genuine problem-solving into
mere calculation, without any experience of truth. Why would proving syntactic
completeness entail trivialization? According to him, if one knew that a system
is syntactically complete, that all problems are decidable, one would start to
“omnilaterally develop logical consequences” from the axioms and then one would
just “discard the ‘uninteresting’ consequences.” But it is not clear what justifies
this claim. As is well known, there are mathematical systems, like Presburger
arithmetic (basically, first order Peano arithmetic without multiplication), that
are syntactically complete, but not trivial in any sense.77
Another question raised by Weyl’s view on understanding is how well does
this account for actual mathematical practice, especially considering the develop-
ment of modern mathematics? As already noted above, it is hard to see how, on
Schopenhauer’s view, one could avoid the conclusion that most of modern math-
ematics is unscientific. But can Weyl’s view, which does not seem to essentially
differ from Schopenhauer’s, avoid this conclusion? As we will see in chapter four,
the answer is both yes and no. For, on the one hand, Weyl considered transcendent
axiomatic proofs as unscientific, since he believed that they lack transparency and,
76Cf. Weyl 1927, 20f (198), Weyl 1949, 24 (211).
77Cf. Presburger 1930 (148).
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thus, hide the inner ground of a mathematical theorem, i.e., they cannot explain
why the theorem is true, as they dispense with the construction of mathematical
objects. On the other hand, Weyl considered that transcendent axiomatics is, in
a certain sense, scientific, but only if one takes into account its relation to physics.
For, as he noted, this type of axiomatics has an indispensable role in the theoret-
ical construction of the real world, that is, in the formation of objective scientific
theories.
2.9 Conclusion
We started this chapter with an analysis of Weyl’s argument against the view
defended by Dedekind, according to which the proper basis for believing a provable
proposition is proof, rather than intuitive evidence. The proper basis for belief is
proof, and only proof, because, as Bolzano emphasized, proof, and only proof, can
reveal the objective ordering of truths. We have seen that Schopenhauer rejected
this view on the basis of the idea that genuine scientific knowledge requires that
the ordering revealed by proof be based on intuitive evidence. Weyl, we argued,
adopted a largely Schopenhauerian position, as he maintained that evidence, con-
ceived of a` la Husserl as an experience of truth, i.e., as an epistemic achievement
of a complete satisfaction of a prover’s meaning intentions, is an unexcelled basis
for belief, and that the provability of a mathematical proposition cannot render
this basis inadequate for proper belief.
Afterwards, we discussed the relation between an experience of truth and math-
ematical understanding. We argued that, led by Husserl’s criticism of the view of
evidence as a feeling, Weyl rejected the maker’s knowledge view of mathematical
understanding as based on a feeling of evidence, and came to think that an ex-
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perience of truth is also the proper basis for understanding why a mathematical
theorem is true. This assumes, however, that such an experience can be admitted
as a form of proof. But the only form of proof that the experience of truth may
take is, as we have seen, that of an immanent axiomatic proof, i.e., a proof that
provides a construction of the objects that a theorem refers to. On Weyl’s view,
then, understanding why a theorem is true requires wholly contentual reasoning.
In the next chapter, we will see that Weyl thought that the method of con-
cept formation that he believed could support both understanding and objectivity
is Husserl’s ideational abstraction, rather than traditional empiricist abstraction.
However, we argue that Weyl eventually came to realize that scientific objectiv-
ity requires the introduction of hypothetical elements, i.e., real but in principle
unobservable entities, and thus it requires free creation as a method of concept
formation and partly non-contentual or purely symbolic reasoning. This fact re-
veals, as will be emphasized, a fundamental tension between what he took to




ABSTRACTION, FREE CREATION, AND OBJECTIVITY
3.1 Introduction
In the present chapter, we consider Weyl’s views about the formation of scien-
tific concepts and its connection with objectivity. As we have seen in the previous
chapter, he believed that understanding requires wholly contentual reasoning and,
as will be clarified below, he endorsed the view that concepts emerge by abstrac-
tion from immediate experience. But we will also see that Weyl eventually came
to realize that scientific objectivity requires that concepts be introduced by free
creation, rather than abstraction, and that non-contentual or purely symbolic rea-
soning is indispensable for our knowledge of the mind-independent world. This
indicates that, on Weyl’s view, there is a fundamental tension between the neces-
sary conditions for intelligibility and the necessary conditions for objectivity.
We start with Weyl’s remarks on the traditional empiricist view that physical
concepts are obtained through abstraction from perceptual experience. He be-
lieved that this view, as represented, for example, by Hobbes’ constructivist view
of natural science, fails to account for what physicists actually do when they do
physics, since it fails to account for hypothetical elements, i.e., real but in prin-
ciple unobservable entities. By empiricist abstraction one cannot introduce, for
example, the concepts of force, energy, or electromagnetic field, since neither force
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nor energy nor field can be given in perceptual experience. Therefore, Weyl con-
cluded, traditional empiricism cannot account for scientific objectivity, that is, for
the physicists’ attempt to provide knowledge of the mind-independent world, al-
though it might account, just like Leibniz’ monadological phenomenalism, for mere
intersubjectivity. Then, we discuss Weyl’s interpretation of Fichte’s constructivist
view in the Wissenschaftslehre. We present the latter’s argument against abstrac-
tion and his emphasis on the freedom of the mind to create concepts, and then
explain the reason for Weyl’s rejection of Fichte’s view. Weyl noted that Fichte
misconceived the connection between freely created concepts and our perceptual
experience, as he claimed that what can be known through perceptual experience
coincides with what is freely created by the mind and, thus, known independently
of perceptual experience. This seems to have led Weyl to believe that the Wis-
senschaftslehre embraces Leibniz’ monadological phenomenalism and, thus, fails
to account for objectivity.
Early in his career, Weyl endorsed Husserl’s phenomenological view that ob-
jectivity demands what the latter called “ideational” abstraction, rather than
traditional empiricist abstraction. Ideational abstraction introduces general con-
cepts on the basis of a certain relation between intending acts of the mind, rather
than by disregarding certain properties of the intended objects. We show how
Weyl modified the general theory of relativity in light of this view, and explain
that the epistemological significance of this modification resides in the elimina-
tion from the physical theory of the concepts obtained from intending acts that
cannot be satisfied by the intuitive presentation of the intended objects. In his
1927 Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science, Weyl developed the view
that a scientific proposition can be considered objective only if one knows that it
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is true when relativized to any coordinate systems. This view may also be un-
derstood along phenomenological lines, as it actually comes down to saying that
a proposition is objective only if one knows that it is true for any transcendental
subjectivity, i.e., as we will explain, only if one has an experience of its truth.
We argue, however, that Weyl ultimately turned against the phenomenological
approach to scientific objectivity. To support this claim, we show that he came to
reject the idea, defended by Husserl, that the experience of truth is necessary for
objectivity. Weyl’s rejection of this idea was based on the observation that the
truth of a proposition about hypothetical elements, i.e., about real but in principle
unobservable entities, cannot be experienced, for no such entity can be presented
in intuition. He came to disagree with Husserl’s rejection of the positing of such
entities, and to realize that pure phenomenology, just like Hobbes’ and Fichte’s
constructivisms, collapses into monadological phenomenalism. The positing of
hypothetical elements in physics led Weyl to believe that scientific objectivity re-
quires the introduction of concepts that are not obtained by abstraction, but freely
created through the stipulation of fundamental theoretical presuppositions (e.g.,
Newton’s laws, Maxwell’s equations, and the like). It is this belief that suggested
to him, as we will see in chapter four, that the scientific significance of Hilbert’s
transcendent axiomatics should be seeked in connection with the epistemic ideal
of objectivity, rather than that of intelligibility.
3.2 Weyl on Hobbes’ Constructivism and Empiricist Abstraction
In this section, we want to explain why Weyl considered that traditional em-
piricism, Hobbes’ view in particular, fails to account adequately for the objectivity
of scientific knowledge. Then, in the next section, we will discuss his reasons for
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thinking that Husserl’s phenomenology could avoid the problems raised against
traditional empiricism, while preserving an essentially similar view of scientific
concept formation.
Hobbes’ view on physics can be best understood by comparison with his view
on geometry. He thought that geometry was unique with respect to the epistemic
character of its results, that it is a demonstrable art, a scientia, and could share
its status only with “civil philosophy:”
Of arts, some are demonstrable, others indemonstrable; and demon-
strable are those the construction of the subject whereof is in the power
of the artist himself, who, in his demonstration, does no more but de-
duce the consequences of his own operation. The reason whereof is
this, that the science of every subject is derived from a precognition of
the causes, generation, and construction of the same; and consequently
where the causes are known, there is place for demonstration, but not
where the causes are to seek for. Geometry therefore is demonstrable,
for the lines and figures from which we reason are drawn and described
by ourselves; and civil philosophy is demonstrable because, we make
the commonwealth ourselves. But because of natural bodies we know
not the construction, but seek it from the effects, there lies no demon-
stration of what the causes be we seek for, but only of what they may
be.1
The fact that, on Hobbes’ view, geometry and civil philosophy are demonstrable
seems to be due to the geometer’s and the civil philosopher’s power to successfully
construct their objects of inquiry, i.e., geometrical figures and the commonwealth.
Their success appears to be guaranteed by the fact that the geometer and the
civil philosopher possess the causes from which, and the operations whereby, such
objects are constructed. The knowledge that they obtain of these constructed
1Cf. Hobbes 1656, 183f (92). For useful analyses of Hobbes’ view on geometry and demon-
stration, see Sacksteder 1980 (160), Jesseph 2007 (109).
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objects is, as one might put it, maker’s knowledge.2
Note, however, that Hobbes did not claim that the physicist cannot be a con-
structor or a maker. Hobbes seems to have suggested that, in physics, knowledge
of the true causes and operations for the generation of physical objects is not a
necessary condition for theoretical construction. For he says that in physics “there
lies no demonstration of what the causes be we seek for, but only of what they may
be.” He, thus, seems to suggest that there is room for construction in physics, but
not the type of construction that one employs in mathematics. The physicist is a
maker, but not a maker of the real world. What, then, is the physicist a maker
of?
Hobbes’ view about construction in physics can be explained by considering a
thought experiment that he offered in his De Corpore.3 He maintained there that
the way physics proceeds can be best understood if one imagines an annihilation of
the world, following which nothing remains but man, who preserves his ability to
think, imagine, and remember. Hobbes noted that, before the annihilation of the
world, bodies are taken to exist independently of the mind. As mind-independent,
bodies have magnitude (or extension), and insofar as they have magnitude, bodies
constitute real space. According to him, all natural phenomena reduce to bodily
changes caused by real motions, i.e., motions in real space. Therefore, if one seeks
knowledge of natural phenomena, one needs to determine the real motions that
cause bodily changes. But real motions are in principle completely inaccessible
to us – we do not possess them, as it were. How can the physicist, then, obtain
knowledge of natural phenomena?
2Cf., e.g., Pe`rez-Ramos 1988 (145), Miner 2004 (136), Jesseph 2007 (109). For a more detailed
discussion of the maker’s knowledge principle, see section 2.7 above.
3Cf. Hobbes 1655, II, 7 (91).
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The world has been annihilated, Hobbes added, only for the sake of a new
genesis on the basis of our own “phantasms,” which had been obtained either by
abstraction from definite bodies, i.e., bodies as distinguished from one another,
or from bodies taken indefinitely, i.e., by abstraction from the qualitative char-
acteristics that distinguish bodies from one another. The former are phantasms
of “light and colour, and heat and sound, and other qualities which are com-
monly called sensible.”4 The latter are phantasms of space, time, and motion. On
Hobbes’ view, the physicist aims at obtaining knowledge of natural phenomena
by drawing consequences from her operations with such phantasms:
If we do but observe diligently what it is we do when we consider and
reason, we shall find, that though all things be still remaining in the
world, yet we compute nothing but our own phantasms. For when we
calculate the magnitude and motions of heaven and earth, we do not
ascend into heaven that we may divide it into parts, or measure the
motions thereof, but we do it sitting still in our closets or in the dark.5
The relevant question is, of course, whether by drawing consequences from oper-
ations with her phantasms the physicist can indeed obtain knowledge of natural
phenomena. What Hobbes seems to suggest is that although the physicist’s knowl-
edge cannot be maker’s knowledge of natural phenomena (since the physicist lacks
the elements and the operations required for their construction), it is neverthe-
less knowledge enough insofar as it is based on the elements and the operations
available to the physicist for a reconstruction of natural phenomena.
Now, how did Weyl interpret this view? Here is a comment he made in his
Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science:
4Cf. Hobbes 1655, 391f (91).
5Cf. Hobbes 1655, 92 (91).
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Hobbes developed the view (English Works VII, 183ff) that we know
with certainty only in those sciences which construct their objects
from the conditions residing within the knowing subject. To him, it
is not the mental images that are the reality, but their content that
makes its construction possible. In contrast with the mere cognitio,
this synthetic process of generating the phenomenon from its grounds
is the scientia in the strict sense. This takes place within the natural
science as far as mathematical deduction is possible.6
As we have seen above, according to Hobbes, natural phenomena cannot be con-
structed from their grounds, i.e., from real motions, for such motions are not in the
physicist’s possession – they do not reside within the subject. This is why Hobbes
believed that natural science is mere cognitio, and not scientia. By contrast, on
his view, mathematics is scientia, and not mere cognitio, since mathematical ob-
jects can be constructed from their grounds, i.e., from imaginary motions, for
such motions are in the mathematician’s possession – these do reside within the
subject.
Weyl’s comment, however, points out that there is no unbridgeable division
between Hobbes’ cognitio and scientia, since mathematical reasoning is actually
used in physics quite extensively. Thus, according to Weyl, there is scientia within
cognitio insofar as not only the mathematician, but also the physicist has the
power to construct objects from elements within the mind. These elements, as
he emphasizes, are not mental images – the sense data – but ideas or phantasms
abstracted from them. Weyl seems to have thought that Hobbes believed that
the objects thus constructed by the physicist are, in a certain sense, real. Thus,
6“Hobbes entwickelt den Satz (English Works VII, S.183ff), daß wir mit Gewißheit nur in
den Wissenschaften erkennen, welche ihren Gegenstand konstruieren aus den im erkennenden
Subjekt gelegenen Konstruktionsbedingungen. Ihm sind nicht die Bewußtseinsbilder die Wirk-
lichkeit, sondern das in ihnen Enthaltene, das ihre Konstruktion mo¨glich macht. Im Unter-
schiede von der bloßen cognitio sei dieser synthetische Fortgang der Erzeugung der Erscheinung
aus ihrem Grunde die scientia in strengem Verstande. Eine solche finde innerhalb des Natur-
erkennens soweit statt, als mathematische Ableitung mo¨glich ist.” (Cf. Weyl 1927a, 111f (198),
Eng. tr., 151 (211))
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according to Weyl, Hobbes’ view was that to the extent that the physicist proceeds
in accordance with the method of scientia, physical knowledge can be both certain
and objective.
Nevertheless, Weyl argued that this view is wrong. He maintained that the
problem with it is that the phantasms within the mind – sensible qualities and
imaginary motions – are merely empirical concepts, a “Ru¨ckstand der Erfahrung,”
a mere residue of our perceptual experience.7 It is this limitation to empirical
concepts that makes Hobbes’ view and, more generally, traditional empiricism,
unable to provide an accurate account of scientific objectivity. For, Weyl wrote,
modern science goes beyond perceptual experience, in the following sense:
We are not satisfied with intuitively isolable elements but interpret
a series of properties which always appear together as an indication
of a concealed something. This leads to hypothetical elements, such
as atoms, forces, electro-magnetic field, etc. Moreover, we learn to
interpret not only the observable properties but also the reactions that
occur if one system is brought together with another as manifestations
of such hypothetical elements and of their intensive and quantitative
values.8
Hence, modern science goes beyond perceptual experience in the sense that it
postulates hypothetical entities, like forces and fields, which are assumed to be
real but in principle unobservable. For example, in classical field theory, one posits
the existence of a real but in principle unobservable field around a conductor, a
field that exerts an observable influence on other bodies. The concept of a field,
7Cf. Weyl 1927a, 79 (198); Eng. tr., 112 (211).
8“Man bleibt nicht bei anschaulich abhebbaren Elementen stehen, sondern faßt eine Reihe
stets zusammen auftretender Beschaffenheiten als Anzeichen eines verborgenen Etwas auf: dies
fu¨hrt zu hypothetischen Elementen, wie z. B. den Atomen, den Kra¨ften, dem elektromag-
netischen Feld. Aber nicht nur die vorfindbaren Beschaffenheiten, sondern auch die Verhal-
tungsweisen eines Systems beim Zusammenbringen mit anderen lernt man deuten als Bekun-
dungen derartiger Elemente und ihres intensiven oder quantitativen Wertes.” (Weyl 1927a, 107
(198); Eng. tr., 146 (211))
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however, cannot be an empirical concept, i.e., it cannot be obtained by abstraction
from the properties of a particular object given in perceptual experience, for no
electromagnetic field can be an object of perceptual experience. Thus, Weyl’s main
reason for rejecting the traditional empiricist approach to scientific objectivity,
Hobbes’ view in particular, appears to be due to its inability to account for the
introduction of so-called theoretical concepts.
This criticism emphasizes that basic propositions of modern science could not
even be formulated, if traditional empiricist abstraction was assumed as a method
of concept formation. Physics would be crippled, were one to limit its concep-
tual apparatus to mere empirical concepts. In particular, if this apparatus were
thus limited, one would fall short of attaining objective knowledge, i.e., knowledge
about the real, mind-independent world, even though one might attain intersub-
jectivity:
As long as I do not go beyond what is simply given, or more exactly,
what is merely given at the moment, there is obviously no need to
support through an objective world that which is given. Even if I
include memory and in principle acknowledge it as valid testimony, if I
furthermore accept as data the contents of the consciousness of others
on equal terms with my own, thus opening myself to the mystery
of intersubjective communication, I would still not have to proceed
as we actually do, but might ask instead for the ‘transformations’
which mediate between the images of different consciousnesses. Such
a presentation would fit in with Leibniz’s monadology.9
9“Solange ich bei dem schlechthin Gegebenen, genauer: dem schlechthin Gegebenen des
Augenblicks stehen bleibe, ist offenbar kein Bedu¨rfnis vorhanden, es durch eine objektive Welt
zu unterbauen. Aber auch wenn ich Erinnerung hinzunehme und ihre Triftigkeit grundstu¨tzlich
anerkenne, wenn ich die Inhalte fremden Bewußtseins als den meinen gleichberechtigte Data
akzeptiere, mich dem Geheimnis der intersubjektiven Versta¨ndigung o¨ffnend und ihr Glauben
beimessend, brauchte ich nicht so zu verfahren, wie wir wirklich tun, sondern ko¨nnte statt dessen
nach den ‘Transformationen’ suchen, welche zwischen den Bildwelten verschiedener Bewußtsein
vermitteln. Eine solche Darstellung wa¨re der Leibnizschen Monadologie angemessen.” (Weyl
1927a, 83 (198); Eng. tr., 117 (211))
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Hence, Weyl seems to have thought that, by limiting the conceptual appara-
tus of physics to empirical concepts, traditional empiricism would fare no better
than Leibniz’s monadological phenomenalism, with respect to scientific objectiv-
ity. Weyl thought that monadological phenomenalism cannot account for scientific
objectivity because it does not account for what physicists actually do when they
do physics. The reason for thinking so was that, on Leibniz’s view, as Weyl un-
derstood it, the physicist would not need to posit hypothetical entities at all, since
her account of natural phenomena may be exclusively based upon the harmonious
connection between what is immediately given to different consciousnesses. This
account, however, is at variance with what physicists actually do when they do
physics. In particular, Weyl believed that it is at variance with classical field
theory. On the Leibnizean view, he argued, “preestablished harmony takes the
place of the reciprocal effects that are transmitted through the field.”10 In other
words, even if one takes into account the “images of different consciousnesses,” i.e.,
even if scientific theories remain invariant across different, but equivalent, obser-
vational perspectives, one still fails to obtain knowledge of the mind-independent
world. For, according to the monadological phenomenalist, no mind-independent
world needs to be stipulated, in the first place, to support that which is given to
consciousness.
Weyl’s rejection of the traditional empiricist approach to science is also indi-
cated in a letter to the German mathematician Otto Ho¨lder, in which Weyl noted
10“An Stelle der Wechselwirkung, die fu¨r uns durch das Feld vermittelt wird, tritt die
pra¨stabilierte Harmonie.” (Weyl 1927a, 133 (198); Eng. tr., 174 (211)) As is well known,
the clearest textual evidence for Leibniz’ phenomenalism comes from his famous 1704 letter to
de Volder: “Matter and motion, however, are not so much substances or things, as they are the
phenomena of percipient beings, whose reality is located in the harmony of the percipient with
himself (at different times) and with other percipient beings.” (Leibniz 1969, 537 (120)) For a
detailed discussion of this and other related passages, see Jolley 1986 (110), Rutherford 1990
(156), and Garber 2009, 267-301 (71).
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that the set-theoretical paradoxes were actually due to an empiricist account of
concept formation:
The failure to recognize that the meaning of a concept is logically prior
to its extension is widespread today; even the foundations of our set
theory suffer from it. It seems to spring from the peculiar theories
of abstraction of the empiricist theory of knowledge; against these
compare the brief but striking remarks in Fichte’s Transcendental Logic
and the more careful exposition in Husserl’s Logical Investigations.11
Thus, Weyl seems to have believed that Fichte’s and Husserl’s criticisms of em-
piricist abstraction can justify the rejection of unrestricted comprehension in set
theory.12 They do so by claiming that the meaning of a general concept is, in a
certain logical sense, prior to the objects that fall under that concept. To properly
understand this claim, we want to look more closely at these two criticisms.
In the next section, we present Fichte’s argument against abstraction and his
emphasis on the free creative activity of the mind. We explain why, despite the
fact that Weyl found this emphasis correct, he nevertheless rejected Fichte’s con-
structivism as unable to support objectivity. Afterwards, we discuss Husserl’s
critical remarks on empiricist abstraction, and his proposal of a new, phenomeno-
logical method of concept formation – the so-called “ideational” abstraction. We
show how Husserl’s method influenced Weyl’s early work on general relativity, and
then argue, as against a recent interpretation, that Weyl eventually rejected the
11“Die Verkennung der Tatsache, daß der Sinn eines Begriffs das logische prius gegenu¨ber
dem Umfang ist, ist heute gang und ga¨be; an ihr leiden auch die Grundlagen unserer Mengen-
lehre. Sie scheint den sonderbaren Abstraktionstheorien der sensualistischen Erkenntnistheorie
zu entstammen; vgl. dawider die kurzen schlagenden Bemerkungen Fichtes in seiner “Tran-
szendentalen Logik”, die sorgfa¨ltigeren Darlegungen in Husserls “Logischen Untersuchungen”.”
(Weyl 1919, 44 (194); Eng. tr., 110 (194))
12In Weyl’s own predicative version of real analysis, developed in The Continuum as a way
around paradox, comprehension is restricted to formulas whose bound variables range over
natural numbers only.
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phenomenological approach to objectivity.
3.3 Weyl on Fichte’s Constructivism and Free Creation
Weyl’s interaction with Fichte’s philosophy has been, in general, overlooked by
Weyl scholars. Quite naturally, one might wonder what would a mathematician
find interesting in the Fichtean Wissenschaftslehre to study it so intensely as Weyl
did.13 But, as we have just noted, in a 1919 letter to Otto Ho¨lder, Weyl refer-
enced Fichte’s criticism of abstraction, which indicates that, in all appearances,
Weyl agreed with Fichte’s emphasis on the ability of the mind to create concepts
independently of perceptual experience, rather than by abstraction from such ex-
perience. However, as we will point out, he rejected Fichte’s view as insufficient
to support objectivity. To understand Weyl’s criticism, it is necessary to present,
even if only briefly, the main aspects of the Wissenschaftslehre.
The purpose of Fichte’s project, as stated perhaps most emphatically in his
Sonnenklarer Bericht, is to “construct simply a priori, from basic principles, the
whole common consciousness of all rational beings.”14 What are the basic princi-
ples on which such a construction is to be based, and how is construction supposed
13In his published work, Weyl referred almost exclusively to Fichte’s popular work Die Bes-
timmung des Menschen, but according to manuscript Hs91:75, Weyl also read at least the 1794
Grundlage des gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, the 1797 Erste Einleitung, the 1810 Wissenschaft-
slehre, the Grundriss des Eigentu¨mlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, and the 1806 Die Einweisung
zum seligen Leben. It is also known that Weyl was an active participant in the philosophical
circle of Fritz Medicus, the proponent of a neo-Fichtean philosophy and also curator of a new
edition of Fichte’s Selected Works (cf. Sieroka 2010 (168)). Thus, it is perfectly reasonable to
suspect that Weyl’s engagement with Fichtean philosophy was not a mere intellectual extrava-
gance. As an aside, it might be worth mentioning that Weyl was not the only major scientist
interested in Fichte. In ways that are still far from being clearly understood, Fichte exerted
some influence also on Helmholtz’ view on science. Cf. Ko¨hnke 1986 (114), Heidelberger 1993
(82).
14“[Die Wissenschaftslehre] construirt das gesammte gemeinsame Bewußtseyn aller
vernu¨nftigen Wesen schlechthin a priori, seinen Grundzu¨gen nach.” (Fichte 1801, 603 (60))
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to proceed in order to produce everything that is contained in the mind of a ra-
tional being?
The first thing that anyone engaged philosophically needs to do is, according
to Fichte, the following:
Attend to yourself; turn your gaze from everything surrounding you
and look into yourself: this is the first demand philosophy makes upon
anyone who studies it. Here you will not be concerned with anything
that lies outside of you, but only with yourself.15
This introspective path, Fichte contended, leads to the absolute ego. In his review
of Gottlob Ernst Schulze’s Aenesidemus, Fichte explained more exactly why he
believed that introspection can lead to the absolute ego: “The absolute subject,
the ego, is not given in an empirical intuition but is posited through an intellec-
tual one. ... one will never become conscious [of the absolute ego] as something
empirically given.”16 On his view, then, the absolute ego is not merely there to be
discovered through introspection, where introspection is taken to be passive obser-
vation, of the kind illustrated (so Fichte believed) by sensible intuition. Rather,
the absolute ego is posited through intellectual intuition. As he put it: “The I
originally simply posits its own existence.”17 But what does this mean? How did
Fichte conceive of intellectual intuition?
15“Merke auf dich selbst: kehre deinen Blick von allem, was dich umgiebt, ab, und in dein
Inneres – ist die erste Forderung, welche die Philosophie an ihren Lehrling thut. Es ist von nichts,
was außer dir ist, die Rede, sondern lediglich, von dir selbst.” (Fichte 1797a, 422; Eng.tr., 7 (56))
16“Das absolute Subject, das Ich, wird nicht durch empirische Anschauung gegeben, son-
dern durch intellectuelle gesetzt; ... des absoluten Subjects ... wird man sich nie, als eines
empirisch gegebenen, bewusst.” (Fichte 1792, 10; Eng. tr., 142 (53)) The notion of positing
(Setzung) through intellectual intuition was introduced in Fichte’s response to Schulze’s criticism
of Reinhold’s reconstruction of Kantian philosophy. For a detailed account of this response, see
Neuhouser 1990, 70-76 (140).
17“Das Ich setzt urspru¨nglich schlechthin sein eigenes Seyn.” (Fichte 1794, 98 (54))
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One doesn’t have the slightest idea what transcendental philosophy –
and Kant especially – is speaking of if one thinks that, when an act
of intuition occurs, there exists outside the intuiter and the intuition
some further thing, perhaps some matter, at which the intuition is
directed (somewhat like the way common sense tends to conceive of
bodily vision.) What is intuited comes to be through the intuiting
itself, and only through it. ... In intuition, reason (the I) is by no
means passive, but absolutely active; in it, it is productive imagination.
Through intuition something is projected, somewhat like – if one wants
an analogy – the way in which the painter projects the completed shape
out of his eye onto the surface, that is, he looks toward, so to speak,
before the slower hand can copy the outline of the shape.18
On Fichte’s view, intellectual intuition, as opposed to sensible intuition, is not
mere Schauen or Sehen – the seeing of something that is already there to be seen.
Rather, it is Hinschauen or Hinsehen – a seeing that produces that which is seen,
a free creative activity, i.e., an activity unconstrained by perceptual experience.
Thus, according to Fichte, the positing of the ego through intellectual intuition
amounts to a free creation of the ego. As he suggestively put it: “I am thor-
oughly my own creation.”19 Furthermore, the construction of the “whole common
consciousness of a rational being,” i.e., the entire representational content of a
rational mind, also obtains, on his view, as a result of the creative activity of the
mind. In particular, as we will see presently, he maintained that all concepts,
including the concepts typically considered empirical, are freely created, rather
than abstracted from perceptual experience.
18“Man hat nicht die leiseste Ahnung, wovon bei der transscendentalen Philosophie, und
ganz eigentlich bei Kant die Rede sey, wenn man glaubt, dass beim Anschauen es ausser dem
Anschauenden und der Anschauung noch ein Ding, etwa einen Stoff, gebe, auf welchen die An-
schauung gehe, wie etwa der gemeine Menschenverstand das leibliche Sehen zu denken pflegt.
Durch das Anschauen selbst, und lediglich dadurch entsteht das Angeschaute. ... Die Vernunft
(das Ich) ist in der Anschauung keinesweges leidend, sondern absolut tha¨tig; sie ist in ihr pro-
ductive Einbildungskraft. Es wird durch das Schauen etwas hingeworfen, etwa, wenn man ein
Gleichniss will, wie der Maler aus seinem Auge die vollendete Gestalt auf die Fla¨che hinwirft,
gleichsam hinsieht, ehe die langsamere Hand ihre Umrisse nachmachen kann.” (Fichte 1796,
57sq; Eng. tr. 54sq)
19“Ich bin durchaus mein eigenes Gescho¨pf.” (Fichte 1800, 256; Eng. tr., 73 (59))
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Fichte’s explicit rejection of abstraction was presented in a series of lectures
offered at Jena, in which he attempted to distinguish his transcendental idealism
from pure logic. The motivation for this attempt was given by Kant’s following
remark:
I clarify herewith that I consider Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre as a com-
pletely untenable system. For pure theory of science is nothing more
or less than mere logic, which cannot reach with its principles as far
as the material of knowledge, but abstracts, as pure logic, from its
content .20
Since pure logic abstracts from content and considers relations between judgments
according to their mere form, Kant implied, it is unable by itself to reveal the
necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Thus, his criticism here
points out that the Wissenschaftslehre cannot be considered as transcendental
idealism, not to mention as a proper or correct development of his own critical
philosophy, as Fichte had maintained.21
In order to distinguish his doctrine from “mere logic,” Fichte believed that
it was sufficient to show that abstraction, which was taken by Kant as the stan-
dard method for the formation of general concepts, is incompatible with the Wis-
senschaftslehre.22 The simplest way of proving this incompatibility was by showing
that abstraction is an inadequate method. “Our task,” Fichte wrote, is “to exam-
ine factual knowledge with regard to what is, in it, a matter of intuition and what
is a matter of thinking.” Once this task is complete, Fichte hoped, one should
20“Erkla¨re ich hiermit: daß ich Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre fu¨r ein ga¨nzlich unhaltbares System
halte. Denn reine Wissenschaftslehre ist nichts mehr oder weniger als bloße Logik, welche mit
ihren Principien sich nicht zum Materialen des Erkenntnisses versteigt, sondern vom Inhalte
derselben als reine Logik abstrahirt.” (Kant 1799, 370 (112))
21For a detailed discussion of Kant’s criticism, see Martin 2003 (131).
22For Kant’s view on the formation of general concepts, see his Ja¨sche Logik (Kant 1800,
(113))
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see that “The thinking in knowledge, the concept, call it what one may, does not
become, but it is. The whole doctrine of logic about the formation of concepts
through abstraction is thereby rejected as utterly false.”23 But why did Fichte
believe that abstraction was an incorrect account of the formation of concepts?
What does it mean to say that concepts simply are, and do not become? Let us
look, first, at how he thought abstraction was supposed to proceed:
The logicians produce concepts ... by abstraction. A horse, for ex-
ample, is given in the factual intuition as something undetermined: I
analyze its characteristics and find that it is similar to other things,
which I have many times already observed, then I name the intuited
thing a horse.24
Hence, on Fichte’s view, abstraction seems to require an analysis of a given partic-
ular thing, to determine the individual characteristics that one wishes to abstract,
as well as the individual characteristics that one wishes to abstract from. However,
Fichte went on, the logicians usually forget to ask about the nature of these very
characteristics. Some of these are, e.g., the place that a particular thing occupies,
its magnitude, the law according to which it came to exist, and so on. But these
characteristics, he noted, need other general concepts in order to be determined:
the concepts of space, quantity, extension, law, etc. Therefore, without such gen-
eral concepts, a particular thing cannot be conceived and, thus, an abstraction
cannot be performed. But how are general concepts obtained then? Here is what
23“Unsere Aufgabe war, das faktische Wissen zu pru¨fen in Ru¨cksicht dessen, was darin Sache
der reinen Anschauung ist, und was des Denkens. ... Das Denken im Wissen, der Begriff, oder
wie man es nennen will, wird nicht, sondern er ist. Die ganze Lehre der Logik von Entstehung
der Begriffe durch Abstraktion fa¨llt damit als durchaus falsch hinweg.” (Fichte 1812, 316 (61))
24“Die Logiker lassen die Begriffe ... entstehen durch Abstraktion. Es ist in der faktischen
Anschauung gegeben z.B. ein Pferd, als unbestimmtes Etwas: ich zerlege nun seine Merkmale,
finde, da es a¨hnlich ist dem und dem anderen, welches ich schon mehrmals bemerkt habe, und
nenne nun das also Angeschaute ein Pferd.” (Fichte 1812, 331 (61))
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Fichte thought that the logicians failed to see, and why they did so:
Had they not analyzed, had they known that the concept, e.g., the
concept of horse, exists solely in conceiving of some thing as a horse,
i.e., in judging that the thing is a horse, they would have not arrived
at this tasteless derivation. ... Had they found this originary existence
of the concept solely in the originary conceiving itself, they would have
also discovered that this conceiving and understanding as such must
be based on a law, and that the whole conceiving of the horse must
proceed thusly: such and such a determined thing is a horse; those
determinations are given in factual intuition; therefore, the thing is a
horse. Once they had grasped this, then wondering where the major
premise (such and such a determined thing is a horse) came from would
have undoubtedly driven them to realize that thinking in general is an
intuition of the absolute laws, to which the fact conforms, but which
are not themselves fact. Thus, the supersensorial nature of thinking
and, with it, the transcendental philosophy would have come under
clear light for them.25
Thus, to say that general concepts are, that they do not become, seems to mean
that they are not abstracted from particular objects which are judged upon, but
that concepts exist only through our acts of conceiving or judging. Thus, for
example, the concept horse does not come into existence by abstracting from
the particular characteristics of individual horses. The concept horse is rather
produced through thinking an “absolute law,” such as that expressed by the major
25“Ha¨tten sie nicht zerrissen, ha¨tten sie gewußt, da der Begriff, hier des Pferdes, nur ist im
Begreifen eines Etwas als Pferdes, d.h. im Urtheilen, da es ein Pferd sei; so wa¨ren sie auf
diese abgeschmackte Ableitung gar nicht gekommen. ... Ha¨tten sie aber dies urspru¨ngliche Sein
des Begriffs lediglich im urspru¨nglichen Begreifen selbst aufgefunden; so wa¨rden sie auch wohl
entdeckt haben, da diesem Begreifen und Verstehen, als solchem, ein Gesetz zu Grunde liegen
mu¨ße; da das ganze Begreifen des Pferdes so einhergehen mu¨ße; ein Solches, so Bestimmtes ist
ein Pferd; nun ist das in faktischer Anschauung Gegebene also bestimmt, mithin ist es ein Pferd.
Ha¨tten sie aber einmal dies begriffen, so wu¨rde die Verwunderung, woher denn der maior : ein
so und so Bestimmtes ist Pferd, komme, sie ohne Zweifel zu der Erkenntnis getrieben haben,
da das Denken u¨berhaupt sei eine Anschauung absoluter Gesetze, nach denen das Faktum sich
richtet, die aber selbst nicht Faktum sind; und so ha¨tte ihnen das klare Licht aufgehen ko¨nnen
u¨ber das u¨bersinnliche Wesen des Denkens und damit die Transscendentalphilosophie.”(Fichte
1812, 331 (61))
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premise in the above passage: “such and such a determined thing is a horse.”
What Fichte seems to have suggested here is that the concept horse is obtained
through the pure activity of positing through intellectual intuition. For a law like
“such and such a determined thing is a horse” is, on his view, a positing (Setzung),
a decree, whereby the concept horse is first introduced. Then, presumably, just
like the concept horse, all other general concepts can be said to be posited by
the mind, i.e., freely created independently of, and prior to, their application to
empirical facts.
This conceptual creativity of the ego is what ultimately explains, in Fichte’s
opinion, the difference between pure logic and his Wissenschaftslehre. While lo-
gicians deploy abstraction as a procedure of concept formation, Fichte regarded
abstraction as non-sensical. This justified, according to him, the claim that the
Wissenschaftslehre is not “mere logic,” but genuine transcendental philosophy:
We stand on the same position as Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason.
Kant had there the same opponent, which we fight against here [i.e.,
the dogmatic or transcendental realist]. But Kant abandoned him,
and confronted another opponent: the investigation whether thinking
is creative and producing itself the object is also critique of pure reason,
where pure reason denotes to him [i.e., to Kant’s new opponent, i.e.,
to Fichte himself] the self-creative thinking.26
However, Kant’s criticism of Fichte does not, and could not, reject the creative
activity of the ego. For, after all, Kant’s own categories and the concepts of
space and time, as well as other concepts like motion, force, and matter, are not
obtained by means of abstraction from experience. Rather, they are produced by
26“Wir stehen auf demselben Standpunkt wie Kant in seiner Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Dort
hatte Kant denselben Gegner, den wir hier bestreiten. Er ließ ihn stehen, und stellte ihm
einen andern Gegner gegenu¨ber: die Untersuchung, ob das Denken scho¨pferisch sei und selbst
hervorbringend das Objekt, heißt eben Kritik der reinen Vernunft, indem reine Vernunft das
selbstscho¨pferische Denken ihm bezeichnet.” (Fichte 1812, 108 (61))
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the mind prior to and independently from experience, as necessary conditions for
the possibility of experience. What seems to have triggered Kant’s criticism is
Fichte’s attributing to intellectual intuition a fundamental epistemic role. As is
well known, Kant had rejected intellectual intuition as a necessary condition for
the possibility of knowledge that can be obtained by beings like us.27 Kant could
not accept the claim that all concepts are freely created, and that this creative
activity, through intellectual intuition, may be taken to be sufficient for knowledge.
Kant was worried, in the first place, about the idea that the activity of the ego, as
conceived of by Fichte, renders completely dispensable the sensibility of epistemic
subjects endowed with cognitive faculties like ours.
In opposition to Kant, Fichte seems to have thought that all knowledge is a
priori, obtained through the mind’s free creative activity alone, i.e., through its
intellectual intuition. He considered that the free creative activity of the mind is
sufficient for the construction of “an image [...] of the real consciousness, which
is present without any assistance from philosophy, and which we all have: in this
consciousness, the same things should be found as are produced in the system,
and they should stand in the same relations to one another as those produced in
the system.”28 In fact, he put it quite bluntly: “The Wissenschaftslehre deduces a
priori, without any consideration of perception, that which should occur only as a
result of perception, and so a posteriori.”29 This view seems to entail that nothing
27Cf. Kant 1781/1787, B72 (111). See also Kant’s own notes inserted in his copy of the first
edition of the first Critique at A248, on page 346 of Guyer’s translation.
28“ein Bild ... des wahren wirklichen, ohne alles Zuthun der Philosophie, vorhandenen Be-
wusstseyns, das wir alle haben: in diesem Bewusstseyn soll dasselbe Mannigfaltige liegen, und in
eben dem Verha¨ltnisse zu einander stehen, in welchem dasselbe in dem Producte eures Systemes
steht.” (Fichte 1801, 600 (60))
29“Die Wissenschaftslehre leitet sonach, ohne alle Ru¨cksicht auf die Wahrnehmung, a priori
ab, was ihr zufolge eben in der Wahrnehmung, also a posteriori, vorkommen soll.” (Fichte 1801,
579 (60))
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could be known through perception that cannot actually be known independently
of perception. More exactly, it seems to entail not only that any concepts that one
might think are obtained by abstraction from perceptual experience are actually
freely created, but also that any perceptual content from which one might think
abstraction derives these concepts is actually free created.
Given this peculiar aspect of Fichtean epistemology, the question arises what
influence, if any, might it have had on Weyl, and especially on his own view about
the introduction of theoretical concepts in physics. As we have noted above,
Weyl came to believe that the introduction of such concepts like force, energy,
and electromagnetic field, through the stipulation of fundamental presuppositions
like Newton’s laws and Maxwell’s equations, rather than by abstraction from
perceptual experience, is an indispensable condition for the formation of objective
scientific theories. This seems to suggest that what Weyl found rightly emphasized
in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is the emphasis on free creation as a method of
concept formation.
Nevertheless, while he seems to have agreed with Fichte’s emphasis on the
free conceptual creativity of the mind, Weyl unequivocally rejected the idea that
all knowledge is in fact a priori. He took Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre to be an
“outrageous execution” of the project of constructivism, because in it “the a pri-
ori coincides ... in the end with the a posteriori.”30 No doubt, Weyl found
Fichte’s doctrine to be wrong insofar as it considers the free creation of concepts
as sufficient for knowledge by completely ignoring the crucial role of perceptual
experience in the process of knowledge acquisition. But Weyl seems to have re-
alized that Fichte’s view raises an important question about the nature of the
30“Das a priori fa¨llt ... schließlich mit dem a posteriori zusammen.” (Weyl 1954b, 643 (216))
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connection between what is given in perception and what is freely created by the
mind. As we will see in the next chapter, this correspondence needs to be properly
articulated if the necessary conditions for our knowledge of the mind-independent
world are to be identified.
Furthermore, one might argue that, in a certain sense, Fichte’s constructivism
falls as short as Hobbes’ constructivism of providing an adequate account of ob-
jectivity. For if the purpose of the Wissenschaftslehre is indeed to show that
the a priori coincides with the a posteriori, i.e., that nothing could be known
through perception that cannot be known independently of perception, then, just
like Hobbes, Fichte could not accommodate the way in which modern science goes
beyond perceptual experience. On his view, modern physics would be crippled be-
cause its conceptual apparatus, although freely created, is confined to what one
typically (although, according to Fichte, wrongly) believes to be empirical.
It seems, thus, plausible to think that Weyl came to believe that whereas
Hobbes’ constructivism collapses, as we have seen above, into Leibniz’ monado-
logical phenomenalism, Fichte’s constructivism actually embraces this phenome-
nalism. As a matter of fact, this seems to have been a common interpretation of
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, advocated, for example, by Schelling: “Since Leibniz,
... we see that the real, the finite, is generally placed in the region of the ideal.
The whole real world has no existence in itself, but only in the representations
of the soul. ... Fichte takes up this idealism, which is denial of the independent
being of the real, and, in this regard, he does not go beyond Leibniz.”31 On this
interpretation, then, Fichte’s doctrine might support, at best, an intersubjective
31Quoted in Latta 1898, 182 (119). A reading of Fichte in the light of Leibniz’ monadology
has been defended also more recently: “Leibniz’s conception of the monad is in many ways the
true philosophical antecedent both of Fichte’s notion of the I and of its essential ambiguities.”
(cf. Grondin 1994, 183ff (77))
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agreement between different images of real consciousness, but cannot account for
objectivity.
In a series of lectures on Fichte given in 1917, Husserl, too, seems to have
endorsed this interpretation. He noted that “for him [i.e., for Fichte] the central
theoretical question is that of the existence, or the type of existence, of the spatial-
temporal reality, of the world in the natural [scientific] sense of the word,”32 and
then pointed out that Fichte’s answer is based on the claim that “what the subject
always has before itself, as substrate of action, as object of its activity, that must
be immanent to the subject, it must be already stipulated,” i.e., produced through
the subject’s creative activity.33 But Husserl’s own answer to the same question is
quite different. To be sure, he agreed that what the subject has before itself, i.e.,
what is immediately available to it in experience, must be considered immanent,
but he disagreed about what is it that the subject could be said to have before
itself and, thus, about what could be considered immanent. Husserl’s answer,
which we discuss in the next section, exercised an important influence on Weyl,
as will also be shown further below.
3.4 Husserl on Ideational Abstraction and Objectivity
In a lecture course given in the Spring semester of 1909, in which Husserl
presented the view to be later developed in the first book of his famous Ideas, he
stated the problem of the objectivity of our knowledge as follows:
32“Die theoretische Frage, die ... fu¨r ihn im Zentrum steht, ist die der Existenz oder Existen-
zart der rau¨mlich-zeitlichen Wirklichkeit, der Welt im natu¨rlichen Wortsinn.” (cf. Husserl 1917,
271 (105))
33“Was immer das Subjekt vor sich hat, als Substrat des Handelns, als Objekt seiner
Beta¨tigung, das muß, als ein ihm Immanentes, selbst schon Erhandeltes sein.” (cf. Husserl
1917, 275 (105))
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The main problem [is] the problem of how the knowing conscious-
ness can, in its own flow of interrelated and variedly formed acts of
knowledge, transcend itself and validly posit and determine an ob-
ject, the constituents of which are not to be found immanently within
consciousness, which never comes in consciousness to absolutely indu-
bitable self-givenness, but nevertheless should, according to the mean-
ing of natural science, exist in itself, whether it happens to be known
or not.34
Hence, Husserl considered that it was the fundamental task of phenomenology
to give an account of the possibility of non-immanent objects, based on reflec-
tion on immanent acts. Taking his cue from Descartes, but reminding also of
Hobbes, Husserl maintained that addressing this task requires “phenomenological
reduction,” i.e., a methodological annihilation of the world, followed by a recon-
struction on the basis of what is immediately given to our consciousness. More
precisely, the phenomenological reduction was meant to dislodge the natural atti-
tude of uncritical acceptance of the existence of mind-independent objects and of
our knowledge about them, an attitude that characterizes, according to Husserl,
the physical sciences.
Unlike Descartes, however, Husserl believed that the substantial ego of the
Cogito also needs to be methodologically annihilated, and thus, that what is imme-
diately given are just the ego’s cogitationes : acts of thinking, willing, perceiving,
etc. Since the objects that are intended by such acts “never come in conscious-
ness to absolutely indubitable self-givenness,” that is, since they transcend our
consciousness, objectivity cannot be attained on the assumption that such ob-
jects exist. Instead, Husserl seems to suggest that objectivity requires reflection
34“Das Leitproblem [ist] das Problem, wie das erkennende Bewusstsein in seinem Fluss man-
nigfach gestalteter und ineinander gewobener Erkenntnisakte sich selbst transzendieren und in
gu¨ltiger Weise eine Gegensta¨ndlichkeit setzen und bestimmen kann, die in ihm nach keinem Be-
standstu¨ck reell zu finden ist, in ihm nie und nirgends zu absolut zweifelloser Selbstgegebenheit
kommt, wa¨hrend sie doch dem Sinn der Naturerkenntnis gema¨ß an sich existieren soll, ob sie
zufa¨llig erkannt wird oder nicht.” (Husserl 1909, 73 (103))
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on the very acts of the mind, since their being immediately present to the mind
is absolutely indubitable.
One may, no doubt, immediately start worrying about the idea that mere
reflection on mental acts may be sufficient for objectivity. What could be achieved
by means of a method based on reflection upon such acts, and how could whatever
is so achieved ensure the objectivity of knowledge, i.e., that our beliefs express
relations between mind-independent objects? Of course, Husserl, himself, was
aware of this difficulty, which he called “the puzzle of transcendence” (Ra¨tsel der
Transzendenz ): in the sphere of immediately given acts “we see no possibility for
establishing objectively valid statements and, thus, no possibility of science.”35
Husserl’s approach to this puzzle developed on the basis of the idea that, given
the restriction imposed by the phenomenological reduction, objectivity should not
be dependent on the actual existence of the objects intended by our acts of think-
ing, i.e., it should be attained ohne Rekurs auf Setzung irgendeiner Transzendenz.
Furthermore, if it is to be objectively valid, a proposition should not refer to
anything that changes when mental acts are changing, but should preserve an in-
variant meaning within the continuous flow of such acts. On his view, briefly put,
objectivity requires that one obtain invariant, general ideas through reflection on
our mental acts. In order to explain how this approach was thought to provide a
solution to the problem of objectivity, and to properly introduce Husserl’s method
for obtaining general ideas, we should start from his criticism of traditional em-
piricist abstraction, a criticism referenced by Weyl in the aforementioned letter to
Ho¨lder.
35“In dieser Spha¨re sehen wir keine Mo¨glichkeit fu¨r die Etablierung objektiv gu¨ltiger Aussagen
und somit fu¨r eine Wissenschaft.” (Husserl 1909, 83 (103))
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Husserl critically addressed British empiricism, in his Second Investigation.36
He dismissed, for instance, Locke’s account of abstraction as “nonsensical,” on
the ground that Locke considered the abstract idea of a triangle to be “neither
oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural nor scalene, but all and none
of these at once.” Husserl thought that this view was absurd, because it entails
that an object could have contradictory properties and also that the abstract idea
of a triangle is itself triangular. “Locke,” Husserl maintained, “should, above all,
have reminded himself that a triangle is something which has triangularity, but
that triangularity is not itself something that has triangularity.”37
Long before Husserl, of course, Berkeley had also rejected Locke’s abstract
ideas. In particular, Berkeley maintained that it is “useless and impracticable” to
think that mathematical propositions hold of such ideas:
Thus when I demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles, it is to
be supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a triangle; which
ought not to be understood as if I could frame an idea of a triangle
which was neither equilateral nor scalenon nor equicrural. But only
that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort
it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear
triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense universal.38
Berkeley safeguarded the generality of mathematical propositions by requiring
that no particular features of a diagram be used in proofs: “It is true, the diagram
I have in view includes all these [particular features], but then there is not the
least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition.”39 Thus, Berkeley
36Cf. Husserl 1900 (102). According to Husserl, theories similar to those proposed by Locke
and Berkeley came to be defended also by German-speaking philosophers like Erdmann, Twar-
dowski, and Cornelius. For a discussion of the relevant historical-philosophical context, see
Rollinger 1993 (153), Chrudzimski and Huemer 2004 (28).
37Cf. Husserl 1900, 359 (102).
38Cf. Berkeley 1710, 15 (12).
39Cf. Berkeley 1710, 16 (12).
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defended a view according to which abstract ideas can and must be dispensed
with, as unnecessary for an account of general mathematical knowledge.
On Husserl’s reading, however, Berkeley’s view amounts to no more than say-
ing that a certain orientation of our attention, away from the particular aspects
of a diagram – the concrete object presented to us in perception – is sufficient
to guarantee the generality of mathematical knowledge. But Husserl rejected this
sufficiency claim by denying Berkeley’s contention that a particular triangle can be
universal, in the sense that it can “stand for and represent” all other triangles.40
According to Husserl, this contention is based on a confusion, i.e., on a failure to
distinguish between the basis of abstraction and the result of abstraction, between
a concrete object and a mathematical object. For one cannot disclose a mathe-
matical object by an orientation of attention away from the particular aspects of
the concrete object. One cannot do so, Husserl seems to have thought, because
a concrete object remains always concrete, even when one does not pay atten-
tion to its particular aspects. Consequently, one cannot claim that mathematical
knowledge is rendered general, as Berkeley did, even if one does not “mention”
the particular aspects of a certain diagram, that is, more precisely, even if one
denies them a role in the justification of mathematical theorems.
For our purposes here, more important than an evaluation of Husserl’s criticism
of Locke and Berkeley is a clarification of Husserl’s claim that his own view is
different from traditional empiricism. To be sure, he did not deny that abstract
ideas are necessary for an explanation of the general character of our knowledge.
But he thought that the empiricists failed to distinguish between a presentative or
intending act of consciousness and an intentional object, i.e., the object intended
40Cf. Husserl 1900, 376f (102).
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by that act, and believed that an abstract idea can be obtained from the object
by disregarding some of its particular aspects. By contrast, on Husserl’s view, a
general idea is obtained by directing our attention to our own acts of consciousness,
rather than to their intended objects. To clarify what this means, let us look at
one attempt to explain, in one of his lectures, how general ideas can be obtained
by reflecting on such acts:
[A general essence is] that which remains identical in the mere ‘rep-
etition’ of the act of consciousness, which in any case we can never
register as actual repetition (as an exact identity relation), but can
only suppose as an idealization in thinking. We obtain thus the ideal
of absolute identity and, corresponding to this, an idea ... which con-
stitutes the full essence of the singular act of consciousness.”41
What Husserl had in mind here is clearly a method of abstraction. For he claims
that a general idea is obtained on the basis of a certain relation between mental
acts, which is, more precisely, a relation of “absolute identity,” rather than one of
“exact identity.” Let us try to explain what this might mean.
Two mental acts are said to be exactly identical if and only if one of them
actually repeats the other. By contrast, two mental acts are said to be absolutely
identical if and only if one of them ideally repeats the other, rather than actually.
A mental act is said to ideally repeat another mental act when it can, presumably,
be imagined, rather than perceived, as repeating the latter. Thus, for example, one
obtains the general idea of redness on the basis of the relation of absolute identity
between our mental acts intending a red object, i.e., between an act intending a
41“[Eine allgemeine Idee ist] dasjenige ... was identisch bleibt in der bloßen ‘Wiederholung’
der cogitatio, die wir als wirkliche Wiederholung (als exakte Gleichheitskette) allerdings nie
konstatieren, aber idealisierend-denkend supponieren ko¨nnen. Wir gewinnen dann das Ideal ab-
soluter Gleichheit und ihr entsprechend eine Idee ..., die das volle Wesen der singula¨ren cogitatio
ausmacht.” (Husserl 1909, 87f (103))
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red object and an act that ideally repeats it. Similarly, the general idea of an
equilateral triangle is obtained on the basis of the relation of absolute identity
between an act of thinking about an equilateral triangle and an act that ideally
repeats it.
Husserl’s method seems to be, essentially, a process of abstraction. On his
view, then, a general concept is introduced neither by isolating and/or disregard-
ing certain features of an object given in sensuous perception, as the empiricists
believed, nor by free creation through intellectual intuition, as Fichte maintained.
Rather, a concept is obtained on the basis of the relation of absolute identity
between mental acts. Husserl dubbed this method “ideational” abstraction:
Naturally I do not mean abstraction merely in the sense of a setting-
in-relief of some non-independent moment in a sensible object, but
ideational abstraction, in which instead of the non-independent mo-
ment, its ‘idea’, its universal, is brought to consciousness, to actual
being-given.”42
How does ideational abstraction help one solve Husserl’s puzzle of transcendence,
i.e., the problem of scientific objectivity? By contrast with the general ideas of
traditional empiricism, which are, as he put it, non-independent moments, that
is, aspects of an object that are dependent on our experience of that object in
sensuous perception, Husserl’s general ideas are independent moments, that is,
they are said to exist independently of such experience. Thus, one seems to be
justified in believing that a scientific proposition may be considered objectively
valid, i.e., capable of expressing relations about mind-independent objects, if it is
42“Natu¨rlich meine ich hier nicht die Abstraktion in dem bloßen Sinne der Hervorhebung
irgendeines unselbsta¨ndigen Moments an einem sinnlichen Objekte, sondern die ideierende Ab-
straktion, in welcher statt des unselbsta¨ndigen Moments seine ‘Idee’, sein Allgemeines zum
Bewußtsein, zum aktuellen Gegebensein kommt.” Cf. Husserl 1900, 52 (102)) Similar claims
may be found in Husserl 1913, 74 (104).
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formulated in terms of ideationally abstracted general ideas. But Husserl, himself,
dismissed this belief:
Scientific knowledge should be objectively valid and grounded in its ob-
jective validity. It cannot be empty intention, but should everywhere
be based on grounds bestowing justification or validity. ... From all
this we conclude that scientific knowledge is knowledge through judg-
ment, that science rises on truth, that truth is laid in objectively valid
judgments and grounded in the intuitive grounds of judgments.43
What Husserl seems to have meant here is that science may provide objective
knowledge, i.e., knowledge about the mind-independent world, only if scientific
propositions are justifiably believed to be true. On his view, as we have shown in
section 2.5 above, one is justified to believe that a proposition is true only when
one has an experience of its truth. Let us recall that, according to Husserl, an
experience of truth is an epistemic achievement characterized by the complete sat-
isfaction of one’s meaning intentions expressed in a proposition, i.e., by presenting
in intuition the objects and states of affairs meant by that proposition. This en-
tails that one is justified to believe that a proposition is true only if the general
ideas in terms of which the proposition is formulated are instantiated through the
intuitive presentation of the objects and states of affairs meant by that proposi-
tion. For example, one is justified to believe the proposition “This is a red object”
only if the idea of redness is instantiated by presenting in intuition the red object
referred to by that proposition.
43“Wissenschaftliches Erkennen soll objektiv gu¨ltiges und in seiner objektiven Gu¨ltigkeit
begru¨ndetes Erkennen sein. Es will nicht leeres Meinen sein, sondern u¨berall auf die Recht
oder Gu¨ltigkeit verleihenden Gru¨nde zuru¨ckgehen. ... Gehen wir etwa davon aus, dass wis-
senschaftliches Erkennen urteilendes Erkennen ist, dass Wissenschaft auf Wahrheit geht, dass
Wahrheit im objektiv gu¨ltigen Urteil gesetzt und in einsichtiger Urteilsbegru¨ndung begru¨ndet
wird. (Husserl 1909, 93 (103)) Recall also the passage from the Logical Investigations, quoted
in section 2.5 above: “Ultimately, all genuine, all scientific, knowledge rests on evidence, and as
far as evidence extends, the concept of knowledge extends also.” (Husserl 1900, 6 (102))
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Thus, on Husserl’s view, objectivity requires not only that scientific proposi-
tions be formulated in terms of general ideas, but also that the objects intended
be presented in intuition as an instantiation of those general ideas. This is why
he wrote that scientific knowledge “cannot be empty intention,” i.e., that scien-
tific propositions cannot be objectively valid if the meaning intentions that they
express are not completely satisfied by objects actually given in intuition, that is,
if the corresponding general ideas are not instantiated. Propositions formulated
in terms of uninstantiated ideas cannot be objectively valid because they cannot
be justifiably believed to be true.
Now, Husserl’s approach to scientific objectivity recalls, we should perhaps
note, Kant’s famous adage in the first Critique: “Thoughts without content are
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. ... Only through their union can [ob-
jective] knowledge arise.” (B75) Weyl, like other philosophers in the first decades
of the twentieth century, criticized Kant by emphasizing that modern physics
rendered the Kantian inventory of pure forms of understanding and sensibility
obsolete. In his correspondence, Weyl noted that “the 12 categories are simply
grotesque. Everywhere he [i.e., Kant] comes to speak about problems of natural
science (space, matter), he remains far behind Leibniz.”44 Weyl took issue, in par-
44“Die 12 Kategorien sind einfach eine Groteske. Wo immer er auf Probleme zu sprechen
kommt (Raum, Materie), die die Naturwissenschaft beru¨hren, bleibt er weit hinter Leibniz
zuru¨ck.” (Manuscript Hs91:2. This is a letter to Magdalena Aebi, a student of Cassirer and
friend of Gonseth and Bernays, and the author of a book titled Kants Begru¨ndung der deutschen
Philosophie.)
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ticular, with Kant’s construction of the concept of matter.45 But Weyl also took
issue with the construction of the concept of Riemannian congruence in general
relativity. He adopted Husserl’s phenomenological approach and believed that this
justified the elimination of that concept, which led to an important modification
of the theory of general relativity, to which we turn now.
3.5 Weyl’s Phenomenological Approach to Objectivity
Husserl’s view, just presented above, suggested to Weyl, in 1918, an important
modification of Einstein’s theory of general relativity. To explain the nature of
this modification, let us note that in the introduction to his famous Space, Time,
Matter, Weyl wrote that the objects that general relativity refers to must be
considered as merely intentional objects:
The real world, each of its constituents and all their determinations
are and can only be given as intentional objects of consciousness acts.
The consciousness-experiences, which I have, are simply given, just
as I have them. They do not consist, of course, in the mere stuff of
sensations, as the positivists often state, but in a perception, e.g., there
stands indeed corporeally an object for me to which that experience
is related in a completely characteristic way known to everyone, but
not more closely describable, which, following Brentano, should be
45Briefly put, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant rejected the view that
matter is something solid that fills space and therefore has the property of impenetrability, for,
he claimed, solidity does not entail impenetrability. He maintained that, in order to account for
the latter, one needs to postulate (besides attractive forces) also some repulsive forces, which
would help that which fills space resist penetration attempts. But Weyl pointed out that Kant’s
dynamical construction “hangs in the air” since it gives no indication how the force acting at
the center of a body can be decomposed into attractive and repulsive forces, and thus, it allows
for arbitrary decompositions (cf. Weyl 1949a, 169 (211)).
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designated by the expression ‘intentional object ’.46
It seems fair to say that he adopted a phenomenological approach to general
relativity. Furthermore, at this stage in his career, Weyl was not only aware of
Fichte’s and Husserl’s criticisms of empiricist abstraction, but also appears to
have endorsed ideational abstraction as a method for the introduction of general
concepts:
In acts of reflection we are capable of bringing the essence, the being-
thus of phenomena into prominence, to be noticed for itself, without de
facto being able to detach it from the individual being of the intuitively
given in which it appears. Here [is] the origin of concepts !47
What Weyl seems to have described here is the phenomenological method of
ideational abstraction, presented in the previous section, a method whereby gen-
eral essences are obtained by reflection on our mental acts, rather than “detached”
from the objects at which these acts are directed, as traditional empiricism main-
tained. According to Weyl, then, ideational abstraction is the proper method for
the introduction of scientific concepts.
For example, the concept of inertial mass was introduced by Galileo on the ba-
sis of the relation of kinematic equivalence: two bodies have the same inertial mass
when neither overruns the other when they collide with equal velocities. It seems
46“Die wirkliche Welt, jedes ihrer Bestandstu¨cke und alle Bestimmungen an ihnen, sind
und ko¨nnen nur gegeben sein als intentionale Objekte von Bewußtseinsakten. Das schlechthin
Gegebene sind die Bewußtseinserlebnisse, die ich habe – so wie ich sie habe. Sie bestehen nun
freilich keineswegs, wie die Positivisten vielfach behaupten, aus einem bloßen Stoff von Empfind-
ungen, sondern in einer Wahrnehmung z. B. steht in der Tat leibhaft fu¨r mich da ein Gegenstand,
auf welchen jenes Erlebnis in einer jedermann bekannten, aber nicht na¨her beschreibbaren, vo¨llig
eigentu¨mlichen Weise bezogen ist, die mit Brentano durch den Ausdruck ‘intentionales Objekt ’
bezeichnet sein soll.” (Weyl 1918b, 3 (192))
47“In Akten der Reflexion sind wir imstande, das Wesen, das So-Sein der Pha¨nomene zur
Abhebung zu bringen, fu¨r sich zu bemerken, ohne es doch von dem einzelnen Sein des jeweils
anschaulich Gegebenen, in dem es erschient, de facto lo¨sen zu ko¨nnen. Hier der Ursprung der
Begriffe!” (Weyl 1920, 114 (195))
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correct to suppose that, on Weyl’s view, this concept emerges through reflection
on acts of thinking about material bodies taken as intentional objects, rather than
by detachment from these bodies themselves. Similarly, it may be suggested that,
according to him, mathematical concepts are introduced (in immanent axiomat-
ics, see section 2.8 above) through ideational abstraction. The concepts of group,
field, etc., emerge through reflection on the acts of thinking about mathematical
objects, rather than by abstraction from these objects themselves. For example,
commutativity of addition a + b = b + a between any elements a, b of a group is
obtained through reflection on the acts of thinking 1+2=2+1, 2+3=3+2, and so
on, rather than by abstraction from numbers.
The phenomenological approach to general relativity, as we will presently see,
was taken by Weyl to justify the introduction of a non-Riemannian concept of
congruence. On the basis of this concept, Weyl developed a “purely” infinitesimal
geometry as a new mathematical framework for Einstein’s theory, one that would
allegedly allow us to attain objective knowledge in general relativity. Here is,
briefly, Weyl’s argument.48
In Riemannian geometry – the geometry of Einstein’s theory of general rela-
tivity – the concept of congruence is defined on the basis of the assumption that
one can always compare the length of two vectors, no matter what positions they
occupy in the space-time manifold. Thus, for instance, one can compare the length
of one vector with the length of another obtained from it by means of any con-
gruent displacement through the (infinite) space-time manifold. This assumption,
however, is unjustified; or so Weyl claimed. Finite displacements fail to support
length comparison and, thus, fail to support Riemannian metrics.
48Cf. Weyl 1918b, ch. 2 (192), Weyl 1918c (193). For a technical presentation of Weyl’s
proposal of a purely infinitesimal geometry, see Fogel 2008, ch. 2 (64).
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To defend his claim, Weyl associated an infinitesimal Euclidean space with
every point in the space-time manifold – the so-called tangent space, considered
to represent the space of intuition of an idealized observer, i.e., the space of those
objects that can completely satisfy the meaning intentions of this observer’s mind.
In light of our discussion in the previous section, a scientific proposition in the
general theory of relativity can be considered objectively valid, on Weyl’s view,
only if its truth can be experienced. Given the restriction of intuition to the
tangent space, this view entails that a proposition can be considered objectively
valid only if it refers to objects in the tangent space, for only those objects can
actually be presented in intuition to completely satisfy the meaning intentions
expressed in the proposition. But unlike the infinitesimal displacement of a vector,
which always remains within the tangent space associated to its point of origin in
the space-time manifold, a finite displacement takes a vector outside the tangent
space.49 Outside the tangent space, however, objects cannot be given in intuition
and thus the meaning intentions of our idealized observer remain empty. In other
words, the Riemannian concept of congruence remains uninstantiated by objects
given in intuition. Therefore, no scientific proposition formulated in terms of this
concept can be justifiably believed to be true and, thus, no such proposition can
be objectively valid.
This is why Weyl thought that the Riemannian concept of congruence had to
be eliminated. He proposed a modification of general relativity along the lines
of a purely infinitesimal geometry. In other words, he introduced a new concept
of congruence, according to which two vectors can be compared only by means
of infinitesimal displacement, for only such a displacement remains within the
49The same point can be made, of course, with regard to infinite displacements.
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tangent space of intuition. Thus, on Weyl’s view, only those propositions in gen-
eral relativity that contain the Weylean concept of congruence can be objectively
valid. It seems right to say, then, that the epistemological significance of Weyl’s
phenomenological approach to Einstein’s theory resides in the elimination of the
Riemannian concept of congruence, and more generally, the elimination of all
scientific propositions that lack intuitive evidence (in Husserl’s sense).
Weyl’s argument can be, of course, resisted in various ways. One could, for
example, challenge Weyl’s stupendous claim that the satisfaction of one’s meaning
intentions is possible only within the tangent space associated to every point in the
space-time manifold. Indeed, it is not clear at all why one should accept Weyl’s
idealization of the space of intuition as an infinitesimal Euclidean space.50 It is not
clear, for that matter, why the phenomenologist should accept this idealization,
either.51 Be that as it may, before we turn to pointing out the problematic conse-
quences of this phenomenological view, let us indicate other reasons for thinking
that Weyl was indeed committed to, and never gave up, his phenomenological ap-
proach to scientific objectivity. To bring such reasons to light, one has to advert
to his later writings. So, in the remainder of this section, we want to present the
conception of objectivity offered in chapter thirteen of Weyl’s Philosophy of Math-
ematics and Natural Science – one of the few chapters that were almost entirely
rewritten, rather than merely translated, for the 1949 English edition of the book
– and to present the support that might be given for a phenomenological interpre-
tation of this conception. In the next section, we will criticize this interpretation
and argue, more generally, that Weyl ultimately rejected the phenomenological
approach to scientific objectivity.
50Cf. Howard 2005 (98)
51Cf. van Atten 2008 (182).
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Weyl attempted to identify, in chapter thirteen of his book, a necessary con-
dition for objectivity. A proposition is objectively valid, he maintained, only if,
when complete, its truth value does not change when the semantic value of its
constituent parts changes. Here is how he put it:
Our knowledge stands under the norm of objectivity. ... Epicurus cer-
tainly thought that the vertical is objectively distinguishable from all
other directions. He gives as his reason that all bodies when left to
themselves move in one and the same direction. Hence the statement
that a line is vertical is elliptic or incomplete, the complete statement
behind it being something like this: the line has the direction of grav-
ity at the point P. Thus the gravitational field, which we know to
depend on the material content of the world, enters into the complete
proposition as a contingent factor, and also an individually exhibited
point P on which we lay our finger by a demonstrative act such as is
expressed in words like ‘I,’ ‘here,’ ‘now,’ ‘this.’ Only if we are sure that
the truth of the complete statement is not affected by free variation
of the contingent factors and of those that are individually exhibited
(here the gravitational field and the point P) have we a right to omit
these factors from the statement and still to claim objective signifi-
cance for it. Epicurus’s belief is shattered as soon as it is realized that
the direction of gravity is different in Princeton and in Calcutta, and
that it can also be changed by a redistribution of matter.52
In other words, the proposition ‘This line is a vertical line’ can be considered to
describe an objective state of affairs only if we know that the truth of its complete
version, ‘This line is a vertical line, relative to the direction of gravity at this point,’
is independent of any changes of the semantic value of its indexicals. Furthermore,
we also have to know that its truth is independent of any contingent factors, like
the distribution of matter in the world. For, if the distribution of matter changes,
our proposition may change its truth value. Thus, objectivity, on Weyl’s view,
requires not only independence from the semantic value of indexicals, but also
52Cf. Weyl 1949a, 73 (211).
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independence from contingent factors.
To meet this double independence requirement, different frames of reference
or coordinate systems, have to be taken into account. A scientific proposition
is objective, then, only if we know that its complete version remains true across
different frames of reference; in other words, only if the complete proposition re-
mains true when relativized to different coordinate systems. According to this
criterion, objectivity may be attained in classical mechanics by Galilean transfor-
mations, in special relativity by Lorentz transformations, and in general relativity
by Einstein’s coordinate-free formulation of the fundamental equations.
But here one should note that, from early on, in his Das Continuum, Weyl
had defended the following view about the nature of a coordinate system:
The coordinate system is the unavoidable residue of the annihilation
of the ego in that geometrico-physical world which reason sifts from
the given under the standard of ‘objectivity – a final scanty token
in this objective sphere that existence is only given and can only be
given as the intentional content of the conscious experience of a pure,
sense-giving ego.53
This idea shows up again in later works, including his 1927 monograph, as well as
in chapter thirteen of its 1949 English translation, where Weyl similarly noted that
“the objectification, by elimination of the ego and its immediate life of intuition,
does not succeed without remainder, and the coordinate system remains as the
necessary residue of the annihilation of the ego.”54
53Cf. Weyl 1918a; Eng. tr., 94 (191).
54“Die Objektivierung durch Ausschaltung des Ich und seines unmittelbaren Lebens der An-
schauung gelingt nicht restlos, das nur durch eine individuelle Handlung (und nur approximativ)
aufzuweisende Koordinatensystem bleibt als das notwendige Residuum der Ich-Vernichtung.”
Weyl 1927a, 57 (198); Eng. tr., 75 (211).
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The apparently pervasive theme of the annihilation of the ego, and the idea
that the coordinate system is the unavoidable residue of such an annihilation,
have been recently considered as an indication of Weyl’s definitive commitment
to a phenomenological conception of objectivity.55 What is taken to justify this
commitment is an interpretation of the coordinate system as representing the
perspective of transcendental subjectivity, i.e., the perspective that survives the
phenomenological reduction. Weyl’s theme is, thus, taken to give an “explicit
recognition to the thesis of transcendental subjectivity,’ the purified consciousness
that is the residue of the phenomenological reduction.”56 Transcendental subjec-
tivity, it is concluded, conceived of “in Husserl’s sense of the ‘absolute being’ of
‘pure consciousness’ surviving the phenomenological reduction, plays the funda-
mental role in Weyl’s understanding of the constitution of objectivity in physical
theory.”57
This interpretation, one must admit, fits very nicely with Weyl’s own early
declarations, in the preface to Space, Time, Matter, endorsing Husserl’s phe-
nomenological approach (and quoted at the beginning of the present section).
On this interpretation, then, saying that a scientific proposition can be considered
objective only if we know that its complete version remains true when relativized
to different coordinate systems is tantamount to saying that that proposition is
objective only if we know that its complete version remains true for any transcen-
dental subjectivity. But we should note that, on Husserl’s view, to know that a
proposition is true for any transcendental subjectivity is tantamount to having
intuitive evidence for it:
55Cf. e.g. Ryckman 2005, especially 5.3.4 (159).
56Cf. Ryckman 2005, 119 (159).
57Cf. Ryckman 2005, 110 (159).
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If someone experiences the evidence of A, it is evident that no second
person can experience the absurdity of this same A, for that A is
evident means that A is not merely meant, but also genuinely given,
and given as precisely that which is meant. In the strict sense, it is
itself present.58
Hence, on the phenomenological interpretation of Weyl’s conception of scientific
objectivity, a proposition is objective only if it is intuitively evident, that is, in
light of our discussion in section 2.5 above, only if one has an experience of its
truth, in Husserl’s sense. On this interpretation, Galilean and Lorentz transfor-
mations, as well as Einstein’s general covariance, should be considered as means
for satisfying the requirement that scientific propositions be intuitively evident.
This suggests, in particular, that general covariance should be understood as a
means for overcoming epistemic relativism by guaranteeing the intersubjectivity
of the scientific propositions of the theory of general relativity.
However, on Einstein’s own view, general covariance was not to be understood
in this way. Rather, it was meant to guarantee that the theory has physical con-
tent, i.e., that “point coincidences” such as that of a pointer with a scale are
preserved under coordinate transformations. In other words, general covariance
was meant to guarantee that the propositions of general relativity are objectively
valid.59 Weyl, himself, eventually realized the fact that phenomenology can sup-
port at most intersubjectivity, and this led him to believe that Husserl’s conception
offers an inadequate account of natural science. Or at least this is what we want
58“Erlebt jemand die Evidenz A, so ist es evident, daß kein zweiter die Absurdita¨t desselben
A erleben kann; denn, daß A evident ist, heißt: A is nicht bloß gemeint, sondern genau als das,
als was es gemeint ist, auch wahrhaft gegeben; es ist im strengsten Sinne selbst gegenwa¨rtig.”
(Cf. Husserl 1900, VI, 39 (102))
59The view that general covariance should be understood as a means for overcoming epistemic
relativism had been also proposed by Joseph Petzoldt, but criticized by Einstein himself. For
discussion, see Howard 1992, 172ff (96). For a recent discussion of Einstein’s general covariance,
see Norton 2003 (141).
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to argue in the next section. This argument is important, we believe, the more so
as it seems to have been unduly ignored in the relevant literature.
3.6 Weyl’s Turn Against Husserl on Objectivity
Weyl’s departure from a phenomenological approach to scientific objectivity
might be thought to be due to his interests in physics in the mid 1920s switching
from general relativity to quantum mechanics. For, one may suppose, he realized
how difficult it is to assign a fundamental role to transcendental subjectivity in
a quantum mechanical context.60 However, his rejection of the phenomenological
approach to objectivity need not (although it might) have been motivated by
his reflections on quantum mechanics. As we argue below, this rejection may be
shown to have been based on the observation that already in classical physics
one deploys a method of concept formation that indicates a radical separation of
conceptual content from what can be intuitively presented to the transcendental
subjectivity.
Let us first note that what might have also led Weyl to reject the phenomeno-
logical approach to objectivity was an interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology
in the light of Leibniz’ monadology. Husserl, himself, seems to have regarded mon-
adology as a forerunner of his own phenomenology. In his lecture courses from
1923/1924 he remarked, for example, that
Leibniz has grasped and used metaphysically the fundamental proper-
ties of intentionality, by discussing the fundamental properties of the
60This supposition does not mean, of course, that assigning a fundamental role to transcen-
dental subjectivity in quantum mechanics is impossible. Indeed, to give just one example, Fritz
London and Edmond Bauer proposed the controversial view that it did have such a role in ex-
plicating the measurement problem (cf. London and Bauer 1939 (123). See also French 2002
(69)).
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monad under the titles of perception, the struggle to effect the transi-
tion from perception to perception, and, especially, the representation
of what is not immanently present but still perceptually given to con-
sciousness.61
Furthermore, Husserl’s own student, Dietrich Mahnke, was among the first to
point out that phenomenology can be seen as a Neuleibnizianismus.62 More re-
cently, it has been similarly emphasized that Husserl defended “a Leibnizian sort
of monadology as the condition of the possibility of objectivity.”63 But even inde-
pendently of this interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology, we believe Weyl had
strong reasons to depart the phenomenological conception of scientific objectivity.
As we have noted above, Weyl realized that, already in classical physics, con-
cepts are introduced that are not abstracted from the properties of objects immedi-
ately presented in intuition, but are freely created, i.e., implicitly defined through
the stipulation of the basic principles of a theory, like Newton’s laws of motion or
Maxwell’s equations. The character of the introduction of theoretical concepts in
physics justified, as we have seen, Weyl’s rejection of the traditional empiricist ap-
proach to scientific objectivity, as represented by Hobbes’ constructivist view, as
well as Weyl’s critical remarks on Leibniz’ monadological phenomenalism. Weyl
criticized Hobbes on account of his inadequate account of the formation of sci-
entific concepts. Abstraction, he argued, renders scientific concepts a “residue of
experience” and, thus, cripples physics by rendering it unable to validly determine
objective states of affairs and relations between mind-independent objects. Weyl
61“Leibniz hat bei der Ero¨rtung der Grundeigenschaften der Monade unter den Titeln Perzep-
tion, strebender u¨bergang von Perzeption zu Perzeption und insbesondere Repra¨sentation von
reell nicht Gegenwa¨rtigem und doch perzeptiv Bewußtem die Grundeigenschaften der Intention-
alita¨t erfaßt und metaphysisch verarbeitet.” (Husserl 1923/1924, 196f (106))
62Cf. Mahnke 1920, 249 (127))
63Mohanty 1995, 46 (137). For a discussion of several lines of connection between Husserl and
Leibniz, see the articles in Cristin and Sakai 2000 (30).
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also criticized Leibniz’ monadology for reducing natural science to an investiga-
tion based upon the harmonious connection between what is immediately given
to different consciousnesses, thereby advocating phenomenalism and upholding a
conception of objectivity as intersubjectivity.
The introduction of concepts by free creation led Weyl to believe that what
is achieved in theoretical physics “is not an intuitive insight into particular or
general states of affairs and a description that faithfully copies the given, but
a theoretical, in the last analysis purely symbolic construction of the world.”64
Thus, for Weyl, physics is a constructive activity that has two main characteris-
tics: the construction that physics achieves is a “purely symbolic” one, and it is
a construction “of the world.” One might think that Weyl made here a confu-
sion that is common to, and commonly charged of, certain constructivist views
– that he is guilty of blurring the distinction between scientific theories and the
real world.65 However, Weyl’s notion of a symbolic construction of the world is
epistemological, rather than metaphysical. In other words, as we will see more
clearly in the next chapter, this notion should be taken to emphasize that physics
aims at constructing an objective image of the real world, in mere symbols, rather
than the world itself.
But this merely indicates that Weyl came to reject the phenomenological ap-
proach to scientific objectivity, which he had endorsed in the Space, Time, Matter
and, as we have seen, as far as the 1949 English translation of his 1927 mono-
64“Was hier [in der theoretischen Physik] geleistet wird, ist nicht anschauende Einsicht in
singula¨re oder allgemeine Sachverhalte und eine das Gegebene treu nachzeichnende Deskription,
sondern theoretische, letzten Endes rein symbolische Konstruktion der Welt.” (Weyl 1928a, 149
(200))
65For this criticism of constructivism, see Devitt 1997, 241f (40). This is a charge often
directed at social constructivism about science, but also at certain remarks by philosophers of
science like Thomas Kuhn and Nelson Goodman. For a more recent view according to which in
quantum physics one “produces” the real world, see Pickering 1984 (147).
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graph. More precisely, it indicates his rejection of the view that objectivity is to
be based on a relativization to coordinate systems as the perspectives of transcen-
dental subjectivities surviving the annihilation of the ego by phenomenological
reduction. But what justifies this rejection?
In order to reveal the main reason that appears to have justified this rejec-
tion, let us note that Husserl, himself, acknowledged that natural science cannot
dispense with hypothetical elements, as these play a crucial role in scientific ex-
planation. However, he made a distinction between the positing of unobserved
entities and the positing of (what he took to be) in principle unobservable enti-
ties:
An explanation of perceptually given processes by means of hypo-
thetically assumed causal realities, by means of unknown objects (as,
e.g., the explanation of certain planetary disturbances by means of
the assumption of a new still unknown planet, Neptune) is something
different in principle from an explanation in the sense of a physical de-
termination of experienced things through physical explanatory means
as atoms, ions, and the like.66
Husserl denied that the world of physics is different than that of the objects given
in perceptual experience, and maintained that physics cannot justify the assump-
tion of “an unknown world of physical realities ... explaining the appearances
causally.” Hypothetical elements, he added, are not the “symbolic representative
of something hidden,” something that is bound to remain unknown because it
is in principle unobservable. For him, it is nonsensical to posit any in principle
66“Eine Erkla¨rung der wahrnehmungsma¨ßig gegebenen Vorga¨nge durch hypothetisch
angenommene Ursachrealita¨ten, durch unbekannte Dinglichkeiten (wie z.B. die Erkla¨rung
gewisser planetarischer Sto¨rungen durch die Annahme eines noch unbekannten neuen Planeten
Neptun) etwas prinzipiell anderes sei, als eine Erkla¨rung im Sinne physikalischer Bestimmung
der erfahrenen Dinge und durch physikalische Erkla¨rungsmittel nach Art der Atome, Ionen u.
dgl.” (Husserl 1913, 111 (104))
112
unobservable and, thus, unknowable real entities, as causing what is presented in
perception. For, he seems to have thought, it is a mistake to extend the scope of
causality beyond the realm of intentional objects. “Atoms, ions, and the like,” are,
according to Husserl, categories of thought whereby the physicist may attempt to
determine physical reality, but is actually unable to give them any intuitive sig-
nificance:
Not even a Divine physics can make simply intuited determinations
out of categorial thought-determinations of realities, any more than a
Divine omnipotence can bring it to pass that someone paints elliptic
functions or plays them on the violin.67
But the view about hypothetical elements, suggested in this passage, appears to
be in conflict with Husserl’s own view about the conditions required for scientific
objectivity, which we discussed in section 3.4 above. For how can any scientific
propositions about hypothetical elements be objective, if objectivity requires that
these propositions should be intuitively evident?
As we have seen already, on Husserl’s view, a scientific proposition can be
objective only if it is justifiably believed to be true, i.e., only if its truth is experi-
enced. In other words, a proposition is objective only if objects can be presented in
intuition that completely satisfy the meaning intentions expressed by that propo-
sition. But Husserl seems to have thought, at the same time, that the meaning
intentions expressed by propositions that refer to certain hypothetical elements
cannot be satisfied, that they are merely empty intentions. For, whereas unknown
planets can be at least in principle observed, atoms and ions (or, more accurately,
things like forces and fields) are in principle unobservable entities. Clearly, on
67“Auch eine go¨ttliche Physik kann aus kategorialen Denkbestimmungen von Realita¨ten keine
schlicht anschaullichen machen, sowenig go¨ttliche Omnipotenz es machen kann, daß man ellip-
tische Funktionen malt oder auf der Geige spielt.” (Husserl 1913, 52 (104))
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Husserl’s own view, this entails that no scientific proposition about the latter can
be objective, since no such proposition can be intuitively evident.
Husserl’s own life-long attempt to solve this conflict undoubtedly deserves
further discussion, within a larger context of a general analysis of the phenomeno-
logical approach to the epistemic role of hypothetical and transfinite elements
in science. Also, it is no less important to address the question whether the
phenomenological method of concept formation – the ideational abstraction – can
allow the introduction of hypothetical and transfinite elements, in the first place.68
While we appreciate the importance of such questions for the phenomenology
of mathematics, we want to focus here on Weyl’s own attempt to come to terms
with the conflict raised by Husserl’s view on objectivity. We want to discuss,
in the next chapter, what we take to be Weyl’s ultimate answer to the question
about scientific objectivity, that is, his attempt to identify exactly the necessary
conditions under which a scientific proposition can, despite its lack of intuitive
evidence, express relations between real, mind-independent objects.
3.7 Conclusion
We discussed, in this chapter, the relation between concept formation and sci-
entific objectivity. In particular, we focused on Weyl’s remarks on abstraction,
and presented his criticism of the traditional empiricist view about physics, as
illustrated by Hobbes’s constructivism. According to Weyl, traditional empiricist
abstraction fails to account for what Weyl took to be a necessary condition for
68It is perhaps worth noting that Oskar Becker argued that Husserl’s method is insufficient
for the introduction of transfinite elements. Becker believed that these could be introduced by
means of an extension of ideational abstraction, by what he called the “transfinite structure-
complication of pure consciousness,” i.e., by phenomenological reflection on the potentially infi-
nite iteration of our own mental acts (cf. Becker 1927 (9)).
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scientific objectivity: the introduction of hypothetical elements. Then, we noted
that Weyl was more attracted to Fichte’s constructivism due to its emphasis on
the freedom of the mind to create concepts independently of our perceptual expe-
rience, rather than by abstraction from experience, but we also explained Weyl’s
misgivings with Fichte’s view.
Afterwards, we discussed the early influence exerted by Husserl’s phenomeno-
logical philosophy on Weyl’s own conception of scientific objectivity. According
to this philosophy, the formation of scientific concepts requires a reorientation
of attention away from objects and toward the immanent and, therefore, indu-
bitably given, acts of consciousness. Weyl’s implementation of the phenomenolog-
ical method of ideational abstraction led to a purely infinitesimal geometry, which
was, according to him, needed for establishing the objectivity of the general theory
of relativity. Later on, however, Weyl came to believe that the phenomenological
method is at variance with what physicists actually do when they do physics, i.e.,
with the positing of real but in principle unobservable entities, and came to main-
tain, against Husserl, that intuitive evidence cannot be a necessary condition for
objectivity. Weyl seems to have realized that, just like Hobbes’ and Fichte’s con-
structivisms, Husserlian phenomenology cannot go beyond Leibniz’ monadological
phenomenalism.
In the next chapter, we discuss what we take to be Weyl’s ultimate view on
objectivity. As we will see, he came to believe that scientific theories should be
understood as systems of symbols (by analogy, as he pointed out, with Hilbert’s
transcendent axiomatization of mathematics), but that such systems can provide
objective knowledge only if they are categorical. We present some reasons for
thinking that categoricity fails to obtain, and then suggest how objectivity may
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be obtained without categoricity.
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CHAPTER 4
OBJECTIVITY, CATEGORICITY, AND UNITARY INEQUIVALENCE
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we want to clarify Weyl’s ultimate view on objectivity, that is,
his view on the conditions under which a scientific theory may provide knowledge
of the mind-independent world. This clarification will strengthen our claim that,
according to him, there is a fundamental tension between scientific objectivity and
intelligibility.
We start by presenting Weyl’s reasons for thinking that Hilbert’s transcendent
axiomatics fails to meet the conditions for scientific understanding and may, there-
fore, be taken for a mere game with symbols on paper. Weyl came to maintain, as
we will see, that the mathematical concepts of transcendent axiomatics (including
its transfinite components), even if unable to help us understand why a theorem is
true, partake in the theoretical construction of the mind-independent world, and
they do so “in the same way” as the scientific concepts (including the hypothetical
elements) do. This seems to suggest that his view was that, just like the hypo-
thetical elements, transfinite components are indispensable for the formation of
a scientific theory that aims at providing knowledge about the mind-independent
world. In other words, Weyl came to think that the free creation of concepts,
i.e., their introduction as symbols through the positing of the basic principles of
117
the theory, is a necessary condition for objectivity. The natural question arises,
however, what further condition(s), besides their being freely created, should such
concepts satisfy, if objectivity is to be attained?
Weyl believed that objectivity further requires categoricity, i.e., a univocal
coordination between theory and its domains of interpretation, up to isomor-
phism. A physical theory is objective only if it can be univocally coordinated
to our perceptual experience, and only if this experience can be isomorphically
mapped to the mind-independent world. We show that Weyl took the criterion
for the univocal coordination between theory and experience to be expressed by
a concordance requirement, i.e., that all methods for determining the value of
an observable quantity must lead to the same result (within the limits of exper-
imental error), and that his emphasis on the isomorphism between experience
and the mind-independent world implies that only the relations between mind-
independent objects, rather than these objects themselves, may be epistemically
accessible to us. This view entails, as we will explain, that categorical theories
cannot bring about understanding of natural phenomena. But it also entails, as
we will see, that categoricity is actually not enough for objectivity, unless one
presents convincing reasons that the mind-independent world may be considered
an interpretation of a categorical theory.
To be sure, Weyl’s view about categoricity as a requirement for objectivity
seems less than tenable, since results like the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem and
Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem showed that natural first-order formaliza-
tions of most common mathematical theories are not categorical. In fact, Weyl
himself came to doubt that physical theories are categorical. One reason for doubt
seems to have been the fact that his view runs against an established theoreti-
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cal result in quantum physics – the failure, under certain circumstances, of the
Stone-von Neumann theorem. This failure entails that the algebraic structure of a
quantum field theory has an infinite number of unitarily inequivalent representa-
tions, with physical quantities taking different values in each unitary equivalence
class of representations. This seems to imply that, in an appropriate sense, such
a theory fails to be categorical and, thus, fails to provide objective knowledge.
Ultimately, as we will see, Weyl remained unsettled with regard to scientific ob-
jectivity.
Recently, however, several responses have been given to the challenge raised
by unitary inequivalence. First, one defended the idea that quantum theories
should be adjusted so that unitary equivalence is restored. But we argue that
any adjustment that purports to eliminate all but one unitary equivalence class
of representations is problematic, since it renders theories unable to account for
natural phenomena that they were designed to account for (such as, e.g., phase
transitions). Secondly, one proposed the view that, while the unitarily inequivalent
representations of the algebraic structure of a theory should not be eliminated, the
theory can provide objective knowledge in spite of its lack of categoricity. This
would require that the structure of the theory be expanded such that the real
world is described by the structure of the relations between unitarily inequivalent
representations, rather than by the algebraic structure of the theory or by any
of its unitarily inequivalent representations. The expanded structure is taken to
span a whole range of physically possible worlds, each of which is described by
an unitarily inequivalent representation. But we point out that it is not clear
that this expansion is sufficient for objectivity, since nothing seems to guarantee
that some unitarily inequivalent representations that describe physically possible
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worlds are not within that range. However, if a criterion is found for identifying all
representations that may be assumed to describe physically possible worlds, this
would justify the belief that science provides knowledge of the mind-independent
world, but a world that is, in a sense to be explained, modally dappled.
4.2 Weyl on Transcendent Axiomatics and Objectivity
In this section, we discuss Weyl’s reasons for believing that Hilbert’s formal
or, as Weyl put it, transcendent axiomatics, despite its alleged failure to bring
about mathematical understanding, is nevertheless scientifically significant. More
specifically, we want to clarify why Weyl believed that, although it cannot have
an explanatory role, transcendent axiomatics has an essential objectifying role.
“Transcendent axiomatics,” Weyl wrote toward the end of his career, “has
something paradoxical and shocking, because one must try to learn to abstract
radically from the familiar intuitive significance of the terms occurring in the
axioms as undefined concepts.”1 What seems to have always appeared to him
paradoxical and shocking is the fact that in a formal system, like the one Hilbert
gave in 1900 for real analysis, for example, the axioms are taken to be (partially)
uninterpreted statements, rather than intuitively evident, and their stipulation is
constrained only by such metatheoretical requirements as consistency, indepen-
dence, and fruitfulness. Weyl was opposed, in his very first writings, to Hilbert’s
claim that classical analysis is just one interpretation of the formal system and
that in order to justify the existence of real numbers as a complete totality one
1Cf. Weyl 1985, 14 (218).
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needs to prove the axioms consistent.2 Later, after Hilbert started to think about
proving consistency syntactically, by proof-theoretical methods, Weyl considered
that mathematics would thereby be transformed into a mere game with meaning-
less symbols:
That from [the constructivist] point of view only a part, perhaps only
a wretched part, of classical mathematics is tenable is a bitter but
inevitable fact. Hilbert could not bear this mutilation. ... he suc-
ceeded in saving classical mathematics by a radical reinterpretation
of its sense without reducing its inventory, namely, by formalizing it,
thus transforming it in principle from a system of intuitive statements
into a game with formulas that proceeds according to fixed rules.3
It is worth noting that, for Weyl, at the time, it was not the potential lack of
success that threatened Hilbert’s attempt to save classical mathematics. The
major problem was, according to Weyl, that the attempt turns mathematics into a
game: “Mathematics becomes, in Hilbert’s theory, a game with signs and formulas;
the formulas, which consist of signs, have no meaning which they wish to convey,
but they are the material of the game of demonstration: according to the rules of
the game new formulas are constructed from those already at hand.”4 However,
this remark seems to overlook the fact that not all of Hilbert’s signs and formulas
were meaningless, but only those of ideal (or transfinite) mathematics. It also
2Weyl maintained that the concept of real number, although clearly defined by the formal
axioms, is not extensionally definite, i.e., that, unlike the set of natural numbers, the set of real
numbers is not, as Hilbert had claimed, a complete totality, i.e., a maximal class of objects. See
Weyl 1919 (194).
3“Daß von [dem intuitionistischen] Standpunkt aus nur ein Teil, vielleicht nur ein
ku¨mmerlicher Teil der klassischen Mathematik zu halten ist, ist eine bittere, aber unumga¨ngliche
Tatsache. Hilbert ertrug diese Verstu¨mmelung nicht. ... es ihm gelang, die klassische Mathe-
matik durch eine radikale Umdeutung ihres Sinnes ohne Minderung ihres Bestandes zu retten,
na¨mlich durch ihre Formalisierung, durch welche sie, prinzipiell gesprochen, sich aus einem Sys-
tem einsichtiger Erkenntnisse verwandelt in ein nach festen Regeln sich vollziehendes Spiel mit
Formeln.” (Weyl 1928a, 148; Eng. tr., 483 (200))
4Cf. Weyl 1929, 155 (202).
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assumes that operations with meaningless signs and formulas cannot be seen as
something other than moves in a cognitively irrelevant game. This assumption
is, in fact, what motivated Weyl to think that formalization raises a difficult
epistemological problem, for he believed that comparing mathematics to a game
like chess sheds a distorting light upon the activity of the mathematician:
Ever since Newton in his modesty spoke of playing with pebbles on the
shore of a wide ocean, the attitude that we mathematicians play a nice
game that ought not to be taken too seriously has enjoyed considerable
popularity. In my opinion, it is fundamentally unsound. Whatever
analogies there are between the mental activities of a mathematician
and a chess player, the problems of the former are serious in the sense
that they are bound up with basic truth, truth about the world that
is and truth about our existence in the world.5
Weyl seems to have implied that, if Hilbert’s mathematics is to be considered
at all mathematics, it was imperative that one explain how its problems are se-
rious, in the sense indicated in this passage, it was imperative that one clarify
its cognitive significance: “Without doubt, if mathematics is to remain a seri-
ous intellectual concern, then some sense must be attached to Hilbert’s game of
formulae.”6 If one is unable to reveal its sense, so was Weyl’s worry, formalized
mathematics would have to be regarded as just a game, isolated from our epis-
temic efforts and maybe even unworthy of serious intellectual pursuit. Hence,
Weyl raised the following question: “Hilbert’s mathematics may be a pretty game
with formulas, more amusing even than chess; but what does it have to do with
knowledge, since its formulas should admittedly have no contentual significance by
5Cf. Manuscript Hs91:17, 16.
6“Ohne Zweifel: soll Mathematik eine ernsthafte Kulturangelegenheit bleiben, so muß sich
mit dem Hilbertschen Formelspiel irgendein Sinn verknu¨pfen.” (Weyl 1925, 540 (197); Eng. tr.,
140 (197))
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virtue of which they would express intuitive truths?”7 This very question seems
to indicate, again, that Weyl merely overlooked the fact that not all of Hilbert’s
formulas lack contentual significance. Furthermore, one can answer the question
simply by pointing out that transcendent axiomatic proofs, i.e., proofs that de-
ploy unbounded existential quantification over infinite domains, and so, formulas
without contentual significance, must have a contentual output. Thus, even such
formulas do have cognitive relevance, as instruments used in the derivation of
formulas with contentual significance. But what Weyl seems to have been wor-
ried about is that a mathematical proof can have contentual output only if it is
wholly contentual, or contentual in all its parts. Hence, he seems to have believed
that only if mathematical reasoning is wholly contentual can mathematics remain
a serious intellectual concern. This further indicates that Weyl failed to grasp
the epistemological import of Hilbert’s commitment to proving the reliability of
non-contentual or purely symbolic mathematical reasoning.8
At any rate, a more serious concern raised by Weyl is that non-contentual or
purely symbolic mathematical reasoning lacks any explanatory power. As we have
seen in section 2.8 above, on his view, only immanent axiomatic proof can bring
about mathematical understanding, since only this type of proof may possess the
transparency demanded for understanding. The transparency of an immanent
axiomatic proof is conceived of in Husserlian terms, as an experience of truth,
that is, as an epistemic achievement of a complete satisfaction of the prover’s
meaning intentions. In other words, Weyl believed that one can understand a
7“Die Hilbertsche Mathematik mag ein hu¨bsches Formelspiel sein, amu¨santer selbst als das
Schachspiel; aber was hat sie mit Erkenntnis zu tun, da doch eingestandenermaßen ihre Formeln
keine inhaltliche Bedeutung haben sollen, derzufolge sie einsichtige Wahrheiten auszudru¨ckten?”
(Weyl 1927a, 49 (198); Eng. tr., 61 (211))
8We come back to this issue in section 5.4 below.
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mathematical theorem only if its proof provides a construction of the objects
and relations referred to in the theorem from the objects and relations referred
to in the axioms. But, as it was clear to him, Hilbert’s transcendent axiomatic
proofs do not provide such constructions, but deploy non-contentual or purely
symbolic reasoning, and so they cannot be regarded as an experience of truth.
Transcendent axiomatic proofs are partly opaque, they fail to completely satisfy
the prover’s meaning intentions. Therefore, Weyl concluded, such proofs cannot
bring about mathematical understanding. From this, he seems to have concluded
that they have no cognitive relevance and may be considered a mere formula game.
Hilbert, quite naturally, resisted the formula game view of mathematics and
repeatedly pointed out that the scientific relevance of formal axiomatics is given
by its use as an instrument of great scientific and epistemic value. For instance,
in a paper presented in 1927 to the mathematical seminar at the University of
Hamburg, he attacked the game view in the following way:
The formula game ... has, besides its mathematical value, an impor-
tant general philosophical significance. For this formula game is carried
out according to certain definite rules, in which the technique of our
thinking is expressed. These rules form a closed system that can be
discovered and definitely stated. The fundamental idea of my proof
theory is none other than to describe the activity of our understand-
ing, to make a protocol of the rules according to which our thinking
actually proceeds.9
Hence, in a certain sense, Hilbert admitted that formalized mathematics is a game.
But he believed that this is not a mere game, since it is the very game that we
call thinking. This idea is based on the fact that, according to him, the rules of
the formula game are, and should be, the rules according to which our thinking
9Cf. Hilbert 1927, 475 (87).
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proceeds. In other words, the idea is based on Hilbert’s belief that the formal
expression of the technique of our thinking provides an accurate description of,
but also the right prescription for, the activity of the mind.
To be sure, Weyl acknowledged that the formula game, the manipulation of
meaningless symbols according to stipulated rules, describes at least part of the
mathematician’s way of thinking:
We forget about what the symbols stand for. The mathematician is
concerned with the catalogue alone; he is like the man in the catalogue
room who does not care what books or pieces of an intuitively given
manifold the symbols of his catalogue denote. He need not be idle;
there are many operations which he may carry out with these symbols,
without ever having to look at the things they stand for.10
Weyl came to believe that the mathematician engaged in symbolic reasoning “re-
frains from constructing the mathematical objects.”11 However, Weyl never aban-
doned the view that the construction of mathematical objects ought to be preferred
to purely symbolic reasoning, if understanding is what the mathematician is look-
ing for. Consequently, while he acknowledged that the rules of the formula game
are the rules according to which mathematical thinking does sometimes proceed,
Weyl denied that they can be the rules according to which mathematical thinking
should proceed. On his view, purely symbolic reasoning has no epistemic value
for mathematics itself.
However, Weyl also came to believe that the rules of the formula game should
be the rules according to which thinking sometimes proceed, if objectivity, rather
than understanding, is the epistemic ideal that one seeks to attain. In other words,
he came to believe that although purely symbolic reasoning has no epistemic value
10Cf. Weyl 1940, 714 (208).
11Cf. Weyl 1940, 717 (208).
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for mathematics itself, it does have great epistemic value for the natural sciences.
This view suggests that Weyl ignored Hilbert’s own emphasis on the fact that
transcendent axiomatics is more than a mere game not only because it is of great
epistemic value to physics, but rather as a formal instrument of great epistemic
value to mathematics itself, as well as to everyday thinking.12 Indeed, as early as
in 1924, Weyl wrote: “I see only one possibility of attributing it [i.e., formalized
mathematics], including its transfinite components, an independent intellectual
significance.”13 This possibility is later on described as follows:
If Hilbert is not just playing a game of formulae, then he wants a
theoretical mathematics in contrast to Brouwer’s intuitive one. But
where is that transcendent world carried by belief, at which its symbols
are directed? I do not find it, unless I completely fuse mathematics
with physics and assume that the mathematical concepts of number,
function, etc. (or Hilbert’s symbols), generally partake in the theoret-
ical construction of the real world in the same way as the concepts of
energy, gravitation, electron, etc.14
It is far from being immediately clear what Weyl’s interpretation of Hilbert’s view
is in this passage. On this interpretation, if Hilbert’s mathematics is to be more
than a mere formula game, it must be regarded as being fused with physics, that
is, as partaking “in the same way” as physics in a theoretical construction of the
real world. What might this mean? What might it mean to say that physical
12Cf., e.g., Hilbert 1918 (85).
13“Ich sehe nur eine Mo¨glichkeit, ihnen einschließlich ihrer transfiniten Bestandteile eine
selbsta¨ndige geistige Bedeutung beizulegen.” (Weyl 1924, 451 (196))
14“Wenn Hilbert nicht ein bloßes Formelspiel treibt, so will er eine theoretische im Gegensatz
zu Brouwers intuitiver Mathematik. Aber wo ist jenes vom Glauben getragene Jenseits, auf das
ihre Symbole richten? Ich finde es nicht, wenn ich nicht die Mathematik sich vo¨llig mit der Physik
verschmelzen lasse und annehme, daß die mathematischen Begriffe von Zahl, Funktion usw.
(oder die Hilbertschen Symbole) prinzipiell in der gleichen Art an der theoretischen Konstruktion
der wirklichen Welt teilnehmen wie die Begriffe Energie, Gravitation, Elektron u. dergl.” (Weyl
1925, 540 (197); Eng. tr., 140 (197), my emphasis)
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concepts partake in a theoretical construction of the world? And what might it
mean to say that mathematical concepts do so, too?
At a later stage in his career, Weyl made the following remark about the
character of physical concepts and what this implied with regard to the nature of
theories:
In the development of physics, the physical concepts have revealed
themselves more and more as free constructions, mere symbols handled
according to certain rules; theoretical physics becomes a system as
thoroughly formalized as Hilbert’s mathematics.15
Thus, Weyl seems to have considered physical concepts as mere symbols defined
implicitly through the relations expressed by the fundamental principles of a the-
ory. Such principles, although they may be suggested by intuition, are freely
stipulated and taken to be merely symbolic expressions, rather than contentual
propositions. This view on concept formation was motivated, as we have seen in
the previous chapter, by the need to take into account the positing of hypothetical
entities (energy, force, field, and the like) as an attempt to overcome phenomenal-
ism. The idea that physical concepts partake in a theoretical construction of the
world emphasizes, then, according to Weyl, the objectifying role of such concepts.
In other words, it emphasizes the fact that physical concepts, considered as mere
symbols without contentual significance, are indispensable for the stipulation of
the fundamental principles of a theory capable of providing knowledge about the
mind-independent world. A theory cannot provide such knowledge, unless it takes
the form of a transcendent or formal axiomatic system.
If this is the right way to understand Weyl, then to say that Hilbert’s math-
ematics partakes in the theoretical construction of the real world is to say that
15Cf. Weyl 1946, 604 (210).
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mathematical concepts (including the transfinite ones) have, just like the physical
concepts, an essential objectifying role. In other words, mathematical concepts
are indispensable, in the sense just explained, for the formation of scientific theo-
ries capable of providing objective knowledge. However, since the free creation of
concepts may hardly be enough for objectivity, what might justify Weyl’s belief
that scientific theories, as transcendent axiomatic systems, can provide knowledge
about mind-independent reality? What further conditions must be satisfied by a
scientific theory for objectivity to obtain? We address this question in the next
section.
4.3 Weyl on Objectivity and Categoricity
In this section, we attempt to show that, on Weyl’s view, a necessary condition
for objectivity is the categoricity of a physical theory, and that its satisfaction
demands that the relations between mind-independent objects be isomorphic with
the relations between our perceptions. Then we take up the question about the
justification that Weyl provided in support of the idea that this isomorphism may
obtain.
As noted above, Weyl maintained that the development of physics led one to
conceive of scientific theories as transcendent axiomatic systems. He also believed
that this development was determined by the physicist’s search for objective the-
ories, and he expressed this belief quite unequivocally: “To fulfill the demand of
objectivity, we construct an image of the world in symbols.”16 But how should
one think about the relation between a symbolic image of the world – a scientific
theory, and the world itself as a domain of its interpretation?
16Cf. Weyl 1949a, 77 (211).
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“Objectivity,” Weyl maintained in an often quoted remark, “means invariance
with respect to the group of automorphisms.”17 As he explained, this implies that
the relations expressed by the statements derived in a theory are objective only
if they remain invariant under the group of one-to-one transformations within
the object domain of the theory that leave invariant the relations expressed by
the fundamental presuppositions of the theory.18 For example, the theorems of
Euclidean geometry (or, rather, Hilbert’s axiomatization of it) can be taken to
express objective relations only if these relations remain invariant across the one-
to-one transformations of the domain of geometrical objects onto itself that leave
invariant the relations expressed by the axioms.
Weyl’s idea that invariance under a certain class of transformations of the
structure of a theory is required for a physical theory to express objective re-
lations has recently resurfaced in the literature.19 But we should ask whether
invariance under automorphic transformations can really be taken as the crite-
rion for objectivity. Making invariance under automorphic transformations the
criterion for objectivity seems to presuppose that we either do not have more
than one domain of objects as a possible interpretation, or that a unique domain
among the possible ones can be identified as the domain with respect to which
invariance is to be measured. In the first case, we would be just wrong, since
a physical theory may typically be interpreted over different domains of objects.
In the second case, the unique domain either is not the domain of objects in the
mind-independent world, and so invariance would be insufficient for objectivity,
or it is, and so invariance is redundant.
17Cf. Weyl 1952, 132 (213).
18Cf. Weyl 1949a, 72ff (211).
19Cf., e.g., Nozick 2001 (142), Kosso 2003 (115), Debs and Redhead 2007 (35).
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By contrast, it seems more appropriate to say that the statements of a physical
theory express objective relations only if these relations remain invariant under
isomorphic transformations of the interpretations that leave invariant the relations
expressed by the fundamental laws of the theory. If this is correct, then the view
that should be attributed to Weyl is that objectivity requires categoricity. But
what would justify this view? Furthermore, should we also think that, according
to him, categoricity is enough for objectivity? Before we address these questions,
let us try to clarify how Weyl conceived the notion of categoricity.
In the winter semester of 1931, after having accepted a position as Hilbert’s
successor in Go¨ttingen, Weyl taught a course on the recent developments of the
axiomatic method. Speaking about the completeness of an axiomatic system, he
told his students: “We only require that [any] two concrete interpretations of a
complete system of axioms are isomorphic to each other. ... One designates this
conception of completeness also as categoricity of the system.”20 To be sure, the
idea of completeness as categoricity was already present in his 1927 monograph,
Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science, although the term “categoricity”
would be used only in the 1949 English translation of the book:
One might have thought of calling a system of axioms complete if
the meaning of the basic concepts present in them were univocally
fixed through the requirement that the axioms be valid. But this
ideal cannot be realized, for the isomorphic mapping of a contentual
interpretation is surely just another contentual interpretation. The
final formulation is therefore this: an system of axioms is complete, or
categorical, if any two contentual interpretations of it are necessarily
20“Wir verlangen nur von einem vollsta¨ndigen Axiomensystem ..., daß zwei inhaltliche Inter-
pretationen ... zueinander isomorph sind. ... Man bezeichnet diese Fassung der Vollsta¨ndigkeit
auch als Kategorizita¨t des Axiomensystems.” (Manuscript Hs91a)
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isomorphic.21
Hence, Weyl believed that the notion of categoricity denotes a certain property
of completeness.22 According to him, a univocal determination of the meaning of
the concepts in the axioms, i.e., a one-to-one mapping of these concepts onto the
domain of one particular interpretation of the system, is not sufficient to make
an axiomatic system complete. What this requires is a one-to-one mapping of
the concepts onto the domain of the “essential” interpretation of the theory. In
other words, an axiomatic system is complete only if it is categorical, i.e., only
if the meaning of concepts is univocally determined up to an isomorphism of all
interpretations of the system.
Weyl’s view, then, seems to have been that objectivity can obtain only if a sci-
entific theory is complete in this sense, that is, only if the correlation between its
basic concepts and the objects it can apply to is univocal up to isomorphism. But
how might this view be understood? It seems obvious that one cannot claim that
there is a univocal correlation between concepts and any mind-independent ob-
jects, for this assumes that one already has epistemic access to mind-independent
objects, which begs the question of scientific objectivity. Furthermore, to claim
that the correlation between concepts and mind-independent objects is univocal
up to isomorphism would assume that the relations between mind-independent ob-
21“Man ko¨nnte nun darauf verfallen, ein Axiomensystem vollsta¨ndig zu nennen, wenn durch
die Forderung der Gu¨ltigkeit der Axiome der Sinn der in sie eingehenden Grundbegriffe eindeutig
fixiert wa¨re. Dieses Ideal ist aber nicht zu erfu¨llen; denn gewiß ist jede inhaltliche Interpretation,
die aus einer vorliegenden durch isomorphe Abbildung hervorgeht, wiederum eine solche. Die
endgu¨ltige Formulierung ist darum diese: Ein Axiomensystem ist vollsta¨ndig, wenn irgend zwei
inhaltliche Interpretationen desselben notwendig isomorph sind.” (Weyl 1927a, 21f (198); Eng
tr., 25 (211))
22Edward Huntington had actually used the term “sufficiency” to express part of a more com-
prehensive notion of completeness, the very part that came to be called categoricity after Oswald
Veblen introduced the term “categoricity,” giving credit for it to John Dewey (cf. Huntington
1902, 264 (99), Veblen 1904, 346 (184)). For historical background on the notion of categoricity,
see Awodey and Reck 2002 (4).
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jects can be isomorphically mapped to relations between objects in other domains
of interpretation. Quite similarly, this begs the question of scientific objectiv-
ity, for it assumes that one already has epistemic access to the relations between
mind-independent objects.
Before we take a closer look at Weyl’s view on the relation between categoricity
and objectivity, let us consider his remarks on the relation between categoricity
and understanding, as we find them formulated in the following passage:
A science can determine its domain only up to an isomorphic mapping.
In particular it remains entirely indifferent as to the ‘essence’ of its ob-
jects. That which distinguishes the real points in space from number
triples or other interpretation of geometry one can only know by im-
mediate, living intuition. But intuition is not in itself some blessed
tranquility, which it would never be able to leave behind. Rather, in-
tuition presses on toward the chasm and adventure of cognition. How-
ever, it would be a chimera to expect cognition to reveal to intuition
an essence deeper than that openly available to intuition. The idea
of isomorphism designates the natural insurmountable boundary of
scientific cognition.23
It is important to note here Weyl’s distinction between what might be called phe-
nomenal knowledge (Kenntnis) and scientific knowledge or cognition (Erkenntnis
or Wissen). This distinction seems to be based on the fact that while phenomenal
knowledge requires that objects be immediately presented in intuition, scientific
cognition has no such requirement. Indeed, as we have seen already, on Weyl’s
23“Eine Wissenschaft kann ihr Sachgebiet immer nur bis auf eine isomorphe Abbildung festle-
gen. Insbesondere verha¨lt sie sich gegenu¨ber dem ‘Wesen’ ihrer Objekte ganz indifferent. Das,
was die wirklichen Raumpunkte von Zahlentripeln oder andern Interpretationen der Geometrie
unterscheidet, kann man nur kennen in unmittelbarer lebendiger Anschauung. Aber das Schauen
ist nicht selige Ruhe in sich, aus der es niemals herauszutreten vermo¨chte, sondern dra¨ngt fort
zum Zwiespalt und Wagnis der Erkenntnis; Schwa¨rmerei aber ist es, von der Erkenntnis zu
erwarten, dass sie ein tieferes Wesen als das der Anschauung offen daliegende – der Anschauung
enthu¨lle. Der Isomorphiegedanke bezeichnet die selbstversta¨ndliche unu¨bersteigbare Schranke
des Wissens.” (Weyl 1927a, 22 (198), Eng. tr., 26 (211))
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view, science goes beyond what is immediately presented in intuition by positing
hypothetical elements, i.e., real but in principle unobservable entities. By doing
so, however, science forgoes the ability to bring about understanding, since, as
we recall from our discussion in chapter two above, the immediate presentation of
objects in intuition was, according to him, an indispensable condition for the ex-
perience of truth, without which no understanding could be brought about. Thus,
the thought that isomorphism is “the natural insurmountable boundary of scien-
tific cognition” points out that one may obtain scientific cognition of the relations
between objects in a domain of interpretation (more exactly, of those relations
that can be mapped isomorphically to the relations between objects in any other
domain of interpretation), but one could never thereby bring about understand-
ing. In other words, Weyl seems to have believed that categoricity is, as a matter
of fact, an obstacle to scientific understanding.
This belief finds further support in his remark that immanent axiomatic sys-
tems – the very purpose of which, as we discussed in section 2.8 above, is to
bring about understanding– are non-categorical systems, for they typically have
non-isomorphic models: “While in the [transcendent] axiomatics one was mostly
concerned with axioms which determine the structure of the system completely
as, e.g., the axioms of Euclidean geometry do for Euclidean space, we have here,
in algebra, to do with [immanent] axioms satisfied by many different individual
number fields that are not mutually isomorphic.”24 For example, the field axioms
can be satisfied by the rational numbers, the real numbers, etc., and these number
24Cf. Weyl 1985, 13 (218).
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fields are, of course, not isomorphic.25
Although, on Weyl’s view, categoricity seems to be an obstacle to understand-
ing, there is good reason, as we emphasized above, to attribute to him the view
that categoricity is necessary for scientific objectivity. A justification for this view
is also suggested in the following passage:
This thought [i.e., the thought of isomorphism as a boundary] has
clarificatory value for the metaphysical speculations about a world
of things in themselves behind the phenomena. For it is clear that
under such a hypothesis the phenomenal world must be isomorphic
to the absolute one (where, of course, the coordination needs to be
univocal only in the direction thing in itself → phenomenon); for “we
are justified, when different perceptions offer themselves to us, to infer
that the real conditions are different” (Helmholtz, Wissenschatliche
Abhandlungen, II, 656) Thus, even if we do not know the things in
themselves, still we have just as much cognition about them as we do
about the phenomena.26
Hence, Weyl’s belief that objectivity requires categoricity would be justified only
if the relations between our perceptions could be isomorphically mapped to the
relations between the objects in the mind-independent world. This condition,
however, raises several problems.
First, it is not clear that categoricity is also sufficient for objectivity. It seems
25It is interesting to note, however, that although these number fields are not isomorphic, the
algebraic closure of any of them is unique up to isomorphism. Thus, for example, if K1,K2 are
two algebraic closures of a field F, there is an isomorphism φ : K1 → K2 which is the identity
map on F (see, e.g., Artin 1991, 528 (1)). This suggests that if invariance is measured with
respect to algebraic closures only, the immanent axioms of field theory are categorical.
26“Auch fu¨r die metaphysischen Spekulationen u¨ber eine Welt der Dinge an sich hinter der
Erscheinungen hat dieser Gedanke aufkla¨renden Wert. Denn es ist bei einer solchen Hypothese
klar, dass die Erscheinungswelt der absoluten isomorph sein muß (wobei freilich die Zuordnung
nur in der einen Richtung Ding an sich→ Erscheinung eindeutig zu sein braucht); denn “wir sind,
wenn verschiedene Wahrnehmungen sich uns aufdra¨ngen, berechtigt, daraus auf Verschiedenheit
der reellen Bedingungen zu schließen” (Helmholtz, Wissenschatliche Abhandlungen, II, S. 656).
Wenn wir also auch die Dinge an sich nicht kennen, so wissen wir doch genau so viel u¨ber sie
wie u¨ber die Erscheinungen.”(Weyl 1927a, 22 (198), Eng. tr., 26 (211))
134
clear that the content of a physical theory interpreted over the domain of percep-
tual experience is more evident than the content of the same theory interpreted
over the domain of objects in the mind-independent world. If categoricity is re-
stricted to interpretations on which the content of the theory is most evident,
or at least as evident as the content of the same theory when interpreted over
the domain of perceptual experience, then categoricity would be insufficient for
objectivity. This suggests that objectivity requires not only categoricity, but also
that the mind-independent world can really be taken as an interpretation of the
theory. But why would this be the case?
Secondly, even if categoricity is not restricted in this way, and the mind-
independent world may be taken as an interpretation of the theory, how might
one justify, without begging the question of objectivity, the view that the required
isomorphism between our perceptual experience and the mind-independent world
actually obtains? On the face of it, it seems obvious that there should be more
mind-independent objects than perceptions, so that such an isomorphism cannot
obtain.27 To see how Weyl attempted to address these questions, we need to look
more closely at Helmholtz’ principle, invoked in the above quotation, to explain
what motivates Weyl’s acceptance of it, and what he had to say against it.
4.4 Weyl on Univocality and Concordance
In support of an isomorphic mapping of the relations between the objects
given in perceptual experience and the relations between the objects in the mind-
independent world, Weyl invoked Helmholtz’ principle that “we are justified, when
27One might want to point out here that objectivity need not actually require isomorphism,
but rather merely a partial isomorphism between our perceptual experience and the mind-
independent world. For the notion of partial isomorphism in this context, see da Costa and
French 2003 (33).
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different perceptions offer themselves to us, to infer that the real conditions are
different.” To explain this principle, and to see how it might have been taken to
support this mapping, let us refer to Helmholtz’ famous claim, in the Treatise on
Physiological Optics, that “the law of sufficient reason is really nothing more than
the urge of our intellect to bring all our perceptions under its own control.”28 How
can this law, thus understood, help us bring perceptions under control?
In his theory of perception, Helmholtz maintained that a perception is just
a sign produced by an object.29 This belief was motivated, at least in part, by
the desire to reject the naive realist view that there exists a resemblance relation
between perceptions and objects. Obviously, Helmholtz thought, this view begs
the question of objectivity, since it assumes that one may compare perceptions
and objects, which seems to require epistemic access to objects independently
of perception. But it is not clear why he believed that the relation he thought
existed between perceptions and objects may not beg the same question. He
seems to have suggested that it is in the nature of perception to be produced by
an object, or at least that it is so under typical physiological and psychological
conditions. Although questionable, this suggestion seems to entail that the claim
that there exists a determinate relation between perceptions and objects does not
require epistemic access to objects independently of perception, and so it does not
beg the question of objectivity.
At any rate, Helmholtz maintained that “it belongs to the nature of a sign
that for the same object always the same sign be given.”30 This entails that the
same object, under the same circumstances, should always produce in us the same
28Cf. Helmholtz 1867, 34 (83).
29Cf. Helmholtz 1903 (84).
30“Zum Wesens eines Zeichens geho¨rt nur, daß fu¨r das gleiche Objekt immer dasselbe Zeichen
gegeben werde.” (Helmholtz 1903, 357 (84))
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perception. Otherwise, it could happen, for example, that the same leaf, under the
same circumstances, appear to us green, at some times, and not green, at other
times. But then our perceptions cannot be said to be under control. Helmholtz
argued that in order to prevent this to be the case, we need to stipulate the
principle that a difference in perception is always determined by a difference in
the domain of objects. He seems to have taken this stipulation to be motivated
by the law of sufficient reason.
Weyl noted that even if Helmholtz’ principle is satisfied, it may still happen
that more than one object produces the same perception. For instance, given
our perceptual limitations, different shades of green may appear to us as the
same color. Then, although for a different reason than above, our perceptions
cannot be said to be under control. Weyl maintained that in order to prevent
this to be the case, we need to stipulate another principle: “The objective image
of the world may not admit of any diversities which cannot manifest themselves
in some diversity of perceptions.”31 This principle suggests that it is scientific
objectivity that demands bringing perceptions under control. Control can be
achieved, according to Weyl, only if both principles are obeyed. But if both
principles are obeyed, then this is enough for an isomorphism between perceptions
and objects to obtain.
As we will see in the next section, Weyl actually came to doubt that this iso-
morphism can actually obtain. Nevertheless, it seems clear now that even if it
did obtain, the isomorphism between perceptions and objects would not be suf-
ficient for objectivity. For, as we have seen in the previous section, objectivity
also requires that a scientific theory be interpreted over the domain of percep-
31Cf. Weyl 1949a, 117f (211).
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tual experiences in a way that allows for a univocal correlation between scientific
concepts and our perceptions. But how can such an univocal correlation obtain?
In the previous chapter, we have seen that, on Weyl’s view, the epistemic
ideal of objectivity requires that physical concepts like force, energy, electromag-
netic field, and the like, be freely created as mere symbols with no contentual
significance. These concepts cannot be introduced through abstraction from ex-
perience, since no force, energy, or field can be directly perceived. This entails
that the interpretation of a physical theory deploying such concepts over the do-
main of perceptual experience cannot allow for an univocal correlation between
concepts and perceptions, if an univocal correlation is conceived of as a one-to-
one coordination. According to Weyl, interpreting the theory over the domain of
perceptual experience may only allow for a correlation between the entire theory
and our experience:
In the systematic theory, one should present . . . a formal scaffold of
mere symbols, without explaining what the symbols for mass, charge,
field strength, etc., mean and only afterwards explain how the entire
symbolic structure is connected with our immediate experience.32
This raises, of course, the question in what sense can a holistic correlation between
theory and experience be univocal. An answer to this question was proposed by
Hans Reichenbach, who maintained that a holistic correlation is univocal in the
sense that the methods whereby the physical quantities of interest in a theory are
measured converge: “Univocality means ... that a physical quantity, determined
32“In der systematische Theorie sollte man . . . ein Formelgeru¨st aus bloßen Symbolen
hinstellen, ohne zu erkla¨ren, was die Symbole fu¨r Masse, Ladung, Feldsta¨rke, usw. bedeuten,
und nur am Ende beschreiben, wie die ganze symbolische Struktur mit unserer unmittelbarer
Erfahrung verknu¨pft ist.” (Weyl 1949b, 311 (212))
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from different observational data, is expressed by the same measure number.”33
In other words, for Reichenbach, the criterion for univocal correlation seems to
be the sameness of numerical expressions associated with a physical quantity by
different methods of measurement. One example that he offered suggests that the
sameness relation may allow for a divergence within the margins of error due to
the experimental setup:
If, based on Einstein’s theory, one calculates a light deflection of 1.7”
by the sun, but finds instead 10”, then this is a contradiction, and such
contradictions decide always upon the validity of a physical theory.
The number 1,7” is obtained on the basis of equations and experiences
on other material. The number 10” is, in principle, not obtained in
a different manner, for it is by no means directly read off, but con-
structed from reading data with the help of quite complicated theories
of the measuring instruments. One can thus say that one chain of
calculations and experiences assigns to the real event the number 1,7,
the other the number 10, and this is the contradiction.34
The property that Reichenbach illustrated in this passage is precisely what Hilbert
and Bernays later called “external consistency” and what Weyl called “concor-
dance.” Concordance was, more precisely, defined as follows:
Concordance. The definite value, which is assigned, in a certain indi-
vidual case, to a quantity occurring in the theory, is determined on the
33“Eindeutigkeit heißt ... daß eine physikalische Zustandsgro¨ße bei ihrer Bestimmung aus ver-
schiedenen Erfahrungsdaten durch dieselbe Messungszahl wiedergegeben wird.” (Reichenbach
1920, 43 (151))
34“Berechnet man etwa aus der Einsteinschen Theorie eine Lichtablenkung von 1,7” an der
Sonne, und wu¨rde man an Stelle dessen 10” finden, so ist das ein Widerspruch, und solche Wider-
spru¨che sind es allemal, die u¨ber die Geltung einer physikalischen Theorie entscheiden. Nun ist
die Zahl 1,7” auf Grund von Gleichungen und Erfahrungen an anderem Material gewonnen; die
Zahl 10” aber im Prinzip nicht anders, denn sie wird keineswegs direkt abgelesen, sondern aus
Ablesungsdaten mit Hilfe ziemlich komplizierter Theorien u¨ber die Meßinstrumente konstruiert.
Man kann also sagen, daß die eine U¨berlegungs- und Erfahrungskette dem Wirklichkeitsereignis
die Zahl 1,7 zuordnet, die andere die Zahl 10, und dies ist der Widerspruch.” (Reichenbach
1920, 41 (151))
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basis of the theoretically posited connections and the contact with the
perceptually given. Every such determination must lead to the same
result.35
Just like Reichenbach, then, Weyl seems to have taken the criterion for an univo-
cal correlation between a theory and experience to be expressed by the notion of
concordance, which requires that the methods that proceed via highly theoretical
considerations must lead to results that agree (within the limits of experimental
error) with results obtained through observational methods. As another elemen-
tary illustration of concordance, consider the prediction of the location of a comet.
On the basis of classical mechanics, the location of a comet at a certain moment t
is calculated from observations of the location of the comet at previous moments.
The result is then compared with the direct observations of the location of the
comet at t. Concordance requires that theoretical calculations are in agreement
with direct observations.
If this is a correct interpretation of Weyl’s view, then according to him, objec-
tivity demands not only that (1) free creation be deployed as a method of concept
formation, i.e., that a scientific theory be conceived of as a transcendent axiomatic
system, but also that the theory be categorical. This means, as we have just seen,
that (2) between the concepts of the theory and our perceptions there has to be an
univocal correlation, i.e., that there must be a concordance (within the limits of
experimental error) between the various methods used to determine the numerical
values of the physical quantities in a theory, and that (3) both Helmholtz’ prin-
ciple and its Weylean converse must be obeyed, i.e., that an isomorphism must
35“Einstimmigkeit. Der bestimmte Wert, welcher einer in der Theorie vorkommenden Gro¨ße
in einem individuell bestimmten Fall zuzuschreiben ist, wird auf Grund der theoretisch geset-
zten Verknu¨pfungen und der Beru¨hrung mit der wahrnehmungsmßig Gegebenen ermittelt. Jede
derartige Ermittlung muß zu dem gleichen Ergebnis fu¨hren.” (Weyl 1927a, 87 (198); Eng. tr.,
121 (211). See also Weyl 1931, 17 (204)) Cf. Hilbert and Bernays 1939, 291 (89). See also
section 5.3 below.
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obtain between our perceptions and the objects in the mind-independent world.
Weyl eventually came to believe, nevertheless, that physical theories fail to
satisfy the condition of categoricity, for even if (2) were satisfied, there is reason
to think that (3) cannot be. He ultimately adopted, as we will see, an unsettled
position with respect to scientific objectivity. In the next two sections, we want
to clarify his reasons for adopting such a position.
4.5 The Non-Categoricity of First-Order Theories
In the 1950s, toward the end of his career, Weyl explicitly noted the failure of
categoricity in current physics, and came to conclude that objectivity may remain
an unattainable epistemic ideal:
The truth as we see it today is this: The laws of nature do not de-
termine univocally the one world that actually exists, not even if one
concedes that two worlds arising from each other by an automorphic
transformation, i.e., by a transformation which preserves the universal
laws of nature, are to be considered the same world.36
Who could seriously pretend that the symbolic construct is the true
real world? Objective Being, reality, becomes elusive; and science no
longer claims to erect a sublime, truly objective world above the Slough
of Despond in which our daily life moves. ... the objective Being that
we hoped to construct as one big piece of cloth each time tears off;
what is left in our hands are – rags.37
In this section, we want to present some of the reasons for Weyl’s ultimate position
on scientific objectivity. But first we would like to note that, as a matter of fact, he
expressed doubts that physical theories could actually satisfy the requirement of
categoricity as early as 1927. Such doubts transpire, for example, in the following
36Cf. Weyl 1952, 27 (213).
37Cf. Weyl 1954b, 627 (216).
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passage from his Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science:
The positing of the real external world does not guarantee that this
constitutes itself from appearances through the cognitive work of rea-
son establishing concordance. For this much more is needed – that the
world be ruled by simple elementary laws. The mere positing of the
external world does not actually explain what it nevertheless ought to
explain, and the question about its reality mingles inseparably with
the question about the reason for the lawful-mathematical harmony of
the world. The ultimate answer lies, thus, beyond all knowledge, in
God alone.38
This passage seems to suggest that, on Weyl’s view, concordant scientific theo-
ries are not able to provide knowledge about the mind-independent world. But
what motivated this view? According to him, as we have seen in the previous
section, objectivity requires, beside concordance, that our perceptions be isomor-
phic with the objects of the mind-independent world. If such an isomorphism
obtained, it would entail that the simple laws of physics actually apply to the
mind-independent world. According to Weyl, however, this assumes without jus-
tification that the world itself is simple, rather than complex. But whether this is
so can be known, he seems to have believed, only by its creator.
Perhaps a more convincing reason for the claim that scientific theories fail
to be categorical is the fact that first-order theories with an infinite model have
non-isomorphic models – a fact of which Weyl was of course aware, since it is a
consequence of the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem. Indeed, as early as 1922, Skolem
showed that Zermelo’s set-theory is not categorical, since one can consistently
38“Die Setzung der realen Außenwelt garantiert nicht dafu¨r, daß diese in der Vernunft sich aus
den Erscheinungen durch die Einstimmigkeit schaffende Erkenntnisarbeit konstituiere; dazu ist
vielmehr noch no¨tig, daß sie von einfachen Elementargesetzen durchwaltet sei. Die bloße Setzung
der Außenwelt erkla¨rt also eigentlich nicht, was sie doch erkla¨ren sollte, sondern die Frage
nach ihrer Realita¨t fließt untrennbar zusammen mit der nach dem Grunde fu¨r die gesetzlich-
mathematische Harmonie der Welt. So liegt die letzte Antwort denn doch, jenseits des Wissens,
allein in Gott.” (Weyl 1927a, 89 (198), Eng. tr., 125 (211))
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build non-isomorphic models for it.39 This line of thought was also taken by
von Neumann, who also attempted to formulate new axioms, in the hope that
a categorical system would thus be obtained, but eventually concluded that “no
categorical axiomatization of set theory seems to exist at all” and more generally
that “there probably cannot be any categorically axiomatized infinite systems at
all.”40
In this context, it appears rather curious that Weyl would consider the notion
of categoricity of central importance to scientific objectivity. One might think,
however, that Weyl was not concerned with first-order theories, and that he had
nothing against quantification over property variables. But this is not true. From
his early predicativist account of analysis on, Weyl constantly rejected second-
order logic. In The Continuum, for instance, when criticizing Russell’s theory of
types, he expressed this rejection in the following terms:
A “hierarchical” version of analysis is artificial and useless. It loses
sight of its proper object, i.e., number. Clearly, we must take the
other path – that is, we must restrict the existence concept to the
basic categories (here, the natural and rational numbers) and must
not apply it in connection with the system of properties and relations
(or the sets, real numbers, and so on, corresponding to them).41
According to Weyl, quantification over property variables turns logic into a meta-
physical doctrine, as he put it in a later review of Russell’s mathematical logic:
In the resulting system [i.e., the system of Principia Mathematica]
mathematics is no longer founded on logic, but on a sort of logician’s
paradise, a universe endowed with an “ultimate furniture” of rather
39Cf. Skolem 1922, 298 (174).
40Cf. von Neumann 1925, 412 (186).
41Cf. Weyl 1918a; Eng. tr., 32 (191).
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complex structure and governed by quite a number of sweeping axioms
of closure. The motives are clear, but belief in this transcendental
world taxes the strength of our faith hardly less than the doctrines of
the early Fathers of the Church or of the scholastic philosophers of the
Middle Ages.42
But one might want to suggest that Weyl believed it possible to define the notion
of isomorphism in a predicative way, and that, consequently, he did not see any
tension between the requirement of categoricity and the rejection of second-order
logic. To the best of our knowledge, even if this was indeed his view, Weyl never
expressed it in writing.43
At any rate, the apparent tension between the rejection of second-order logic
and the requirement of categoricity for scientific objectivity was, no doubt, in-
creased by Go¨del’s “surprising” discoveries, which according to Weyl show “to
what extent the intuitively certain goes beyond what (in an arbitrary but fixed
formalism) is capable of mathematical proof.”44 More exactly, the first incom-
pleteness theorem shows that any first-order theory at least as strong as Peano
arithmetic contains an undecidable proposition p, i.e., it shows that neither p nor
not-p can be derived in that theory. That is, the theorem shows that any first-
order theory at least as strong as Peano arithmetic is syntactically incomplete.
But this entails, assuming the completeness of the underlying logic, that such a
42Cf. Weyl 1946, 272 (210).
43As a matter of fact, the conditions for the categoricity of a first-order theory have been
identified only ten years after Weyl’s death, when it was proved that if a first-order theory (in
a countable language) is k -categorical, or categorical in an uncountable cardinality k, i.e., if
it has one model of cardinality k up to isomorphism, then it is categorical in all uncountable
cardinalities (cf. Morley 1965 (138), and for a recent review Hedman 2006, 205-211 (81)). After
ten more years, the same result has been proved for first-order theories in uncountable languages
(cf. Shelah 1974 (166)).
44Cf. Weyl 1944, 126 (209).
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theory is not categorical, since it has at least two non-isomorphic models.45
Nevertheless, one could argue that all this is not enough to justify Weyl’s
ultimate position with respect to scientific objectivity. For one might suggest
that, even if Weyl rejected second-order logic in the context of his predicative
reconstruction of real analysis, he might have accepted it in the context of a
theoretical construction of the world in physics. As we have discussed above,
Weyl’s conversion to Hilbert’s formalism seems to have been motivated by the
idea that the method of transcendent axiomatics is necessary for the theoretical
construction of the world, that is, for the formation of physical theories capable
of providing objective knowledge. And it is plausible to think that, after this
conversion, Weyl dropped his predicativist principles, at least in the context of
physics. But even if this was the case, he provided no reason that could justify the
acceptance of second-order logic as a necessary condition for scientific objectivity.
Be that as it may, perhaps the most serious challenge to Weyl’s view on scien-
tific objectivity and, thus, a stronger reason for skepticism, was provided by the
phenomenon of unitary inequivalence in quantum physics, to which we turn now.
4.6 The Non-Categoricity of Quantum Physical Theories
In order to present the problem raised by the phenomenon of unitary inequiva-
lence for Weyl’s view on scientific objectivity, let us begin by noting that he played
45We should perhaps recall that it was Huntington who had noted that categoricity entails
syntactic completeness: “A set of postulates having this property [i.e., a unique model up to
isomorphism] has been called a “categorical,” as distinguished from a “disjunctive,” set; see
Veblen 1904, 346. Every proposition concerning a class K, a relation <, and an operation +,
is either deducible from the postulates of this set, or in contradiction with them.” (Huntington
1905a, 17 (100)) Later on, Huntington noted, however, that, if the underlying logic is not
complete, certain sets of postulates might be categorical, but not syntactically complete (cf.
Huntington 1905b, 210 (101)). For a concrete example, see Corcoran 1980 (29) where a second-
order formalization of arithmetic is given, one that is categorical but cannot prove that zero is
not a successor.
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a major role in the introduction of group theory to quantum physics.46 Having
worked for some time on the abstract theory of group representations, Weyl came
to see the importance of algebra for quantum mechanics.47 He found abstract al-
gebra to be the mathematical instrument needed for overcoming the lack of unity
and mathematical rigor that characterized quantum mechanics, which was at the
time “a conglomeration of essentially different, independent, heterogeneous and
partially contradictory fragments,” as von Neumann described it.48 In particular,
Weyl noted that the wave and the matrix mechanics are equivalent, insofar as
they can be seen as interpretations of a common algebraic structure:
This newer mathematics, including the modern theory of groups and
“abstract algebra,” is clearly motivated by a spirit different from that
of “classical mathematics,” which found its highest expression in the
theory of functions of a complex variable. The continuum of real num-
bers has retained its ancient prerogative in physics for the expression
of physical measurements, but it can justly be maintained that the
essence of the new Heisenberg-Schro¨dinger-Dirac quantum mechanics
is to be found in the fact that there is associated with each physical
system a set of quantities, constituting a non-commutative algebra in
the technical mathematical sense, the elements of which are the phys-
ical quantities themselves.49
However, given that the algebra associated with the observables in a physical sys-
tem could have different interpretations, the question arises under what conditions
could these observables be univocally determined up to isomorphism? To answer
46Of course, in the early 1920s, Wigner also played a major role in this direction, as his work
in chemistry and crystallography made him realize that group theory immensely facilitated
his calculations, and eventually led him to also realize its significance for quantum mechanics.
Wigner was actually the first to express various symmetries of a quantum system in terms
of groups of rotations and permutations (cf. Wigner 1927 (219), Wigner 1931 (220)). For
discussion, see Chayut 2001 (26))
47Cf. Weyl 1927b (199). See also Mackie 1988 (125).
48Cf. von Neumann 1932, 4 (188).
49Cf. Weyl 1928b, viii (201).
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this question, let us start with the basics and consider a physical system consisting
of a free particle with one degree of freedom.50 The observables that characterize
the system (i.e., momentum and position) are standardly associated self-adjoint





Momentum and position, let us note, are implicitly defined by the Heisenberg com-
mutation relation. The question is whether they can be univocally determined,
and if so under what conditions. Since P and Q are unbounded, PQ − QP is
not everywhere defined on the Hilbert space, and thus the Heisenberg commuta-
tion relation does not always have a solution. To overcome this problem, Weyl
reformulated the Heisenberg commutation relation in terms of unitary operators,
U(α) = e
2pii
~ αP , V (β) = e
2pii
~ βQ, for any real numbers α and β. These unitary
operators are bounded and, thus, PQ−QP is defined everywhere in the Hilbert
space. This eliminates the cases in which the Heisenberg commutation relation
has no solution.51 The commutation relation is reformulated accordingly:
U(α)V (β) = e
2pii
~ αβV (β)U(α)
The advantage of this new equation – the Weyl commutation relation – is that its
solutions make possible the univocal determination of momentum and position.
This idea was formulated by Marshall Stone, without rigorous proof, as a theorem,
which was subsequently proved by von Neumann: a system of unitary operators
50We follow here von Neumann 1931 (187) and speak of one degree of freedom for the sake of
simplicity of notation. But the same considerations apply for a system with any finite number
of degrees of freedom.
51Cf. Weyl 1928b, IV, 14 (201). See also von Neumann 1931, 571 (187).
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U(α), V (β) that obey the Weyl commutation relation is univocally determined up
to unitary equivalence, or is reducible to such systems.52
As Stone noted, the significance of the theorem had been already pointed out
by Weyl.53 The theorem justifies Weyl’s claim that the various formulations (by
Schro¨dinger, Heisenberg, and Dirac) of the quantization of a physical system are
equivalent, in the rigorous sense that they are unitarily equivalent representations
of the same operator algebra on the Hilbert space, that is, the algebra determined
by the Weyl commutation relation. But it is not clear what Weyl thought about
the conditions that have to be assumed in order for the theorem to hold.
There are two main conditions that have to be met for the Stone-von Neumann
theorem to hold. First, as we have seen, one has to substitute unitary operators
U(α), V (β) for unbounded operators P and Q. In other words, one has to refor-
mulate the Heisenberg commutation relation as the Weyl commutation relation.
Without this reformulation, the Hilbert space representations of the Heisenberg
commutation relation are not unitarily equivalent, for there are representations
in which it has no solutions, i.e., representations in which momentum and po-
sition cannot be determined. However, we know today that this reformulation,
although necessary, is not sufficient for unitary equivalence. There exist unitarily
inequivalent representations of systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom,
whose observables obey the Heisenberg commutation relation, but not the Weyl
52Cf. Stone 1930, 174 (176) and von Neumann 1931, 577 (187). More rigorously, for a Hilbert
space H and a structure preserving mapping pi from an abstract algebra A to H, any irreducible
representation (H, pi) of A is univocally determined up to a unitary transformation (bis auf eine
unita¨re Transformation eindeutig festgelegt). Any two representations (H1, pi1) and (H2, pi2) are
unitarily equivalent if and only if there is a unitary operator Uˆ : H1 → H2 such that pi1(A) =
Uˆpi2(A)Uˆ
∗ for all elements A ∈ A.
53Weyl was indeed aware of the Stone-von Neumann theorem. He acknowledged Stone’s




Secondly, and more importantly, the Stone-von Neumann theorem applies only
to physical systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom. If one considers
physical systems with an infinite number of degrees of freedom (i.e., an infinite
number of particles and an infinite volume), as in quantum statistical mechanics
and quantum field theory, unitary equivalence fails. In the case of physical sys-
tems with an infinite number of degrees of freedom, this theorem is false, since
the algebra determined by the Weyl commutation relations possesses an infinity
of unitarily inequivalent representations. This is significant for Weyl’s view on
scientific objectivity, for unitary inequivalence entails that a theory describing a
system with an infinite number of degrees of freedom fails, in an appropriate sense,
to be categorical. This shows that, on his view, our predictively most successful
theories do not provide objective knowledge.
This is a serious challenge, which philosophers attempted to respond to in
recent literature. The first response points out that the failure of the Stone-von
Neumann theorem just indicates the need to adjust our physical theories in a way
that allows us to regain unitary equivalence. The second response emphasizes that
one needs to alter, in a certain sense, the conditions under which objectivity may
obtain, despite the failure of this theorem. But it may be argued that neither of
these responses addresses the challenge in a fully satisfactory manner, although
the latter is, as we will see, more promising.
One recent proposal for the adjustment of quantum field theory is to eliminate
the unitarily inequivalent representations, and simply consider fields as if they
had only a finite number of degrees of freedom.55 The proposal is based on the
54Cf. Schmu¨dgen 1983 (162).
55Cf. Wallace 2006 (189).
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assumption that at least some degrees of freedom (i.e., those at short distance and
high energy) may be considered a “pure mathematical artefact,” which is taken
to justify the belief that their corresponding Hilbert space representations can be
“cut off” as having no physical significance. The cut-off procedure is meant to
establish that the resulting theory, the so-called effective quantum field theory,
has only one unitary equivalence class of representations.
However, one problem with this proposal is that, even if unitarily inequiva-
lent representations are physically insignificant, by cutting them off one loses an
important heuristic tool for the development of a physical theory. To see this, con-
sider an analogy with mathematics, where non-categoricity is sometimes thought
to provide precisely such a tool. John Wesley Young had emphasized, already in
1911, the heuristic advantages of non-categorical systems of axioms:
Is it always desirable that the set of assumptions from which we build
up a mathematical science be categorical? The answer depends upon
the object we have in view. It is an advantage to keep the set non-
categorical as long as possible, for the reason that, if we build up a
science on a set of assumptions which is non-categorical, there will be
more than one system of things which satisfies the assumptions, that is,
there will be at least two essentially distinct concrete representations
of it. There will thus be a gain in generality. ... In general, by starting
with a non-categorical set of assumptions, we can develop a part of
several abstract sciences at the same time. We obtain, in that way, a
theory which may be part of a great many different theories.56
Young seems to have thought that the existence of non-isomorphic interpretations
of an axiomatic system is a significant advantage, in that its efficiency with respect
to the development of a theory is greater than that of a categorical system. The
elimination of non-isomorphic interpretations entails, on his view, the loss of an
56Cf. Young 1911, 49f (225).
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important tool, and should, therefore, be postponed until after a certain stage
in the development of the theory. Similarly, one could argue, the elimination
of the unitarily inequivalent representations of a physical theory may not be a
heuristically optimal procedure, even if they are physically insignificant.
But a more serious problem with this elimination stems from the fact that
these representations are actually not physically insignificant. For an illustration
of this problem, let us briefly consider how unitary inequivalence helps one ac-
count, in quantum mechanical statistics, for phase transitions. Examples of such
transitions are evaporation, magnetization, superconductivity, and the like. The
classical thermodynamic description of a physical system says that, at certain tem-
peratures and pressures, the system can be in multiple phases at equilibrium. For
example, at a temperature of -38.83C and a pressure of 0.2mPa, mercury exists
at equilibrium in three phases, solid, liquid, and gas. Also, water, ice and steam
coexist at 0.01C and 611Pa. In quantum statistical mechanics, in order to account
for phase transitions, that is, to derive the equations that govern the behavior of a
physical system undergoing such transitions, one typically considers the system in
the thermodynamic limit. In other words, one stipulates that the physical system
has an infinite number of degrees of freedom, i.e., an infinite number of particles
and an infinite volume, but a finite density. Unless the system is considered in
the thermodynamic limit, the partition function that describes its behavior does
not display any singularities, i.e., any non-analyticities in the free energy.
It is easy to see the consequence of adjusting quantum statistical mechanics
by eliminating unitarily inequivalent representations. Such an elimination makes
it impossible to account, in quantum statistical mechanics, for phase transitions,
and also entails that there is no physical difference between the multiple phases
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a system may be in at equilibrium.57 Thus, in quantum mechanical statistics,
unitarily inequivalent representations are, in a certain sense, indispensable for an
account of natural phenomena like phase transitions and, therefore, ought not to
be eliminated.
However, the problem raised by the elimination of unitarily inequivalent repre-
sentations in quantum mechanical statistics may strike one as irrelevant to quan-
tum field theory. Indeed, the argument that it is wrong to consider in quantum
field theory a physical system as if it had only a finite number of degrees of freedom,
because in quantum mechanical statistics one needs to consider a physical system
as if it had an infinite number of degrees of freedom, might seem unconvincing.
For one might easily question the justification of the latter claim by denying that
going to the thermodynamic limit is the right approach to phase transitions.58 It
would presumably be more convincing to argue that it is wrong to consider in
quantum field theory a physical system as if it had only a finite number of degrees
of freedom, because considering that physical system as having an infinite number
of degrees of freedom is necessary. But is it necessary, in quantum field theory,
to consider a physical system as having an infinite number of degrees of freedom,
rather than to consider it as if it had only a finite number of degrees of freedom?
The answer to this question is yes: unitarily inequivalent representations are in-
dispensable for providing an account of the natural phenomena to which quantum
field theory applies. For the equations that govern such phenomena are typically
derived as the result of spontaneous symmetry breaking, and spontaneous sym-
metry breaking is understood as the singling out of one unitary equivalence class
57Cf. Ruetsche 2003, 1335-1338 (155).
58See, e.g., Callender 2001 (24).
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among the infinitely many unitarily inequivalent representations of the theory.59
The underlying idea that one cannot dispense with unitarily inequivalent rep-
resentations in quantum field theory suggests another response to the challenge
raised by unitary inequivalence against Weyl’s view on objectivity. This response
admits that one should not eliminate these representations, and proposes instead
that one adopt a “profoundly modal” conception of structure, that one should
“modally expand the relevant notion of structure.”60 In other words, objectivity
would require a modal expansion of the abstract algebra of quantum field theory,
that is, the algebra determined by the Weyl commutation relations. The result
“would have to be viewed as a structure that effectively spans physically possible
worlds, rather than being confined to the actual one.” But how can this modal
structure be defined? And how is it supposed to support objectivity?
The suggestion here is meant to accommodate the fact that no unitary equiva-
lence class of representations can, by itself, provide knowledge about the structure
of the real world, for reasons already discussed above. So the modal structure that
one should search for cannot be that of a particular unitary equivalence class of
representations. Instead, it may be taken to be a structure defined by the rela-
tions between unitarily inequivalent representations themselves. But even if such
a structure may be defined, what does it mean to say that it “spans” physically
possible worlds? This seems to assume that unitarily inequivalent representations
describe physically possible worlds. But can all of them do so? If not, which
of them do? What is it that renders a representation of the abstract algebra
physically possible? How can one distinguish the unitarily inequivalent represen-
59Cf. Earman 2004 (42).
60Cf. French 2010 (70). The view that quantum physics describes the “modal structure of
the world” is also defended in Ladyman and Ross 2007 (117).
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tations that describe physically possible worlds from those that describe physically
impossible worlds?
Let us suppose that a criterion can be found that identifies all unitarily in-
equivalent representations that describe physically possible worlds.61 The view
about objectivity that seems to be supported by this response to the challenge
under consideration is, we have to note, essentially different from Weyl’s own
view, since it allows – indeed it demands – that the requirement of categoricity
be dropped. On this view, the structure of the real world is defined not by the
abstract algebraic structure of a theory, but by the “modal” structure determined
by the relations between the unitarily inequivalent representations of that abstract
algebraic structure. But if the real world may be represented in this way, then, as
we briefly explain below, the real world must be considered modally dappled.
The notion of a dappled world has been motivated by the observation that the
methodology of natural science, i.e., its predictive and explanatory strategies, are
diverse rather than uniform. This determined some to believe that the world is
dappled, in the sense that it is ontologically diverse, rather than uniform, and that
scientific methods and laws apply locally, rather than globally.62 For instance,
in phenomenological theories, like hydrodynamics, laws apply only to a certain
domain of objects, and they do so only under certain conditions. Similarly, in
the theories of fundamental physics, like quantum field theory, laws apply to a
61One criterion that has been proposed for identifying unitarily inequivalent representations
that describe physically possible worlds is given by the so-called Doplicher-Haag-Roberts the-
ory, according to which, the representations that should be taken to describe physically possible
worlds are those that are locally different from a vacuum representation, i.e., one that corre-
sponds to the vacuum state of the physical system under consideration (where local differences
between representations are determined by the excitations of the vacuum state). Hans Halvorson
takes this criterion to support a position that he calls “representation realism” (Halvorson 2006
(80)).
62Cf. Cartwright 1999 (25).
154
different domain of objects, and they do so, again, only under certain conditions.
This is, of course, a controversial issue. One has recently argued, for instance,
that methodological and nomological diversity does not entail ontological diver-
sity. Thus, theories might be dappled, but not the world itself.63 Whereas the
ontology of the so-called phenomenological theories is one of idealized objects, like
continuous fluids, the ontology of fundamental physics is not: quarks and gluons,
or some such other things to be discovered, are what the real world is made of.
This argument has been, in turn, criticized from an instrumentalist perspective,
by pointing out that the ontology of fundamental physics is as idealized as that
of a phenomenological theory.64 Thus, the world of physics is dappled, but it
is not the real world: even if methodological and nomological diversity entails
ontological diversity, all scientific ontology is one of idealized objects.
However, the argument against the dappling of the real world can be criticized
also from a different perspective. For, as already suggested, if the structure of the
real world may be defined via the relations between the unitarily inequivalent rep-
resentations of an algebraic quantum field theory, then the real world must be, in
a certain sense, dappled. The failure of unitary equivalence in quantum field the-
ory indicates, as we have seen, that one should consider the relations between its
unitarily inequivalent representations, rather than any unitary equivalence class,
as defining the structure of the real world. But if unitarily inequivalent represen-
tations may be taken to describe physically possible worlds, it follows that the
structure of the real world should be defined via the relations between physically
possible worlds. This indicates that the real world is modally dappled, i.e., that
63Cf. Sklar 2003 (173).
64Paul Teller emphasized that quarks and gluons are idealized objects because their existence
is based on a quantization scheme that assumes a flat or regularly curved space-time (cf. Teller
2004 (179)).
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the real world is ontologically diverse, rather than uniform, in a modal sense.65
The view that the real world is modally dappled raises, to be sure, several
questions, which remain to be further investigated. For example, one might point
out, even if one could accommodate the notion of a real world as distinct from
the actual physical world, it is not clear whether all unitarily inequivalent repre-
sentations that describe physically possible worlds can be identified.66 But if one
fails to identify all unitarily inequivalent representations that describe physically
possible worlds, then one does not seem to be far better off than the advocate of
the outright elimination of unitarily inequivalent representations, for one would
seem to likewise cut off representations that may not be physically insignificant,
thereby incurring the problematic consequences recorded above.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed Weyl’s ultimate view on scientific objectivity. We
started from his observation, to which we were led in the previous chapter, that ob-
jectivity cannot be reached through wholly contentual reasoning and abstraction
(of a traditional empiricist or phenomenological variety) as a method of scientific
concept formation, but demands non-contentual or partly symbolic reasoning and
free creation as a method of concept formation, whereby concepts are defined im-
plicitly or contextually by their position as symbols in the fundamental laws of
65We should note, en passant, that the important metaphysical significance of what we called
above modal dappling is that it refuted actualism, i.e., the view according to which everything
that exists is actual, rather than fundamentalism, i.e., the view that all physical reality is
governed by fundamental laws, which was Cartwright’s main target. Drawing more general
lessons from this interaction between physics and metaphysics is left here for further closer
consideration.
66What justifies the belief, shared by the proponents of the Doplicher-Haag-Roberts criterion,
that some representations that are not locally different from the vacuum representation may not
describe physically possible worlds?
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a scientific theory. We argued that this approach to scientific concept formation
determined Weyl to believe that Hilbert’s mathematics, even if it lacks explana-
tory power, has a crucial objectifying role: it is indispensable for the formation
of objective scientific theories. We then explained the relation between objectiv-
ity and the categoricity of a theory, and presented Weyl’s notion of concordance
as a criterion for the univocal coordination between freely created concepts and
perceptual experience, which, if it is taken to hold up to isomorphism, renders a
theory complete or categorical.
After pointing out that already certain results in mathematical logic raise
doubts about Weyl’s view on objectivity, we discussed the non-categoricity of
quantum physics, suggested by the failure of the Stone-von Neumann theorem
in quantum field theory. We argued that the current proposals for coming to
terms with the existence of unitarily inequivalent representations are problematic,
since they lead to the elimination of representations that have physical significance
and, thus, may render theories unable to account for the natural phenomena that
they were designed to account for. This problem may be overcome, however,
if a criterion for identifying the representations that describe physically possible
worlds is found. In this case, the world that quantum field theory attempts to
provide scientific knowledge of turns out to be a modally dappled world, i.e., a
world whose structure spans physically possible worlds.
In the final chapter of the dissertation, we summarize the argument for Weylean
skepticism, and then argue, against this type of skepticism, that the tension that
Weyl saw between objectivity and intelligibility can be dissolved by clarifying the
relation between transcendent axiomatics and scientific understanding.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION: FREE CREATION AND UNDERSTANDING
5.1 Summary of the Main Argument
In the preceding chapters, we argued that, according to Weyl, the conditions
required for scientific objectivity could only be satisfied at the expense of intelli-
gibility, and that, conversely, the conditions required for scientific understanding
could only be satisfied by sacrificing objectivity. We take this idea to emphasize
a skeptical aspect of his philosophical thinking, perhaps its most characteristic
aspect, albeit one that contemporary scholars working on Weyl have unduly ne-
glected. In this chapter, we first summarize the argument that we presented in
support of this idea, and then criticize one of its main premises – the claim that
scientific understanding requires wholly contentual reasoning. We want to defend
the view that free creation as a method of concept formation has a significant con-
tribution to bringing about scientific understanding, which may thus be obtained
through partly non-contentual or purely symbolic reasoning, provided that one can
establish that such reasoning is simple and reliable, in a sense to be explained.
Weyl rejected the notion of understanding from within, as we have seen in
section 2.7 above, as inadequate to mathematics, i.e., as unable to account for the
kind of proof transparency required to explain why a mathematical theorem is
true. As developed along the maker’s knowledge tradition, the understanding from
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within may be taken as based on a feeling of evidence that is allegedly produced by
one’s creatorly experiences. Under the influence of Husserl’s phenomenology, Weyl
came to see, so we argued, that if one takes evidence as a feeling, one misconceives
the nature of evidence and the nature of its relation to truth. Nevertheless, he did
not fail to take note of the various attempts to consider the understanding from
within as a scientific approach to knowledge. In “Physics and Biology,” one of the
texts appended to the 1949 English edition of his Philosophy of Mathematics and
Natural Science, Weyl cited the work of Richard Woltereck, who had developed
an account of biology from the perspective of intuitive understanding:
Scientists would be wrong to ignore the fact that theoretical con-
struction is not the only approach to the phenomena of life; another
way, that of understanding from within (interpretation), is open to
us. Woltereck, in a broadly executed Philosophie der lebendigen Wirk-
lichkeit, has recently ventured to describe in some detail the “within”
of organic life.1
It might sound strange to approach biological phenomena from this perspective,
i.e., to attempt to provide objective knowledge about living organisms on the basis
of a feeling of evidence produced by one’s creatorly experiences. For, although we
may be said to have such experiences in the case of simple balances, mathematical
objects, or commonwealths, the same obviously does not hold in the case of living
organisms.2
Weyl, at any rate, noted that the conditions required for understanding from
within are entirely distinct from those required for scientific objectivity: “Both
roads run, as it were, in opposite directions. . . For objective theory the un-
1Cf. Weyl 1949a, 283 (211).
2It might seem, nevertheless, less strange to consider living organisms as if they were artefacts
and, thus, that one may have a feeling of evidence produced by one’s experiences considered as
if they were creatorly experiences. See, for example, Cheney and Seyfarth 1990 (27).
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derstanding from within can serve as a guide to important problems although it
cannot provide their objective solutions.”3 But this raises the question if, accord-
ing to Weyl, there is a different notion of understanding that, whether it serves
as a guide or not, may not conflict with objectivity. In particular, it raises the
question whether understanding, as based on a Husserlian conception of evidence
as an experience of truth, rather than on a conception of evidence as a feeling,
can provide objective solutions. Can the road of understanding, conceived of
phenomenologically, and that of scientific objectivity, run in the same direction?
Husserl’s conception of evidence as an experience of truth, which we discussed
in section 2.5 above, was developed around the idea that a proposition is evident
if and only if the meaning intentions that it is taken to express are completely
satisfied by actually presenting in intuition the intended objects. Weyl argued, as
we have seen, that this conception supports the idea that provability cannot render
evidence an improper basis for belief, which led him to conclude that Dedekind’s
principle that, in science, one ought not to believe a provable proposition without
proof is a mere epistemological perversity. Weyl also seems to have thought that
experiencing the truth of a proposition is a proper basis for understanding why
it is true, provided that the experience of truth is admitted as a proof. As we
have stressed above, an experience of truth may only be admitted as an immanent
axiomatic proof, that is, one based on wholly contentual reasoning and ideational
abstraction as a method of concept formation. Thus, the question was raised,
can ideational abstraction and contentual reasoning be sufficient conditions for
objectivity?
We have argued, in chapter three, that Weyl realized that they can not, for
3Cf. Weyl 1949a, 284 (211).
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neither traditional empiricism nor pure phenomenology can account for the possi-
bility of objective scientific knowledge. He came to believe that unless one allows
the introduction of hypothetical elements in physics, i.e., real but in principle
unobservable entities (like the electromagnetic field), one cannot overcome phe-
nomenalism, of the sort proposed, according to Weyl, in Leibniz’ monadology. But
concepts like that of an electromagnetic field should be regarded as freely created
concepts, rather than ones obtained by abstraction from intuition, since an elec-
tromagnetic field cannot be presented in intuition. This indicates that Weyl took
non-contentual or purely symbolic reasoning as necessary for scientific objectivity.
Two problems appear here. First, this view clearly leads to a tension between
the conditions required for understanding and those required for objectivity. This
tension underlies the position that we called Weylean skepticism. Secondly, the
idea that the free creation of concepts is necessary for objectivity may strike one as
less than plausible: how can knowledge acquired by means of concepts freely cre-
ated by the mind be regarded as knowledge about the mind-independent reality?
In response to the latter problem, we discussed Weyl’s requirement of categoric-
ity, i.e., the idea that a theory can be objective provided that it is categorical,
only to see that there are mathematical logical grounds for doubting that this
requirement can be satisfied (section 4.5 above), and furthermore that categoric-
ity actually fails in quantum physics (section 4.6). Thus, we argued, if objective
knowledge is to be obtained, one must drop or modify this requirement.
In the remainder of this chapter, we attempt to show that Weylean skepticism
is untenable. In order to do so, we want to identify the conditions that may be
required for scientific understanding without an experience of truth of the sort
envisaged by Husserl and Weyl.
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5.2 Einstein on Free Creation and Understanding
Let us start by emphasizing the role that hypothetical elements are normally
thought to have in bringing about scientific understanding. Boltzman, for exam-
ple, noted the following:
In order to understand the phenomena which actually occur, we may
draw conclusions from hypothetical assumptions, that is, from pro-
cesses which, though possible on analogy with similar phenomena in
other circumstances, cannot be observed and may not even be observ-
able in the future, owing to their speed or small size or something
similar.4
This remark raises, of course, a question about the exact relation between hy-
pothetical assumptions and scientific understanding. The typical answer to this
question emphasizes that there is a causal connection between the unobservable
processes and the observable natural phenomena that one purports to under-
stand. It is the existence of this causal connection that seems to provide support
for scientific understanding. For example, this seems to be the idea that underlies
Einstein’s view in the following passage:
We can distinguish various kinds of theories in physics. Most of them
are constructive. They attempt to build up a picture of the more
complex phenomena out of the materials of a relatively simple for-
mal scheme from which they start out. Thus the kinetic theory of
gases seeks to reduce mechanical, thermal, and diffusional processes
to movements of molecules – i.e., to build them up out of the hypoth-
esis of molecular motion. When we say that we have succeeded in
understanding a group of natural processes, we invariably mean that
4“Zum Zwecke des Versta¨ndnisses der wirklich gesehenen Erscheinungen ko¨nnen wir Folgerun-
gen aus hypothetischer Voraussetzung ziehen, das heißt aus Vorga¨ngen, die zwar nach sonstigen
analogen Erscheinungen mo¨glich wa¨ren, die aber – ob ihrer Schnelligkeit oder Kleinheit oder
dergleichen – direkt nicht zu sehen sind und oft auch in Zukunft nicht zu sehen sein werden.”
(quoted in Flamm 1983, 261 (63), German version on page 277)
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a constructive theory has been found which covers the processes in
question.5
According to Einstein, one may be said to bring about understanding of natural
phenomena only if a constructive theory is formulated, that is, a theory that can
reconstruct these phenomena on the basis of certain hypothetical assumptions. In
particular, one may be said to understand the observable behavior of gases just in
case a description of this behavior can be derived from the fundamental equations
of molecular motion. But why would one think that such a derivation may provide
understanding? One way of looking at this is to consider that one understands
the observable behavior of gases because the derivation of its description from the
equations is backed up by a causal connection between molecular motion and the
phenomena, i.e., the mechanical, thermal, and diffusional processes of gases.
The idea that understanding is somehow dependent on a causal connection
is quite plausible, indeed, especially if one considers more mundane examples.
For it is true that one understands, say, why one’s house burned if one knows
not only that it burned because of its faulty wiring, but also how faulty wiring
may lead to fire.6 That is, one understands why one’s house burned only if one
knows that there is a causal connection between its faulty wiring and its having
burned. This example suggests a general belief: “understanding is not some sort
of super-knowledge, but simply more knowledge: knowledge of causes.”7
However, things appear to be more complicated than this. For Einstein’s view
also suggests that the introduction of concepts like that of molecular motion, in
terms of which hypothetical assumptions – the fundamental equations of molecular
5Cf. Einstein 1919, 228 (43).
6Cf. Pritchard 2009 (149).
7Cf. Lipton 2004, 30 (121).
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motion – are formulated, is necessary for understanding. But he famously opposed
the view that scientific concepts are introduced by abstraction from perceptual
experience and, thus, that they have a direct connection with experience. There-
fore, according to Einstein, scientific understanding requires that the concepts that
are typically considered to have a direct connection with experience, as well as
the relations between such concepts, be logically derived from some fundamental
concepts and relations, which are not directly connected with experience. These
latter may, themselves, be derived from other, even more fundamental concepts
and relations, which are freely posited:
An adherent to the theory of abstraction or induction might call our
layers “degrees of abstraction”; but I do not consider it justifiable to
veil the logical independence of the concept from the sense experiences.
The relation is not analogous to that of soup to beef but rather of check
number to overcoat. ... As a matter of fact, we are dealing with freely
formed concepts.8
Hence, it seems correct to say that Einstein believed that understanding requires
that concepts be freely created, rather than created by abstraction from perceptual
experience. This indicates that, according to him, a formal axiomatic approach
to science, of the type advocated by Hilbert, is indispensable for scientific under-
standing. But if this is a correct account of Einstein’s view, then this raises doubts
about the idea that scientific understanding always requires a constructive theory,
that is, the idea, which Boltzman also seems to have had in mind, that only a
causal connection between physical processes can support scientific understand-
ing. For, on a formal axiomatic approach to natural phenomena, the derivation of
the equations governing these phenomena from the fundamental presuppositions
8Cf. Einstein 1936, 293f (45). See also Einstein 1944 (46).
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of a theory might not be backed up by any causal connection. Indeed, to give just
one example, this is the case of thermodynamic phase transitions, the derivation
of which typically requires, as we have seen in section 4.6 above, the idealizing
assumption that physical systems are infinite.
Einstein’s view raises a fundamental question about the relation between scien-
tific idealization and understanding. We want to sketch, in the following sections,
what we take to be the most plausible answer to this question, that understand-
ing requires that reasoning through idealization be controllable and simpler, in a
certain sense, than reasoning without idealization.
5.3 Understanding and Idealization Control
Scientific idealization is often said to be “the cornerstone of understanding
essential features of certain kinds of physical systems.”9 But how, more precisely,
should one conceive of the relation between idealization and understanding?
One suggestion is that idealization procedures are indispensable for scientific
understanding because they “provide the kind of detailed knowledge required to
answer causal questions.”10 Taking a physical system to the thermodynamic limit,
as in the example discussed in section 4.6 above, would thus allegedly allow one to
identify the causes of phenomena like phase transitions. But this does not seem
to be correct. For in what sense might one say that there is a causal connec-
tion between the physical processes in an infinite physical system and observable
phenomena like the phase transitions? Indeed, to see what is wrong with this sug-
gestion, one may consider again the aforementioned mundane example, in which
one seeks to understand why one’s house burned. By analogy, the suggestion seems
9Cf. Morrison 2009, 127 (139).
10Cf. Morrison 2009, 127 (139).
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to amount to the claim that in order to understand why one’s house burned, one
must consider that house as an infinite physical object, for this would reveal the
causal connection between its faulty wiring and the fire.
The relation between scientific idealization and understanding should be ap-
proached, we submit, by appeal to the notion of idealization control. One can
find this notion, for example, in the recent philosophical literature on statistical
mechanics:
The theory of the thermodynamic limit has been highly fruitful. Re-
sults may be rigorously obtained in interesting idealized cases. Fur-
thermore, there is in this theory a nice sense of “control” over the
limiting process in that one can not only prove things about the limit
but get estimates on deviation from the limit in finite cases.11
But what does it mean to say that one has a sense of control over a scientific
idealization? How could an idealization be controlled? What may be required
for this to be the case? Unfortunately, no clear conception of idealization control
seems to be available: “Admittedly this notion of controllability is one that is
vague and open-ended, and one that would require a great deal more in the way
of explication before it could be considered truly understood and a legitimate
concept to employ in methodology.”12
However, a clear conception of idealization control can be obtained by consid-
ering more closely the notion of concordance, first discussed in section 4.4 above.
According to Weyl, let us recall, concordance characterizes a scientific theory just
11Cf. Sklar 1993a, 78f (170).
12Cf. Sklar 2000, 45 (172). See also Batterman 2005, 235 (8): “The idea that some idealiza-
tions are controllable and others uncontrollable is prevalent in physics. However it is a difficult
task indeed to try to make the distinction precise. Very roughly, let us say that an idealization
is controllable means that it is possible, via appeal to theory, to compensate in some way for
the idealization.”
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in case its highly theoretical methods, which deploy scientific idealization, lead to
results that agree (within the limits of experimental error) with the results ob-
tained through observational methods. It seems natural to believe that a proof of
concordance can provide a “nice sense of control” over scientific idealization.13 In
order to prove concordance, one can point out that the use of idealization in sci-
entific reasoning renders this reasoning partly non-contentual or purely symbolic.
Thus, the suggestion here is that to gain control over idealization requires that
one prove, through contentual reasoning, that the outcome of purely symbolic
reasoning agrees with the outcome of contentual reasoning, within the limits of
experimental error.
This, of course, is basically the view defended by Hilbert. He noted, for exam-
ple in his 1919/1920 lectures, that despite progress in the foundations of mathe-
matics, the most important things – the external consistency (or concordance) of
classical analysis and the (logical) consistency of arithmetic – are still unproved.14
Hilbert thought that these proofs would definitely establish the reliability of the
13It is fair to note that Sklar, himself, gestured towards a conception of idealization control via
a “comparison between our idealized solutions and the solutions obtained when a less idealized
description of the system is invoked.” (Sklar 2000, 62 (172)) But he also noted that we need
the “theoretical resources to tell us in what ways, and to what degree, the conclusions we reach
about the idealized model can be expected to diverge from the features we will find to hold exper-
imentally of the real system in the world.” (Sklar 1993b, 258 (171)) This suggests, interestingly,
that he believes that idealization is controllable even if a theory lacks concordance, provided
that the type and extent of disagreement between observational and theoretical methods can be
accurately described in advance.
14“Zum Beispiel ist noch nicht einmal wirklich bewiesen worden, dass die Regeln fu¨r das
gewo¨hnliche mathematische Rechnen stets zu u¨bereinstimmenden Ergebnissen fu¨hren mu¨ssen.
Noch viel weiter sind wir davon entfernt, einen Beweis fu¨r die Widerspruchslosigkeit der Arith-
metik zu besitzen; vielmehr wird diese u¨berall da, wo man sonst die Widerspruchslosigkeit einer
mathematischen Theorie beweist, immer schon vorausgesetzt.” (Hilbert 1992, 34f (88)) The
same idea, that not only logical, but also external consistency, needs to be proved was later
on acknowledged also by Go¨del, who stated that in order to secure the classical rules of the
mathematical calculus, the formalist needs to show “that the rules of the equational calculus
applied to equations demonstrable in [a formal system] S between primitive recursive terms yield
only correct numerical equations (provided that S possesses the property which is asserted to
be unprovable).” (Go¨del 1972, 305 (76))
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non-contentual parts of mathematical reasoning, in the sense that consistency and
concordance proofs that proceed entirely through contentual reasoning would jus-
tify the belief that results obtained by means of non-contentual reasoning are true.
The idea that such proofs should proceed entirely through contentual reasoning
motivated his finitary attitude:
The objects of number theory are for me . . . the signs themselves,
whose shape can be generally and certainly recognized by us – indepen-
dently of space and time, of the special conditions of the production of
the sign, and of insignificant differences in the finished product. The
solid philosophical attitude that I think is required for the grounding of
pure mathematics – as well as for all scientific thinking, understanding,
and communication – is this: In the beginning was the sign.15
It seems to be clear from this passage that, according to Hilbert, a finitary at-
titude, motivated by the idea that consistency and concordance proofs should
proceed entirely through contentual reasoning, is also necessary for scientific un-
derstanding. This may be taken to mean, arguably, that in order to achieve an
idealization control that is sufficiently strong for bringing about scientific under-
standing, finitary reasoning is necessary for consistency and concordance proofs.16
Here is how Bernays explained the way such proofs are supposed to proceed.
“It was Hilbert’s idea,” Bernays wrote, “to use for this purpose [i.e., for the
purpose of giving consistency and concordance proofs] the symbolic formalizing of
mathem[atical] theories, so that instead of conceptual structures we get figurative
structures.’17 For example, in order to prove the concordance of classical analysis,
one must consider its conceptual structure as a figurative structure and show that
15Cf. Hilbert 1922, 1121f (86).
16Of course, precisely what Hilbert considered to be finitary reasoning has been a matter of
debate, which need not concern us here. For discussion, see Zach 2001 (226), chapter 4.
17Manuscript Hs973:18, in the Bernays collection at the ETH Zu¨rich.
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no symbolic expression of contradiction could be derived by following its formal
rules of reasoning. Similarly, in order to prove, say, quantum statistical mechan-
ics concordant, one must take its conceptual structure as a figurative structure
and show that it is impossible to derive a symbolic expression of contradiction by
following its formal rules of reasoning. More precisely, one has to prove that it is
impossible to derive a symbolic expression of a deviation – larger than experimen-
tal error – of the results based on theoretical methods from the results obtained
by observational methods.
Adopting a finitary attitude, i.e., regarding the conceptual structure of a the-
ory as a figurative structure, is thus necessary for obtaining idealization control.
One can argue that the kind of idealization control provided by a finitary proof
of concordance can guarantee that the epistemic quality of scientific results is not
vitiated by idealization, since the (meta-theoretical) evaluation of the correspond-
ing figurative structures does not involve idealization, i.e., it proceeds entirely by
means of contentual reasoning.18 Thus, epistemic quality is not vitiated because
a finitary proof of concordance can show that reasoning through idealization is as
justificatorily powerful as reasoning without idealization.
Here we encounter two problems. First, one might deny that this is really the
epistemic significance of a finitary proof of concordance. Weyl himself came to
believe that, in fact, neither concordance nor consistency needs to be proved, and
he argued, as we will see in the next section, that the formalist commitment to
proving them is unjustified. Was Weyl right in thinking so, or did he merely fail
to realize the epistemic significance of such proofs? Secondly, one might insist
that even if concordance could be established, and so even if idealization could be
18For a defense of this interpretation of Hilbert’s view, see Detlefsen 1986 (38).
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controlled, this is not sufficient for understanding. We should, therefore, ask what
further conditions, if any, might be required for reasoning through idealization to
be (at least) as explanatorily powerful as reasoning without idealization. We shall
offer a tentative answer to this question in section 5.5 below.
5.4 Weyl on Consistency and Concordance Proofs
As emphasized in section 4.2 above, Weyl seems to have believed that prov-
ing consistency and concordance is insufficient for vindicating Hilbert’s formalism
with respect to mathematical understanding. In this section, we want to show
that, after Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, Weyl thought that proving
consistency and concordance was not necessary, either. An argument for the lat-
ter claim can be found in the following passage:
[The formalist’s] interest in the fact that no contradiction occurs can
hardly be justified or can at most be justified by the following remark.
If two games lead to the formulas b and ∼b, then, if a is an arbitrary
given formula, it is possible to obtain the formula a by two additional
moves, as final result. It is consequently a priori certain that one can
prove any arbitrary formula a and one has a simple fixed rule according
to which to do it. In this case the game would be tedious; still it would
only be tedious if I knew the contradiction.19
The argument that Weyl attributed to the formalist as a means to justify the
commitment to proving consistency seems to be the following. If a contradiction
exists in a system, then one knows that (and how) every formula can be derived
in the system. But if one knows that (and how) every formula can be derived,
then the game of proving is a tedious one. According to Weyl, the formalist’s
motivation to prove consistency stems from the desire to show that this game is
19Cf. Weyl 1929, 158 (202).
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not tedious.
Weyl considered this a bad argument. On his view, the existence of a con-
tradiction is not itself enough to make the proving game tedious. Rather, the
contradiction has to be known, for only if one knows the contradiction can one
know that (and how) every formula can be derived in the system. Thus, ac-
cording to Weyl, since tediousness is a consequence of known inconsistency, but
not a consequence of unknown inconsistency, the formalist’s motivation to prove
consistency, and thereby show that the game is not tedious, is misguiding, if no
contradiction has been yet revealed in the system.
The formalist could point out, nevertheless, that while a system might be
tedious only if one knew a contradiction, an inconsistent system would be worthless
as a cognitive tool even if one didn’t. For, its unknown inconsistency implies
its unreliability, which entails that the formulas that are actually proved in the
system are not properly justified. That one is not aware of their lack of proper
justification does not, of course, turn their actual proofs into proper justifications.
The formalist’s motivation to prove consistency does not stem, then, from the
desire to show merely that the proving game is not tedious, but rather from the
desire to show that it is not unreliable.
Some denied, however, that only a consistency proof can establish reliability.
Wittgenstein, as is well known, famously set out “to alter the attitude to con-
tradiction and to consistency proofs.”20 His motivation for doing so was given
by the attempt to understand what a purported consistency proof might achieve.
Wittgenstein asked: “How can a proof have put the calculus right in principle?
How can it have failed to be a proper calculus until this proof was found?”21
20Cf. Wittgenstein 1956, 213 (222).
21Cf. Wittgenstein 1956, 219 (222).
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and suggested that the idea that only a consistency proof can show that a for-
mal system is reliable is simply based on a misunderstanding. For suppose, said
Wittgenstein, that
I wanted to play this game in such a way as to follow rules “me-
chanically” and I “formalized” the game. But in doing this I reached
positions where the game lost all point; I therefore wanted to avoid
these positions “mechanically”. – The formalization of logic did not
work out satisfactorily. But what was the attempt made for at all?
(What was it useful for?) Did not this need, and the idea that it
must be capable of satisfaction, arise from a lack of clarity in another
place?22
The formalist’s commitment to proving consistency stems, Wittgenstein added,
from a lack of clarity with respect to the nature of a mathematical proposition.
Mathematical propositions are, on his view, rules of syntax, instructions that tell
us how to proceed.23 Can two rules, he asked, contradict one another?
Suppose two of the rules were to contradict one another. I have such
a bad memory that I never notice this, but always forget one of the
two rules or alternately follow one and then the other. Even in this
case I would say everything’s in order. The rules are instructions how
to play, and as long as I can play they must be right. They only cease
to be all right the moment I notice that they are inconsistent, and the
only sign for that is that I can’t apply them any more. For the logical
product of the two rules is a contradiction, and the contradiction no
longer tells me what to do. And so the conflict only arises when I
notice it. While I could play there was no problem.24
Hence, just like Weyl, Wittgenstein believed that if no contradiction is known, then
the formalist’s commitment to proving consistency has no serious motivation, even
22Cf. Wittgenstein 1956, 217 (222).
23Cf. Wittgenstein 1975, 145 (223).
24Cf. Wittgenstein 1975, 321f (223).
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if the system is actually inconsistent. For, on his view, only known inconsistency
implies unreliability.25 The search for a consistency proof, Wittgenstein further
suggested, is motivated only by Hilbert’s anxiety to “set our minds at rest.” But,
according to Wittgenstein, as long as we are not aware of a contradiction, our
minds should not need to be set at rest at all. Mathematics, in other words, does
not need a consistency proof in order to be considered reliable.
Wittgenstein’s position regarding the significance of a consistency proof is as
untenable as Weyl’s own view, since one can similarly point out that an inconsis-
tent system would be unreliable even if one were not aware of its inconsistency.
A finitary consistency proof was meant to establish that no inconsistency exists
and, thus, that the system is reliable. But the desire to establish reliability does
not entail that Hilbert, himself, was skeptical about the consistency of mathemat-
ics, and that he needed a consistency proof in order to allay his own anxiety, his
own restlessness of mind.26 Rather, according to the formalist, a consistency proof
would show that a proper justification of theorems does not necessarily require the
restrictions that the intuitionist and predicativist impose on mathematical proof,
but that, as one sometimes put it, such restrictions are based on mere prejudice.27
At any rate, Weyl continued to believe that the formalist’s commitment to
proving consistency is unjustified. Fully aware of the limitations entailed by
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem with regard to the ability of a formal
axiomatic system to prove its own consistency, Weyl recommended that the math-
ematical logician ought to adopt the same attitude with regard to consistency that
the physicist adopts with regard to concordance:
25Cf. Wittgenstein 1956, 219 (222). For more detailed discussions of Wittgenstein’s view on
consistency, see Shanker 1987, 220-258 (165), Rodych 1997 (152).
26For a development of this point, see Franks 2009, ch. 2 (67).
27This is, at least, how Bernays put it. Cf. Bernays 1922, 15f; Eng. tr., 219 (14).
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Do we really have to be guaranteed the consistency for eternity, or
could we just defer the revision of our formalism until a contradiction
arises from it? The mathematician can hardly accept such resignation.
The physicist, however, works with physical laws which are tested
against all known phenomena. To him, it is a matter of course that
these laws might at some point be thrown over board due to some
newly discovered facts.28
Hence, Weyl advocated a view according to which the problem of consistency in
mathematics should be treated in the same way as the problem of concordance
in physics. In physics, he believed that rather than being proved, concordance
is and must be merely restored, if it is found to be lacking, that is, in case of
disagreement (larger than may be due to experimental error) between observation
(“newly discovered facts”) and any result obtained by reasoning through ideal-
ization. Similarly, instead of trying to prove consistency, mathematicians should
merely attempt to restore it, when they become aware of a contradiction.
This view is unsatisfactory in at least a couple of ways. It indicates once again
that Weyl failed to see the epistemic significance of a consistency proof. Without a
consistency proof, as we already pointed out, no proper justification can be given
in a system that includes transfinite components. But the view also indicates
that he failed to see the epistemic significance of a concordance proof. As we
suggested in the previous section, a concordance proof should be taken to provide
idealization control, without which no scientific understanding may be obtained.
However, even if one agrees that this is the epistemic significance of a con-
cordance proof, the question still remains whether idealization control is enough
28“Muss uns wirklich die Widerspruchslosigkeit fu¨r alle Ewigkeit garantiert werden, oder
ko¨nnen wir nicht eine etwa no¨tige Revision des Formalismus vertagen bis zu jenem Augen-
blick, da tatsa¨chlich aus ihm ein Widerspruch hervorgegangen ist? Dem Mathematiker fa¨llt
dieser Verzicht schwer. Der Physiker arbeitet mit physikalischen Gesetzen, deren Bewa¨hrung
darin liegt, daß sie mit allen bekannten Erscheinungen in Einklang stehen; ihm ist es selb-
stversta¨ndlich, daß er stets darauf gefasst sein muss, sie einmal durch neu entdeckte Tatsachen
u¨ber den Haufen geworfen zu sehen!” (Weyl 1953, 533 (214))
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for scientific understanding. Can we say that one really understands natural phe-
nomena, and that one really understands why a mathematical theorem is true, if
these are derived by provably concordant reasoning through idealization?
5.5 Understanding and Simplicity
What further conditions might be required for provably concordant reasoning
through idealization to have (at least) as much explanatory power as reasoning
without idealization? In this section, we focus on the relationship between sim-
plicity and understanding. We would like to argue that, at least in some cases,
one may understand natural phenomena derived by means of provably concordant
reasoning through idealization, provided that such reasoning is simpler, i.e., more
thought-economical, than reasoning without idealization.
Einstein, as is well known, believed that the free creation of concepts can
serve scientific understanding provided that the theoretical principles formulated
in terms of concepts freely introduced by the theorist are, in a certain sense, simple
and economical: “It is the very essence of our striving for understanding that, on
the one hand, it attempts to encompass the great and complex variety of man’s
experience, and that on the other, it looks for simplicity and economy in the
basic assumptions.”29 He also suggested that the simplicity of basic assumptions
depends on their economy, i.e., on the number of concepts used to formulate them:
“[as] the distance in thought between the fundamental concepts and laws on one
side and, on the other, the conclusions which have to be brought into relation with
our experience grows larger and larger, the simpler the logical structure becomes –
29Cf. Einstein 1950b, 357 (48). Here is also a more recent declaration: “To have theories
which we can actually apply in describing and understanding the world we have no choice but
to work with nature to do what it does not sufficiently do by itself: We must simplify further.”
(Teller 2001, 394 (178))
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that is to say, the smaller the number of logically independent conceptual elements
which are found necessary to support the structure.”30 Thus, simplicity would
require not only that the freely created concepts used to formulate the laws be
simple, as one might be inclined to believe, but also that their number be minimal.
One could ask, of course, why would fewer concepts entail simpler laws? Here
one might point out, for example, that the fewer the concepts used in formulating
the basic laws, the fewer the symbols used to express them. One might also argue
that the fewer the concepts used in formulating the basic assumptions, the fewer
the number of entities, or kinds of entities, postulated by the theory.31 But one
should emphasize perhaps that it is not only simplicity of basic laws, but simplicity
of reasoning as well, that would be needed for scientific understanding. For, in
the practice of science, as Weyl so often pointed out, the simplicity of laws may
be often obscured by the complexity of reasoning.
The question about the criteria for simplicity of reasoning was considered by
Hilbert as one of the most fundamental epistemological questions about math-
ematics.32 The most common approach to this question regards simplicity as
a measure of descriptive length or, as one might put it, as a type of syntactic
elegance: simplicity requires the minimization of the number of symbols (and
lines) in a proof.33 But how can syntactic elegance contribute to bringing about
understanding? The answer that we suggest below is that provably concordant
reasoning through idealization may be capable of bringing about understanding
30“Der gedankliche Abstand zwischen den grundlegenden Begriffen und Grundgesetzen einer-
seits und den mit unseren Erfahrungen in Beziehung zu setzenden Konsequenzen andererseits
immer mehr zunimmt, je mehr sich der logische Bau vereinheitlicht, d.h. auf je weniger lo-
gisch voneinander unabha¨ngige begriffliche Elemente man den ganzen Bau zu stu¨tzen vermag.”
(Einstein 1934, 273 (44))
31For recent discussions of these old ideas, see, e.g., Barnes 2000 (7), Baker 2003 (6).
32See Hilbert 1918, 1113 (85) and, for a historical account, Thiele 2003 (180).
33For an overview, see Pudla´k 1998 (150).
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only if its syntactic elegance renders it more thought-economical than reasoning
without idealization.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Ernst Mach maintained that science, as
developed by biological organisms like us, can be conceived of as an adaptation,
that is, as an optimization strategy for obtaining genuine scientific knowledge of
natural phenomena – a strategy that maximizes epistemic benefits and minimizes
epistemic costs:
Within the short span of a human life and with man’s limited powers
of memory, any knowledge worthy of the name is unattainable except
by the greatest economy of thought. Science itself, therefore, may be
regarded as a minimum problem, consisting of the completest possible
presentation of facts with the least possible expenditure of thought.34
If Mach is right that science can be regarded as an optimization strategy, then sci-
ence strives for maximizing epistemic benefits and, at the same time, minimizing
epistemic costs. On his view, epistemic benefits are maximized when science pro-
vides the most complete presentation of facts, and epistemic costs are minimized
when the presentation is most thought-economical. According to Mach, scien-
tific idealization (for instance, the concept of a space of more than three dimen-
sions) is essential in this respect: reasoning through idealization is most thought-
economical because it focuses attention on signs and operations with signs, rather
than on the objects signified and the operations with such objects. That purely
syntactic operations are most thought-economical is obvious, Mach believed, in
mathematics:
34“In der kurzen Zeit eines Menschenlebens und bei dem begrenzten Geda¨chtnis des Men-
schen ein nennenswerthes Wissen nur durch die gro¨sste Oekonomie der Gedanken erreichbar
[ist]. Die Wissenschaft kann daher selbst als eine Minimumaufgabe angesehen werden, welche
darin besteht, mo¨glichst vollsta¨ndig die Thatsachen mit dem geringsten Gedankenaufwand
darzustellen.” (Mach 1883, 461 (124); Eng. tr., 490)
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Even a total disburdening of the mind can be effected in mathematical
operations, for operations of counting hitherto performed are symbol-
ised by mechanical operation with signs, and our brain energy, instead
of being wasted on the repetition of old operations, is spared for more
important tasks. The merchant pursues a like economy, when, instead
of directly handling his bales of goods, he operates with bills of lading
or assignments of them.35
Hence, on Mach’s view, if science can be regarded as an optimization strategy,
and if reasoning through idealization is more thought-economical than reasoning
without idealization, then one is justified to deploy reasoning through idealiza-
tion in attempting to provide genuine scientific knowledge, i.e., the most complete
presentation of facts. One might similarly argue that if science strives to bring
about understanding of natural phenomena in the most efficient way, and if rea-
soning through idealization is, as a matter of fact, more thought-economical than
reasoning without idealization, then one is justified to deploy reasoning through
idealization in attempting to bring about understanding.
But this argument is open to criticism. Mach, himself, acknowledged that
reasoning through idealization is typically believed to cause unintelligibility. He
also claimed, however, that this criticism is due to a failure to see science as an
optimization strategy:
The mathematician who pursues his studies without clear views on
this matter [i.e., on the nature of science] must often have the uncom-
fortable feeling that his paper and pencil surpass him in intelligence.
Mathematics, thus pursued as an object of instruction, is scarcely of
more educational value than busying oneself with the Cabala. On the
35“Bei mathematischen Operationen kann sogar eine ga¨nzliche Entlastung des Kopfes ein-
treten, indem man einmal ausgefu¨hrte Za¨hloperationen durch mechanische Operationen mit
Zeichen symbolisiert und statt die Hirnfunction auf Wiederholung schon ausgefu¨hrter Operatio-
nen zu verschwenden, sie fu¨r wichtigere Fa¨lle spart. Aehnlich sparsam verfa¨hrt der Kaufmann,
indem er, statt seine Kisten selbst herumzuschieben, mit Anweisungen auf dieselben operirt.”
(Mach 1883, 459 (124); Eng. tr., 488)
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contrary, it induces a tendency toward mystery, which is pretty sure
to bear its fruits.36
Thus, Mach considered that although one is right to believe that symbolic rea-
soning may be a cause of unintelligibility in educational contexts, one is wrong to
think that this is so in scientific practice. An optimization strategy for teaching
science is, as perhaps ought to be, different than an optimization strategy for
scientific research.
The above argument is also problematic, perhaps more seriously so, in that it
does not make clear one’s justification for believing that science strives to bring
about understanding in the most efficient way. Mach’s own conviction that science
is an optimization strategy may, indeed, be defended on the basis of biological
principles of adaptation, but as Husserl emphasized, this basis is epistemologically
inadequate.37 To be adequately defended, the belief that science strives to bring
about understanding in the most efficient way should be justified on a rational,
rather than biological, basis.
However, the conviction that science is an optimization strategy can be ra-
tionally justified. For Husserl, himself, took the search for the smallest possible
set of axioms for a given domain of investigation to be a consequence of what he
called the principle of maximum rationality:
If all matters of fact obey laws, there must be some minimum set of
laws, of the highest generality and maximum deductive independence,
36“Wer Mathematik treibt, ohne sich in der angedeuteten Richtung Aufkla¨rung zu verschaf-
fen, muss oft den unbehaglichen Eindruck erhalten, als ob Papier und Bleistift ihn selbst an
Intelligenz u¨bertra¨fen. Mathematik in dieser Weise als Unterrichtsgegenstand betrieben ist
kaum bildender, als die Bescha¨ftigung mit Kabbala oder dem magischen Quadrat. Nothwendig
entsteht dadurch eine mystische Neigung, welche gelegentlich ihre Fru¨chte tra¨gt.” (Mach 1883,
460 (124); Eng. tr., 489.)
37Cf. Husserl 1900, Prolegomena, chapter 9 (102). See also McGinn 1972 (132).
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from which all other laws can, by mere deduction, be derived. ... This
goal or principle of maximum rationality we recognize with insight to
be the supreme goal of the rational sciences. It is evident that it would
be better for us to know laws more general than those which, at a given
time, we already possess, for such laws would lead us back to grounds
deeper and more embracing.38
According to Husserl, identifying the smallest possible set of most general and
logically independent axioms minimizes epistemic costs while maximizing epis-
temic benefits by increasing the explanatory power of a scientific theory. This
entails that his principle of maximum rationality justifies rationally and, thus,
on his view, adequately, Mach’s conviction that science is an optimization strat-
egy. Furthermore, it suggests that the belief that science strives to bring about
understanding in the most efficient way can also be justified on a rational basis.
Nevertheless, one could point out that whereas Husserl’s principle of maxi-
mum rationality may be taken to justify thought-economy via a minimization of
axiomatic basis, it does not justify thought-economy via a minimization of the
expenditure of thought in reasoning from the axioms. One might, thus, point to
an ambiguity in the above argument: the type of optimization strategy based on
partly non-contentual or purely symbolic reasoning is not the type of optimiza-
tion strategy that scientists are justified to adopt in attempting to bring about
understanding. For, as Weyl emphasized, such reasoning lacks the complete trans-
parency given by the experience of truth that characterizes wholly contentual rea-
soning. As a consequence, the use of idealization in attempting to bring about
38“Ordnet sich alles Tatsa¨chliche nach Gesetzen, so muß es einen kleinsten Inbegriff mo¨glichst
allgemeiner und deduktiv voneinander unabha¨ngiger Gesetze geben, aus welchen sich alle u¨brigen
Gesetze in reiner Deduktion ableiten lassen. ... Dieses Ziel, bzw. Prinzip gro¨ßtmo¨glicher Ratio-
nalita¨t erkennen wir also einsichtig als das ho¨chste der rationalen Wissenschaften. Es ist evident,
daß die Erkenntnis allgemeinerer Gesetze als jener, die wir jeweils schon besitzen, wirklich das
Bessere wa¨re, sofern sie eben auf tiefere und weiter umfassende Gru¨nde zuru¨ckleiteten.” (Husserl
1900, Prolegomena 56 (102))
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understanding is not rationally justified.
Note, however, that one’s insistence on regarding the experience of truth as an
indispensable condition for scientific understanding would also entail that neither
is the type of optimization strategy based on the minimization of axiomatic basis
the type of optimization strategy that scientists are justified to adopt in attempt-
ing to bring about understanding. For if one believes that understanding why a
theorem is true requires that one experience its truth, in the phenomenological
sense clarified in chapter two of this dissertation, then one believes, as Weyl seems
to have done, that understanding why a theorem is true demands that this be as
evident as the axioms. This entails that one’s insistence on regarding the experi-
ence of truth as an indispensable condition for scientific understanding reveals a
strategy based on the maximization, rather than minimization, of axiomatic basis.
But this goes against Husserl’s own principle of maximum rationality.
Summing up, we can say that one is justified in believing that understanding
can be brought about by means of provably concordant reasoning through idealiza-
tion, provided that the requirement of simplicity, in the sense of thought-economy,
is also satisfied. Undoubtedly, the development of this view requires further work.
In particular, one would need to show that the type of reasoning whereby nat-
ural phenomena like, say, phase transitions are typically accounted for is simple
and controllable, in the senses specified above. But the little we have said here
about this view on scientific understanding seems enough to motivate resistance
to Weylean skepticism. We conclude that this type of skepticism is untenable
because, as far as we are able to see, there is no irremediable conflict between
the conditions required for scientific objectivity and those needed for scientific un-
derstanding. In opposition to what Weyl seems to have believed, it is reasonable
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to expect that scientific theories can provide an objective and intelligible account
of natural phenomena, that is, an account that justifies their mind-independent
reality and renders them understandable. However, a more detailed account of
the conditions under which one can attain objectivity without categoricity, and
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